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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ERIC R. CLARK, and CLARK &
ASSOCIATES, PLLC,

Supreme Court Case No. 44477

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P .A, an Idaho Professional Association;
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM,
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants-Respondents.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE SAMUEL A.HOAGLAND

ERIC R. CLARK

AMANDA K. BRAILSFORD

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

EAGLE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633
Eric R Clark, Clark & Associates PLLC
vs.
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A, William Fuhrman,
Christopher Graham

§

§
§
§

Location: Ada County District Court
Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel
Filed on: 03/10/2016

CASE INFORMATION

AA- All Initial District Court
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and HI)

Statistical Closures
06/28/2016
Closed

DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-OC-2016-4633
Ada County District Court
03/10/2016
Hoagland, Samuel

PARTY lNFORl\lATIO:'11

Lead Attorneys

Plaintiff

Clark, Eric Robert

Clark & Associates PLLC

Retained

208-830-8084(W)
Clark, Eric R

Clark, Eric Robert
Retained

208-830-8084(W)
Defendant

Fuhrman, William

Brailsford, Amanda Kathleen
Retained

208-342-441 l(W)
Brailsford, Amanda Kathleen

Graham, Christopher

Retained

208-342-441 l(W)
Brailsford, Amanda Kathleen

Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A

Retained

208-342-441 l(W)
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE C0t:RT

DATE.

03/10/2016

INDEX

New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed - Other Claims

03/10/2016

Complaint Filed
Complaint Filed

03/10/2016

Summons Filed
Summons Filed

03/21/2016

Amended
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

03/22/2016

Affidavit of Service
(3) Affidavit OfService (3/14/16)

03/31/2016

Notice of Appearance
Notice OfAppearance ofCounsel (Andersen Brailsford and Murphy for Defendants)
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633
04/04/2016

Notice of Hearing
Notice OfHearing

04/04/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 05/11/2016 02:00 PM)

04/04/2016

Memorandum
Defendant's Memorandum In Support OfMotion To Dismiss Amended Complaint

04/04/2016

Motion
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint

04/04/2016

Notice
Three Day Notice ofIntent to Take Default

04/12/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 05/20/2016 02:30 PM)

04/12/2016

Notice
Notice ofScheduling Conference

05/04/2016

Declaration
Declaration ofEric R. Clark in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

05/04/2016

Memorandum
Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

05/06/2016

Reply
Defendant's Reply In Support ofMotion To Dismiss

05/06/2016

Motion
Former Clients' Motion To Seal Documents Containing Informaiton Protected By AttorneyClient Privilege or Work Product Doctrine

05/06/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum In Support OfFormer Clients' Motion To Seal Documents Containing
Informaiton Protected By Attorney-Client Privilege or Work Product Doctrine

05/06/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit OfAmanda K Brailsford In Support OfFormer Client's Motion To Seal Documents

05/06/2016

Motion
Motion To Shorten Time On Motion To Strike And Motion To Seal

05/06/2016

Notice of Hearing
Notice OfHearing

05/06/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss 05/11/2016 02:00 PM) Motion To Strike, Motion To
Seal

05/06/2016

Motion
- Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to Strike Clark's Declaration and Recitation ofFacts

05/09/2016

Motion
Plaintiffs Motion For Judicial Notice And Oppositon To Defendants "Motion To Dismiss To
Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of Facts;" And "Former Clients Motion To Seal
Documents Containing Information Protected By Attorney-Client Privileged Or Work Product
Doctrine

05/09/2016

Declaration
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633
Declaration OfEric R Clark Filed In Support OfPlaintiffs Motion For Judicial Notice And
Opposition To Defendants Motion To Dismiss To Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of
Facts;" And "Former Clients Motion To Seal Documents Containing Information Protected By
Attorney-Client Privileged Of Work Product Doctrine
05/11/2016

Amended
Amended Notice Of Hearing (6/3/16@10A. M)

05/11/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 05/11/2016 02:00 PM· Hearing Vacated
Motion To Strike, Motion To Seal

05/11/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on 05/11/2016 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

05/11/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/03/2016 10:00 AM) Motion To Dismiss, Motion To Strike,
Motion To Seal, Motion To Shorten Time,

05/11/2016

CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)
Vacated

05/11/2016

CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)
Vacated
Motion To Strike, Motion To Seal Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled on
05/11/2016 02:00 PM- Hearing Vacated

05/12/2016

Continued
Continued (Scheduling Conference 06/03/2016 10:00 AM)

05/17/2016

Notice
Notice OfFirm Name Change

05/17/2016

Notice
Notice OfFirm Name Change

05/27/2016

Reply
Defendants' Reply in Support ofMotion to Strike and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Judicial Notice

05/27/2016

Reply
Former Clients' Reply in Support ofMotion to Seal Information Protected by the AttorneyClient Privilege and Work Product Doctrine

06/02/2016

Notice
Notice of Opportunity to Recuse Judge Hoagland

06/03/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference scheduled on 06/03/201610:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated

06/03/2016

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/03/201610:00AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100

06/03/2016

CANCELED Scheduling Conference (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)
Vacated

06/03/2016

Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)
Motion To Dismiss, Motion To Strike, Motion To Seal, Motion To Shorten Time, Hearing
result for Motion scheduled on 06/03/2016 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633
Court Reporter: Christy Olesek
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: less than 100
06/13/2016

Motion
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

06/13/2016

Motion
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint

06/13/2016

Memorandum
Plaintiffs Memorandum Filed in Support ofMotion for Reconsideration and Motion to Amend
Complaint

06/13/2016

Declaration
Declaration ofEric R Clark Filed in Support ofPlaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and Motion to
Amend Complaint

06/20/2016

Notice of Hearing
Notice OfHearing Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint

06/20/2016

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/15/2016 l l:30AM) Motion to Reconsider and Motion to
Amend Complaint

06/28/2016

Memorandum
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal and Motion to
Dismiss and Denying Motion/or Judicial Notice

06/28/2016

Order
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint

06/28/2016

Hearing Vacated
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 07/15/2016 l l:30AM: Hearing Vacated Motion to
Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint

06/28/2016

Civil Disposition Entered
Civil Disposition entered/or: Fuhrman, William, Defendant; Graham, Christopher,
Defendant; Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A, Defendant; Clark & Associates PLLC,
Plaintiff; Clark, Eric R, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/28/2016

06/28/2016

Status Changed
STATUS CHANGED: Closed

06/28/2016

Dismissed
Party (Clark & Associates PLLC)
Party (Clark, Eric R)
Party (Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan Gourley P.A)
Party (Fuhnnan, William)
Party (Graham, Christopher)

07/15/2016

CANCELED Motion Hearing (11 :30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)
Vacated
Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint Hearing result for Motion scheduled
on 07/15/201611:30AM: Hearing Vacated

07/19/2016

Transcript Filed
Reporter's Transcript ofProceedings Filed

07/20/2016

Judgment
Judgment
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CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633
08/02/2016

Motion
Defendant's Motion/or Fees and Costs

08/02/2016

Memorandum of Costs
Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Fees and Costs

08/02/2016

Affidavit
Affidavit ofAmanda K Brailsford in Support ofDefendants' Motion/or Attorney Fees and
Costs

08/15/2016

Objection
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion/or Fees and Costs

08/15/2016

Declaration
ofEric R Clark Filed Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Costs and Attorney Fees

08/18/2016

Memorandum
in Support ofPlaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion/or Fees and Costs

08/31/2016

Notice of Appeal

08/31/2016

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court

08/31/2016

Notice of Hearing
RE Plaintiffs Objection To Defendants Motion For Costs And Attorney Fees (9/14/16 at 4pm)

09/07/2016

fflReply
in Support ofMotion/or Fees and Costs

09/12/2016

ffl BriefFiled
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRJEF IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES

09/14/2016

Objection to Attorney Fees and Costs (4:01 PM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)

09/14/2016

ffl Court Minutes

10/18/2016

ffl Memorandum
Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion/or Costs and Attorney Fees

10/21/2016

ffl Amended Judgment
$26,386.00

10/21/2016

I 1/07/2016

Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A; Fuhrman, William; Graham,
Christopher
Against: Clark & Associates PLLC; Clark, Eric R
Entered Date: 10/21/2016
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 10/21/2016
Monetary Award:
Amount: $26,386.00
fflAmended
Amended Notice ofAppeal
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ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-OC-2016-4633
11/17/2016

fflRequest
for Additional Record
FINANCIAL INFORMATION

DATE

Defendant Fuhrman, William
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits

136.00
136.00

Balance Due as of 11/18/2016

0.00

Defendant Graham, Christopher
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits

0.00
0.00

Balance Due as of 11/18/2016

0.00

Defendant Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley P.A
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits

0.00
0.00

Balance Due as of 11/18/2016

0.00

Plaintiff Clark, Eric R
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits

350.00
350.00

Balance Due as of 11/18/2016

0.00
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FILED

MAR 10 2016
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
Sy SANTIAGO BARRIOS
O~PUTY

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CV OC 160463:3
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN
GOURLEY, P.A., an Idaho Professional
Association; William Fuhrman,
individually, and as an agent of Jones
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and
Christopher Graham, i~dividually, and
as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,

Case No. CV OC-· ----COMPLAINT
AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Fee Category: A.A. $221.00

Defendants.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel and hereby complain
and allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION

1.

This is an attorney lien case; and in particular a failure to protect

settlement funds notwithstanding notice of the attorney's lien.
PARTIES

2.

At all times relevant to these proceedings, Jones Gledhill Fuhrman

Gourley, P.A., was an Idaho Professional Association, conducting business as a
law firm, with its principle place of business in Boise, Idaho.
3.

At all times relevant to these proceedings, William Fuhrman, was an

attorney licensed to practice law in the State ofldalio, and was employed as an
attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.
4.

At all times relevant to these proceedings, Christopher Graham, was

an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, and was employed as an
attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.
5.

At all times relevant to these proceedings Defendants represented

Anfinson Plumbing and plumber Daniel Bakken who were defendants in Forbush,
et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County Case No. Case No. CV PI 1304325.
("Forbush case")
6.

At all times relevant to these proceedings Plaintiff, Eric R. Clark, was

an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho, who was operating the law firm of
Clark & Associates, PLLC, in Eagle, Idaho. 1

1

Clark and Clark & Associates; PLLC are hereinafter referred collectively as "Clark."

COMPLAINT AND DEMANP FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7.

Jurisdiction in the District Court
is proper as the amounts sought for
fit..

damages in this litigation exceed $10,000.00, the jurisdictional limit of the court.
FACTS

8.

Private First Class McQuen Forbush died the morning ofNovember

10, 2012 in an apartment at the Sagecrest Apartments in Meridian, Idaho. The
cause of death was subsequently determined.to be carbon monoxide poisoning.
9.

The water heaters installed at Sagecrest were manufactured using new

technology called "Flammable Vapor Ignition Resistant" or "FVIR."
10.

The water heater manufacturer describes "FVIR" in its Service

handbook:
Thi.s class of residential. gas water heaters meet the new ANSI
standards and testing protocols (ANSI 221.10.1) established to deal
. with the accidental or unintended ignition of flammable vapors, such
as those emitted by gasoline. YirtU:ally all gas-fired, atmospherically
vented, residential water heaters manufactured in 'the United States
with BTU ratings of75,000 or less are required to meet this new
ANSI standard effectiv~_Ju\r 1_,. ?003.
11.

As of July 1, 2003, the Federal Government had mandated that

all of water heaters manufactured had.to have thiS'technology.
12.

In April 2009, dming a service call, Bakken, then an Anfinson

Plumbing employee, removed a safety feature; what the manufacturer called a
"thermal cut off switch" or "TCO," from the water heater in the apartment where
McQuen died. This safety feature was designed to prevent the continued
production of carbon monox~de.
13.

When deposed in 2014, Peter Anfinson, owner of Anfinson Plumbing,

testified that he did not even know of or ~nderstand the "FVIR" technology.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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14.

During Anfinson's deposition, Anfinson testified that notwithstanding

"FVIR" type water heaters had been mandatory since mid-2003, Anfinson
Plumbing had no type of training or education for its employees regarding this
technology. Anfinson testified he "assumed" licensed plumbers were trained to
service water heaters using the "FVIR" technology.
15.

Bakken, although employed by Anfinson Plumbing, was untrained

and unqualified to service "FVIR" technology water heaters, yet Anfinson
Plumbing sent Bakken on service calls, including to the apartment where McQuen
died, to work on water heaters capable of producing lethal levels of carbon
monoxide if not serviced properly.
'

16.

When finding the water heater manufacture had no liability, the

district court ruled that the plumber and his employer's conduct in removing a
safety device designed to prevent carbon monoxide production was extreme and
reckless to such a degree that the manufacturer could not reasonably have foreseen
such conduct. 2
17.

Clark init~ally represented McQuen's family and his girlfriend who

was also suffered carbon monoxide poisoning but survived.
18.

Subsequently, the Spence Law Firm from Jackson, Wyoming joined

Clark as co-counsel in the Forbush case.
19.

Ultimately, due to the Spence Law Firm's malpractice and

incompetence, Clark withdrew from the case. One of several issues in contention

2

The Plaintiffs in Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County Case No. Case No. CV PI 1304325, believed the
District Court erred in its findings because there was compelling evidence A.O. Smith was aware as early as July
2004, that plumbers were mistakenly replacing the A.O. Smith specific thermocouple that contained a proprietary
safety device with a standard thermocouple, thereby rendering the WO without a safety device designed to prevent
the production of lethal carbon monoxide. However, inexplicably The Spence Firm representing the Plaintiffs in
Forbush v. Sagecrest failed to timely present this compelling evidence to the Court. It is unclear why, with the
compelling evidence that the manufacturer knew the danger but failed to warn plumbers or to put any warning signs
on the water heaters, that Anfinson Plumbing and Daniel Bakken failed to cross-claim against A.O. Smith in this
case.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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was the Spence Firm's malpractice in failing to pursue a claim for punitive
damages against Anfinson Plumbing, although Clark had obtained an expert
witness who had opined that Anfinson Plumbing's conduct was an "extreme
deviation from reasonable standards of conduct," and although the district court in
dismissing the manufacturer had ruled Anfinson Plumbing's conduct in removing a
safety device was so outrageous and reckless that it was not foreseeable.
20.

Upon withdrawing, on September 23, 2015, Clark notified the

Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. that
Clark was asserting an attorney lien "according to LC. § 3-205," and requested that
the Defendants protect Clark's lien by putting Clark's name on any payments to
the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case related to settlement of verdict. A true and
correct copy of Clark's letter is attached as Exhibit 1.
21.

In January 2016, Anfinson Plumbing and Bakken settled with the

Plaintiffs in the Forbush case for $1,000,090,00 and sent a check to the Spence
Firm.
22.

Even before.delivery to The Spence Firm, Clark's lien attached to the

settlement funds in the hands of the Defendants.
23.

Notwithstanding the actual kno.wledge that Clark had represented the

Plaintiffs in the Forbush case and despite Clark/s written request that Defendants
Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. protect Clark's lien
by listing Clark as a payee on any settlement check, Defendants Fuhrman, Graham
and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. provided the $1,000,000.00 settlement
funds to the Spence Firm without protecting Clark's lien.
24.

Thereafter, The Spence Firm and/or the Forbush Plaintiffs converted

Clark's fees.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5
(
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25.

As the Defendants had constructive and actual knowledge of Clark's

attorney lien, the Defendants owed Clark a duty to protect his lien.
'
.
..
.
.
.
26. This duty included protecting Clark's lien by complying with Clark's
'

request and placing Clark's name as a payee on the $1,000,000.00 Anfinson
Plumbing settlement check.
27.

The Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman

Gourley, P.A. breached their duty to protect Clark's lien when the Defendants
delivered the settlement check to the Spence Firm without protecting Clark lien
interest.
28.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants

Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., Clark has suffered
damages of at least $140,000.00, plus accumulating interest, costs and attorney
fees.
29.

In the _alternative, t4e Defendants are required to compensate Clark for

Clark's time and costs expended in recovering his attorney fees from The Spence
Law Firm and/or his former clients in an amount to be proven at trial.
.

.

ATTORNEY FEES
30.

The Plaintiffs hereby request an award of attorney fees according to

Idaho Code§ 121, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
31.

The Plaintiffs hereby requests a trial by jury on all contested issue in

this case.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for j_udgment against all Defendants
jointly and severally as follows:

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6
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1.

For Judgment against all Defendants for specific damages in the

amount of $140,000.00, plus accumulating pre-judgment interest;
2.

For Judgment in the alternative for Clark's damages incurred to

recover his attorney fees from The Spence Law Firm and/or his former clients.
3.

For Judgment requiring the Defendants to pay attorney fees and

litigation costs to the Plaintiffs of not less than $10,000.00 in the event default is
obtained and default judgment is entered, and the actual amount of attorney fees
and litigation costs the Plaintiffs inc~r if this matter is contested; and,
4.

For such other relief the Court determines is appropriate and proper

under the circumstances.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2016.

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiffs

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7
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9/23/2015 9:42 AM

FROM: 2

9-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

TC

Jl-1529

PAGE: 001 OF 001

CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
Real Estate • Business • Litigation
September 23, 2015
Via Facsimile
Michael Elia
Craig Stacey
MOORE & ELIA, LLP
PO Box 6756
Boise, ID 83707
Fax: (208) 336-7031

William A Fuhrman
Christopher Graham
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A
Post Office Box 1097
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529

Re: Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al; Ada County Case No. CV - PI 1304325 - Notice
of Attorney Lien
Dear Counsel:
This letter will serve as notice that I am asserting an attorney lien according to LC. § 3-205,
which attaches to any settlement or verdict. Please include my name on any settlement checks
payable to the plaintiffs or any other payments related to a verdict or judgment. Thank you.
Sincerely,

Eric R. Clark

P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com

EXHIBIT
1
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**

.

INBOUND NOTIFICATION: FAX RECEIVED SUCCESSFULLY *R

' • TIME RECEIVED
March 21, 2016 12:19:25 PM MDT

REMOTE CSID

208-939-7136

I
1

DU

i

272

PAGES

ON

8

STATUS

Received

I

3/21/2016 12:14 PM

I

FROM: 208-939-7136 CLARK ....,ASSOCIATES, A!TORNEYS AT LAW TO: 2876919

PAGE: 001 OF 008

'
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NO
FILED
•
A.M. _ _ _ _P . M - - - -

MAR 2 1 2016
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk
By SANTIAGO BARAIOS
DEPUTY

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
. Attorneys for Plaintiffs
'i

IN 1HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
'

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,

Case No. CV OC-1604633
AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN
GOURLEY, P.A., an Idaho Professional
Association; William Fuhrman,
individually, and as an agent of Jones
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and
Christopher Graham, individually, and
as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
I

ORIGINAL
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3/21/2016 12:14 PM

FROM:

939-7136 CLARK ...ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
.

l

?.876919

PAGE: 002 OF 008

i

COl\,IB NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel and hereby complain
I

and allege as follows:

:
I

'
INTRODUCTION
I

1.

I

This is an attorney lien case; and in particular a failure to protect

settlement funds notwithstanding notice of the httomey's lien.
I

PARTIESi
2.

At all times relevant to these procJedings, Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
I

Gourley, P.A., was an Idaho Professional Association, conducting business as a

l

law firm, with its principle place of business in. Boise, Idaho.
3.

At all times relevant to these proc~edings, William Fuhrman, was an
I
attorney licensed to practice law in the State o~Idaho, and was employed as an
I

attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley; P.A.
4.

At all times relevant to these proc~edings, Christopher Graham, was
/

an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho, and was employed as an
.

!

attorney with Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,.P.A.
5.

At all times relevant to these proceedings Defendants represented
I

Anfinson Plumbing and plumber Daniel Bakker who were defendants in Forbush,
et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County Case No: Case No. CV PI 1304325.
("Forbush case")
I

6.

At all times relevant to these proce~dings Plaintiff, Eric R. Clark, was
'

an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho, ~ho was operating the law firm of
Clark & Associates, PLLC, in Eagle, Idaho. 1

'

I
I

1

i

Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC are hereinafter referred co~ectively as "Clark."
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
'

I

7.

Jurisdiction in the District Court is proper as the amounts sought for
!

damages in this litigation exceed $10,000.00, the jurisdictional limit of the court.
1

FACTS
8.

1
I

Private First Class McQuen Forbu,sh died the morning of November
i

10, 2012 in an apartment at the Sagecrest Apartments in Meridian, Idaho. The
I
I

cause of death was subsequently determined to !be carbon monoxide poisoning.
9.

The water heaters installed at SagJcrest were manufactured using new
!

1

technology called "Flammable Vapor Ignition Resistant" or "FVIR."
· 10.

The water heater manufacturer deJcribes "FVIR" in its Service

handbook:
This class of residential gas water heaterk meet the new ANSI
standards and testing protocols (ANSI Z21.10.l) established to deal
with the accidental or unintended ignition of flammable vapors, such
as those emitted by gasoline. Virtually al). gas-fired, atmospherically
. vented, residential water heaters manufa~tured in the United States
with BTU ratings of 75,000 or less are r~quired to meet this new
ANSI standard effective July 1, 2003.

I
i

· 11.

I

As of July 1, 2003, the Federal G~vernment had mandated that
I

all of water heaters manufactured had to have this technology.
t

12.

In April 2009, during a service call, Bakken, then an Anfinson
I

Plumbing employee, removed a safety feature; !what the manufacturer called a
"thermal cut off switch" or "TCO," from the wkter heater in the apartment where
I

McQuen died. This safety feature was designed to prevent the continued
production of carbon monoxide.

!j
l

13.

When deposed in 2014, Peter Anfinson, owner of Anfinson Plumbing,
I

testified that he did not even know of or understand the "FVIR" technology.

I
I

'
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i

14.

During Anfinson's deposition, Anfmson testified that notwithstanding
I

"FVIR" type water heaters had been mandatory since mid-2003, Anfinson
j

Plumbing had no type of training or education for its employees regarding this
I

technology. Anfmson testified he "assumed" licensed plumbers were trained to
'

service water heaters using the "FVIR" technology.
I
!

15.

Bakken, although employed by N?fmson Plumbing, was untrained
l

and unqualified to service ''FVIR" technology ~ater heaters, yet Anfmson
I

Plumbing sent Bakken on service calls, includ~g to the apartment where McQuen
I

died, to work on water heaters capable of producing lethal levels of carbon
I

monoxide if not s~rviced properly.

I
I

I

16.

When finding the water heater manufacture
had no liability, the
!

district court ruled that the plumber and his employer's conduct in removing a
I

safety device designed to prevent carbon monokde production was extreme and
'i

.

.

reckless to such a degree that the manufacturer'.could not reasonably have foreseen
such conduct. 2
17.

I
I

!
Clark initially represented McQuen's family and his girlfriend who
I

was also suffered carbon monoxide poisoning but sUIVived.
I

18.

Subsequently, the Spence Law F~ from Jackson, Wyoming joined

Clark as co-counsel in the Forbush case.
19.

/

Ultimately, due to the Spence Lair Firm's malpractice and

l

incompetence, Clark withdrew from the case. One of several issues in contention

2

I

The Plaintiffs in Forbush, et aL vs. Sagecres~ et aL Ada County Case No. Case No. CV PI 1304325, believed the
District Cotnt erred in its findings because there was compelling evidence A.O. Smith was aware as early as July
2004, that plumbers were mistakenly replacing the AO. Smith specific thermocouple that contained a proprietary
safety device with a standard thermocouple, thereby rendering the.WO without a safety device designed to prevent
the production of lethal carbon monoxide. However, inexplicably' The Spence Firm representing the Plaintiffs in
Forbush v. Sagecrest failed to timely present this compelling evidence to the Cotnt. It is unclear why, with the
compelling evidence that the manufacturer knew the danger but failed to warn plumbers or to put any warning signs
on the water heaters, that Anfinson Plumbing and Daniel Balck.en failed to cross-claim against AO. Smith in this
case.
i
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i

I
I
!

I

was the Spence Firm's malpractice in failing t~ pursue a claim for punitive
i

damages against Anfinson Plumbing, although,Clark had obtained an expert
'

witness who had opined that Anfinson Plumbirig' s conduct was an "extreme
i

deviation from reasonable standards of conduc~," and although the district court in
:

dismissing the manufacturer had ruled Anfinson Plumbing's conduct in removing a
i

safety device was so outrageous and reckless that it was not foreseeable.
l

I

20.

Upon withdrawing, on September 23, 2015, Clark notified the
i

Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. that
I

Clark was asserting an attorney lien "according to LC. § 3-205," and requested that
i

the Defendants protect Clark's lien by putting Clark's name on any payments to
t

I

the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case related to settlement of verdict. A true and
I

correct copy of Clark's letter is attached as Ex~ibit l.
21.

In January 2016, Anfinson Plumb~ and Bakken settled with the
i

Plaintiffs in the Forbush case for $1,000,000.00 and sent a check to the Spence
I
. .
l
F
~.

I

I

22.

Even before delivery to The Spence Firm, Clark's lien attached to the
I

settlement funds in the hands of the Defendant~.
I

. 23.

Notwithstanding the actual knowledge that Clark had represented the

Plaintiffs in the Forbush case and despite ClarJ's written request that Defendants
I
Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman'. Gourley, P.A. protect Clark's lien
!

by listing Clark as a payee on any settlement check, Defendants Fuhrman, Graham
I

and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A. provided the $1,000,000.00 settlement
I

funds to the Spence Firm without protecting Cl~k's lien.
i

24.

Thereafter, The Spence Firm and/<;>r the Forbush Plaintiffs converted

Clark's fees.

I

'
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!

!

25.

As the Defendants had constructi-Je and actual knowledge of Clark's

I

attorney lien, the Defendants owed Clark a duty to protect his lien.
I

26.

This duty included protecting Clark's lien by complying with Clark's
!

request and placing Clark's name as a payee on the $1,000,000.00 Anfinson
I

Plum~ing settlement check.
27.

j

The Defendants Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
l

i

Gourley, P.A. breached their duty to protect Clark's
lien when the Defendants
I
!

delivered the settlement check to the Spence Firm without protecting Clark lien

!

interest.

,
'

l

28.

As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants
'

I

Fuhrman, Graham and Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., Clark has suffered
I

damages of at least $500,000.00, plus accumulating interest, costs and attorney
I

i

fees.

'
i

29.

In the alternative, the Defendants are
required to compensate Clark for
r
I

Clark's time and costs expended in recovering pis attorney fees from The Spence
'r

Law Firm and/or his former clients in an amount to be proven at trial.
I

ATTORNEY FEES
I

30.

The Plaintiffs hereby request an aiard of attorney fees according to
I

Idaho Code§ 121, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
!

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
!

31.

The Plaintiffs hereby requests a trial by jury on all contested issue in
I

i

this case.

'

I

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs pray for j~gment against all Defendants
I

jointly and severally as follows:

j

I
I

i

I

'

I
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For Judgment against all Defendants for specific damages in the
!

amount of $500,000.00, plus accumulating pre~judgment interest;
2.

For Judgment in the alternative foi Clark's damages incurred to
i

recover his attorney fees from The Spence Law Firm and/or his former clients.
3.

I

For Judgment requiring the Defen~ants to pay attorney fees and

litigation costs to the Plaintiffs of not less than :$10 ,000 .00 in the event default is
l

obtained and default judgment is entered, and the actual amount of attorney fees
I

I

and litigation costs the Plaintiffs incur if this matter is contested; and,
I

4.

For such other relief the Court det~rmines is appropriate and proper

under the circumstances.
DATED this 21st day of March, 2016.
!
CLARK' & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

Eric R. Clark
For the Plaintiffs
!

!
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l

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i

i

i

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of Marc~ 2016, I served the
foregoing, by having a true and complete copy 'delivered via facsimile or e-mail
• •
I
transm1ss1on to:
l
;

i

William A. Fuhrman, bfuhnnan@idalaw.com
Christopher Graham, cgraham@i~alaw.com
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A.
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 l
Post Office Box 1097
i
Boise, Idaho 83701
!
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
i
I

Eric R. Clark
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By TYLER ATKINSON
DEPUTY

LJ

StevenB. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@andersenbanducci.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@andersenbanducci.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@andersenbanducci.com
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
Facsimile: 208.342.4455

Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.
Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher
Graham (collectively, the "Jones Gledhill Attorneys") hereby submit this memorandum in support
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of their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed against them by Plaintiffs Eric. R. Clark
and Clark & Associates, PLLC (collectively, "Clark"), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
INTRODUCTION
This Court should dismiss Clark's Amended Complaint attempting to collect attorney's
fees relating to his representation of Travis Forbush, Gretchen Hymas, and Breanna Halowell
(collectively, the "Forbush Clients") from the Jones Gledhill Attorneys. The Jones Gledhill
Attorneys' only relationship to Clark is that they opposed Clark when they represented two
defendants, Anfinson Plumbing and plumber Daniel Bakken (collectively, the "Anfinson
Defendants"), who settled a lawsuit with the Forbush Clients after Clark's representation of the
Forbush Clients had terminated. Although Clark has not identified the causes of action he
purports to bring against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys, it appears that he is attempting to enforce
an attorney's lien against them, seeking damages for their purported negligent failure to protect
his attorney's lien, or both. Either way, Clark's Amended Complaint fails.
First, Clark's claims against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys are barred by the litigation
privilege because they arise out of the Jones Gledhill Attorneys' representation of the Anfinson
Defendants. The litigation privilege alone requires dismissal of Clark's entire Amended
Complaint. Moreover, even setting aside the privilege, Clark cannot state a claim against the
Jones Gledhill Attorneys for an attorney's lien because (1) the Idaho attorney's lien statute does
not authorize an attorney's lien against an opponent; (2) Clark has not yet reduced his attorney's
lien to a judgment; and (3) the Jones Gledhill Attorneys do not control any fund to which his lien
might attach. Furthermore, Clark cannot state a claim against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys for
negligence because they owed no duty of reasonable care to their adversary, nor did they owe
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him any duty to prevent purely economic loss. For all of these reasons, the Amended Complaint
should be dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND
The Amended Complaint alleges the following relevant facts:
Clark represented the Forbush Clients in an action against the Anfinson Defendants,
among others. (Amended Complaint 115, 17.) The Jones Gledhill Attorneys represented the
Anfinson Defendants in that litigation. (Id. 15.) After Clark initiated the litigation, the Forbush
Clients engaged The Spence Law Firm PLLC ("Spence") as counsel. (Id. 118.) Clark's
representation of the Forbush Clients thereafter terminated. (Id. 119.) Upon his termination,
Clark told the Jones Gledhill Attorneys that he was asserting an attorney's lien on any settlement
between the Anfinson Defendants and the Forbush Clients and asked that his name be put on any
settlement check. (Id. 120.) The Anfinson Defendants subsequently settled with the Forbush
Clients and sent the settlement check to Spence. (Id. 121.) The settlement check did not list
Clark as a payee, and Spence has not paid Clark any portion of the settlement. (Id. 1123, 29.)
Clark brought this action against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys to enforce an attorney's lien for
fees relating to his representation of the Forbush Clients or to recover tort damages for the Jones
Gledhill Attorneys' purported negligent failure to protect his attorney's lien. (Id. 1125-29.) 1
The only injury Clark identifies is the loss of his attorney's fees. (Id. 128.)
ARGUMENT

This Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice because the litigation
privilege protects the Jones Gledhill Attorneys from suit arising out of their representation of the

1

Clark also has filed a complaint against his former clients, the Forbush Clients, for breach of
contract, attorney's lien, conversion, and tortious interference with contract See Clark v.
Forbush, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1604217 (filed March 3, 2016).
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Anfinson Defendants, and in any event, Clark cannot state a claim against the Jones Gledhill
Attorneys for an attorney's lien or negligence.

I.

Standard of Review on Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

complaint "must allege all essential elements of the claims presented." Johnson v. Boundary Sch.

Dist.# 101, 138 Idaho 331,334, 63 P.3d 457,460 (2003). Where, as here, "the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts upon which the court could grant relief, the complaint should be dismissed."

Id. In this context, "it is not enough for a complaint to make conclusory allegations. Although
the non-movant is entitled to have his factual assertions treated as true, this privilege does not
extend to the conclusions oflaw the non-movant hopes the court to draw from those facts."

Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455,462 (2005) (internal citation
omitted).

II.

The Litigation Privilege Bars Clark's Suit Against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys.
Clark's suit against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys is barred in its entirety by the litigation

privilege. "[T]he litigation privilege shall be found to protect attorneys against civil actions
which arise as a result of their conduct or communications in the representation of a client,
related to a judicial proceeding." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,839,243 P.3d 642,655
(2010). "[W]here an attorney is sued by the current or former adversary of his client, as a result
of actions or communications that the attorney has taken or made in the course of his
representation of his client in the course of litigation, the action is presumed to be barred by the
litigation privilege." Id The only exceptions "occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to
show that the attorney has engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the scope of his

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

000027

representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own interests and not his
client's." Id. at 841,243 P.3d at 657.
Applying this rule in Taylor, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a
corporate shareholder's claims for civil conspiracy and tortious interference with contract against
his opponents' attorneys. Id. at 844,243 P.3d at 660. The Court considered the plaintiffs
allegations that the attorneys wrongfully "assisted" their clients in breaching a stock agreement
and obtaining an injunction against him, but determined that the alleged conduct fell within the
scope of the attorneys' representative function. Id. Because the plaintiff"fail[ed] to allege that
[the attorneys] were acting outside the scope of their employment or solely for their own
benefit," his claims were "barred by the litigation privilege." Id. at 844-45, 243 P.3d at 660-61.
As in Taylor, Clark's allegations seeking to hold the Jones Gledhill Attorneys liable for
an attorney's lien or in negligence fall squarely within the litigation privilege. Clark's claims
against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys arise from their representation of the Anfinson Defendants
in the course of settling litigation in which Clark represented the Anfinson Defendants'
adversary. (Amended Complaint~~ 20-21, 23, 25-28.) Accordingly, Clark's suit "is presumed
to be barred by the litigation privilege." Taylor, 149 Idaho at 839, 243 P.3d at 655. Further, the
Amended Complaint contains no allegations that the Jones Gledhill Attorneys were acting
outside the scope of their representative function or solely for their own benefit. See id. at 841,
844-45, 243 P.3d at 657, 660-61. The Amended Complaint therefore should be dismissed as
barred by the litigation privilege.

III.

Clark Cannot State a Claim Against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys for an Attorney's
Lien or Negligence.
The Amended Complaint also fails for the independent reason that it does not state a

claim for an attorney's lien or negligence.
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A.

Clark Cannot Enforce an Attorney's Lien Against His Opposing Counsel.

To start, Clark's apparent attempt to enforce an attorney's lien against the Jones Gledhill
Attorneys fails because the Idaho attorney's lien statute does not authorize a lien against an
opponent. Additionally, Clark has not reduced his attorney's lien to a judgment, and the Jones
Gledhill Attorneys do not control any fund to which the lien might attach. For all of these
reasons, to the extent Clark is trying to bring an attorney's lien claim against the Jones Gledhill
Attorneys, it must be dismissed.
"[T]he only type of attorney's charging lien provided under Idaho law is that defined in
LC.§ 3-205." Kenneth F. White, Chtd. v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 136 Idaho 238,242, 31
P.3d 926,930 (Ct. App. 2001). That statute provides:
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the
agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained by law. From the
commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the
attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's
favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be
affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
Idaho Code§ 3-205. An attorney seeking to establish an attorney's lien under this section must
prove:
(1) (T)hat there is a fund in court or otherwise available for distribution on equitable
principles, (2) that the services of the attorney operated substantially or primarily to
secure the fund out of which he seeks to be paid, (3) that it was agreed that counsel look
to the fund rather than the client for his compensation, (4) that the lien claimed is
limited to costs, fees or other disbursements incurred in the litigation by which the fund
was raised and (5) that there are equitable considerations which necessitate the
recognition and application of the charging lien.

Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 76,625 P.2d 1072, 1079 (1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Kinghorn v. Clay, 153 Idaho 462,283 P.3d 779 (2012).
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"The plain language of this section allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer against that
lawyer's own client. There is nothing in§ 3-205 or case law that authorizes an attorneys' lien in
favor of an opponent's lawyer." In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476,484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999)
(emphasis in original) (citing Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,465,660 P.2d 928, 930 (1983)).
Indeed, in Frazee, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the very claim Clark attempts to advance
here, holding that an attorney's lien asserted by a wife's divorce attorney could not be levied
"against the property of the opposing party, who is a total stranger to the contract under which
[the attorney] claims money." Frazee, 104 Idaho at 465,660 P.2d at 930, overruling Renfro v.

Nixon, 55 Idaho 532, 45 P.2d 595 (1935). For the same reason, the court in Goldberg held that
an attorney's lien asserted by the wife's divorce attorney against her former husband's
bankruptcy estate was "improper." 235 B.R. at 484. Thus, as a matter oflaw, Clark cannot
assert an attorney's lien against his opposing counsel.
Not only are the Jones Gledhill Attorneys improper parties, Clark's claim fails for the
additional reasons that he has not (1) reduced his lien to a judgment or (2) established the
existence of any fund within the Jones Gledhill Attorneys' control to which his lien might attach.
As the Idaho Supreme Court elucidated in Frazee, "the equitable source of the charging lien
necessitates that an attorney take affirmative steps in an adjudicative process to perfect and
reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court." 104 Idaho at 466, 660 P .2d at 931. Clark
may not claim any sum in fees without first "proving the reasonableness of such fees in an
adjudicative process." Id. at 465, 660 P.2d at 930. Here, Clark has not taken this necessary step.
Instead, he has attempted to deprive interested parties, including Spence, of the opportunity to
challenge the validity or amount of his claimed attorney's fees by bringing a claim against the
Jones Gledhill Attorneys, who have no knowledge of or interest in Clark's underlying
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entitlement to fees. See id. at 466, 660 P .2d at 931 (due process requires that interested parties
have an opportunity to challenge lien). For that reason as well, Clark's claim must be dismissed.
Finally, the Jones Gledhill Attorneys do not control any fund to which Clark's attorney's
lien could attach. As stated in Frazee, no "fund" exists within the meaning of section 3-205
where the moneys obtained by the attorney for the client have "already been paid to the client."
104 Idaho at 466, 660 P .2d at 931. According to Clark's own allegations, the Anfinson
Defendants have already "sent a check to the Spence Firm," thereby relinquishing control over
the settlement funds. (Amended Complaint ,r 21.) Thus, in addition to the other reasons just
given, because the Jones Gledhill Attorneys hold no fund to which Clark's lien could attach, his
attorney's lien claim against them must be dismissed.

B.

Clark Cannot State a Negligence Claim Against the Jones Gledhill Attorneys
Because They Owed Him No Duty of Reasonable Care.

Likewise, to the extent Clark is attempting to assert a negligence claim against the Jones
Gledhill Attorneys, such claim fails not only because of the litigation privilege discussed above
but also because the Jones Gledhill Attorneys owed no duty of reasonable care to their adversary
nor did they have a duty to prevent purely economic loss. "The elements of common law
negligence have been summarized as (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage."

Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 28,244 P.3d 166, 172 (2010).
Here, Clark's negligence claim fails for want of any duty.
To start, the Jones Gledhill Attorneys owed no duty to Clark to refrain from acting
negligently toward him in the course of their representation of the Anfinson Defendants. "As a
general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client and not to
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someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship." Harrigfeld v.
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 137, 90 P.3d 884, 887 (2004). Because Clark never had an attorney-

client relationship with the Jones Gledhill Attorneys, he cannot hold them liable for any
negligence relating to their performance of legal services.
Nor did the Jones Gledhill Attorneys owe Clark a duty to prevent purely economic loss.
"Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely economic
losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to another."
Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. Inc., 153 Idaho 735,742,291 P.3d 418,425

(2012). The only exceptions to this rule are where: (1) the economic loss is "parasitic to an
injury to person or property"; (2) "the occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a different
allocation of the risk"; or (3) a "special relationship" exists between the parties. Duffin v. Idaho
Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007-08, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995).

Here, Clark's only alleged injury is the loss of his attorney's fees, a purely economic loss.
(Amended Complaint ,r,r 28, 29.) Clark has not and cannot allege physical or property damage
which can be attributed to the Jones Gledhill Attorneys; any "unique circumstance" justifying
allocating the risk to the Jones Gledhill Attorneys; or any "special relationship" between Clark
and the Jones Gledhill Attorneys. On the contrary, as counsel for Clark's adversaries, the Jones
Gledhill Attorneys owed Clark no duty of reasonable care at all. Clark's negligence claim
therefore must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, this Court should grant Defendants' motion and dismiss the
Amended Complaint with prejudice.
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I

DATED THIS 4th day of April 2016.
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC

B y ~
A~
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of April 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83 816
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
AMENDED COMPLAINT

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.
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Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham hereby move to dismiss the Amended
Complaint filed against them on March 21, 2016, by Plaintiffs Eric. R. Clark and Clark &
Associates, PLLC, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum filed separately herewith.
DATED THIS 4th day of April 2016.
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC
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ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
Facsimile: 208.342.4455
Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.
Defendants, Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher
Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill") reply in support of their motion to dismiss the complaint
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of Plaintiffs, Eric R. Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC (collectively "Clark") for failure to
state a claim under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Drawing all inferences in Clark's favor, it is beyond a doubt that Clark can prove no set
of facts in support of his claims for negligence against Jones Gledhill or for an attorney's lien
under Idaho Code§ 3-205. Section 3-205 does not provide for an attorney's lien against Clark's
opponent, Jones Gledhill. Further, Jones Gledhill has no duty of care to protect Clark's interest
in his attorney fees. Accordingly, Clark's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.

A. Clark Cannot Enforce an Attorney's Lien for a Fee Not Yet Adjudicated.
Clark's overly simplistic interpretation of§ 3-205 ignores the statute's plain language and
binding Idaho case law. Clark argues that the statute's phrase "in whosoever hands they may
come" means he has an attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill simply because it transmitted
settlement proceeds between its client, Anfinson, and Clark's former clients. (See Plaintiffs'
Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Plaintiffs' Memo") at p. 8
("That protection [of§ 3-205] extends to anyone holding funds to which an attorney has an
interest, such as when a settlement is reached but the Defendants still possess the funds.").) This
argument is without merit.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 76,625 P.2d 1072, 1079
(1981), interpreted§ 3-205 and recognized five prerequisites for determining and enforcing an
attorney's lien. "The language of§ 3-205 grants an automatic lien on a 'fund' created by the
efforts of the attorney, so long as the elements set forth in Skelton fl are satisfied." In re

Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476,484 (D. Idaho 1999) (emphasis added). Both Clark's complaint and his
opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss ignore the five requirements set forth in Skelton.
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Most notably, Clark's argument ignores that the requirements for an attorney's lien
include determining that "the services of the attorney operated substantially or primarily to
secure the fund out of which he seeks to be paid," and that "the lien claimed is limited to costs,
fees or other disbursements incurred in the litigation by which the fund was raised." Id. Along

.
these lines, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that an attorney may not "claim any sum in fees
without the necessity of proving the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process."
Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,465,660 P.2d 928,930 (1983).

In this case, the sum of fees to which Clark is entitled is undeniably in dispute. The most
obvious indication of this dispute is that Clark has also sued his former clients for the very same
fees that he contends Jones Gledhill owes him. See Clark v. Forbush, Ada County Case No. CVOC-1604217, Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment (filed May 5, 2016).

In Clark's separate action against his former clients, Clark seeks his purported share of the
Anfison settlement, additional fees in the wrongful death action, and yet other legal fees in an
entirely separate action against the Meridian Police Department. Id. Clark has not yet
adjudicated his right, if any, to a portion of the Anfinson settlement. Accordingly, under Idaho
law, there can be no attorney's lien for a disputed fee.
Moreover, Jones Gledhill has never had and does not now have any legitimate means of
participating in and resolving a fee dispute between Clark and his former clients. It does not
know the fee arrangement between Clark and his former clients. It does not know what, if any,
work Clark performed that may have operated to secure a settlement with Anfinson. It does not
know about other extenuating circumstances, such as ethical breaches or malpractice, giving rise
to Clark's discharge and adversely impacting his entitlement to share in settlement proceeds
acquired after his former clients discharged him. Because Clark's right to attorney fees against
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his former clients, including fees from the Anfinson settlement, are disputed, no attorney's lien
exists against Jones Gledhill or otherwise.
B. Clark may not assert an attorney's lien against his opponent.

An independent basis to dismiss Clark's claim for an attorney's lien against Jones
Gledhill is that "[t]he plain language of [§3-205] allows only for a lien in favor of a lawyer
against that lawyer's own client. There is nothing in §3-205 or case law that authorizes an
attorney's lien in favor of an opponent's lawyer. Frazee ... expressly rejected the attempted
assertion of a charging lien against the property of the opposing party." In re Goldberg, 235
B.R. at 484 (emphasis added).
Clark attempts to avoid this rule by arguing his claim is different because the source of
the fund at issue is a settlement. (Plaintiffs' Memo at pp. 9-10.) This attempt fails. In In re

Goldberg, the source of the fund was the Debtor's proceeds from the sale of real property. 235
B.R. at 480. Both the Debtor's attorney and the opposing attorney sought to enforce a lien
against these proceeds. Id. at 478-480. Regarding the opposing attorney's lien, the court held
simply that the plain language of the statute did not provide for a lien in favor of the lawyer of
the Debtor's opponent. Id. at 484. This ruling was not premised upon the nature or source of the
fund at issue but rather on the plain language of the statute.
Similarly, the Court in Frazee held that an attorney did not have a lien against the
property of his client's former husband, whom the attorney had opposed in a divorce. The Court
rejected the attorney's claim that "he may have any sum in fees without the necessity of proving
the reasonableness of such fees in an adjudicative process." Frazee, 104 Idaho at 465, 660 P .2d
at 930. Again, the source of the fund was not the basis for the Court's decision in Frazee.
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Under the plain language of§ 3-205, Clark may not assert an attorney's lien against his
opponent, Jones Gledhill. No authority supports Clark's assertion that the statute means
something different depending on the source of the fund to which the lien might attach. The crux
of the problem here, as in Frazee, is that Clark seeks to enforce his lien against his opponent
without first establishing he is entitled to any fees from the Anfinson settlement. Clark has not
established in an adjudicative process his right to any such fees, and he cannot do so in an action
vis-a-vis Jones Gledhill.
C. Jones Gledhill Owed No Duty of Care to Clark.
Finally, Clark fails to establish that Jones Gledhill owed Clark a duty of care to protect
his potential interest in proceeds from the Anfinson settlement, whatever that interest might be.
Clark cites no authority, in Idaho or otherwise, recognizing that an attorney's opposing counsel
has a duty of care to protect that attorney's interests in recovering his fees against his client, and
indeed, no such authority exists.
Clark's argument that Jones Gledhill has such a duty is based solely on the phrase "in
whosoever hands they may come" in § 3-205 and his assertion that this phrase creates a statutory
duty on behalf of Jones Gledhill to protect Clark. This argument fails for the same reasons
Clark's argument that he has an enforceable attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill fails-§ 3-205
does not allow for an attorney's lien against Clark's opponent and whether Clark has any
entitlement to fees after his discharge for cause is disputed and that dispute cannot be resolved by
Jones Gledhill.
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D. Jones Gledhill's Litigation Privilege Protects It from Clark's Action.
Even if Jones Gledhill owed Clark a duty to protect his interests in fees, which it does
not, the litigation privilege protects Jones Gledhill against such liability. As the Idaho Supreme
Court has held in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,243 P.3d 642 (2010):
[A]s a general rule, where an attorney is sued by the current or former adversary
of his client, as a result of actions or communications that the attorney has taken
or made in the course of his representation of his client in the course of litigation,
the action is presumed to be barred by the litigation privilege. An exception to
this general rule would occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to show
that the attorney has engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the
scope of his representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own
interests and not his client's.
Id. at 841,243 P.2d at 658.

Clark does not and cannot allege the Jones Gledhill was acting outside the scope of its
representation in transmitting the settlement check from Anfinson to Clark's former clients.
Jones Gledhill's purpose in doing so was to comply with a settlement agreement and obtain a
dismissal of the action against Anfinson. Jones Gledhill took this action within the scope of its
representation of Anfinson, not for its own interests. Accordingly, Clark's action is barred by the
litigation privilege. Contrary to Clark's suggestion, the litigation privilege is consistent with
§ 3-205 in that neither the privilege nor the statute allows for an action such as Clark's against
his opposing counsel.
E. The Court Should Strike Clark's Declaration and Recitation of Facts.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides this Court discretion to strike "any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Such information includes "[f]acts
which are wholly foreign to the issues [or] needless repetition of immaterial averments;"
"[m] atter having no essential or important relationship to the averments or unnecessary
particulars, history and description ... ;" [s]tatements which do not pertain and are not necessary
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to the issues in question;" and "[u]necessary matter or facts derogatory to a person referred to in
the pleading." Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., Inc., 92 Idaho 526, 530, n. l, n.2, n.3, n.4,
446 P.2d 895,899, n.1, n.2, n.3, n.4 (1968).

In this case, Clark has submitted the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, attaching numerous documents immaterial to Clark's claims and
his opposition to Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss. Neither the commentary in Clark's
declaration nor the attachments thereto have any relationship at all to his averments. At best, this
information is unnecessary particulars, history and description. But more concerning is the
privileged and protected nature of the information Clark discloses in the public record. Much of
the information is undisputedly protected under the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine. See Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).
Likewise, pages two through five of Clark's brief also recite purported facts that have no
relationship to his claims for negligence or an attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill and appear
to contain privileged information. Accordingly, both these pages of Clark's brief and his entire
declaration should be stricken under Rule 12(f).
Pages two through five of Clark's brief should likewise be stricken under Rule 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(6) expressly grants this discretion: "If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered
(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 ...." Idaho R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) (emphasis added). "[C]ourts have complete discretion to determine whether or not to
accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it." SC Wright & Miller Federal Practice & Procedure
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."
§ 1366 (3d ed.).
Courts generally reject plaintiffs' attempts to avoid a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) by
endeavoring to create disputed factual issues. "[W]hen one party moves to dismiss solely upon
the pleadings ... [,] it is inappropriate for the responding party to introduce extraneous materials
in an attempt to convert the dismissal motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56."

Alexander Assocs., Inc. v. FCMP, Inc., No. 10-12355, 2012 WL 1033464, at *7 (E.D. Mich.
March 27, 2012) (citing Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F.Supp. 333,334 (D. Nev. 1993) (emphasis
added)).
Clark offers no justification for submitting extraneous materials in response to Jones
Gledhill' s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. That motion can be resolved under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard
and should result in the dismissal of Clark's complaint in its entirety for his failures to state any
. viable claims for relief. To avoid any suggestion in the record that the Court considered Clark's
extraneous, immaterial submissions, the Court should strike those submissions from the record.

CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, Jones Gledhill respectfully requests the Court to grant its motion
to dismiss Clark's complaint with prejudice and strike both his declaration in its entirety and
pages two through five of his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
DATED TIDS 6th day of May 2016.
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC

B y ~

K~d

Amanda
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of May 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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U.S.Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
~ Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorne~.com
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StevenB. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@andersenbanducci.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@andersenbanducci.com
ANDERSENBANDUCCIPLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
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Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
TO STRIKE CLARK'S DECLARATION
AND RECITATION OF FACTS

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule J2(b)(6) and Rule 12(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Defendants, Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
move to strike the entire Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
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. .
to Dismiss and also to strike "Facts" section in pages two through five of Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Filed in support of this motion
is Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, with argument related to the motion to
strike appearing in Section E of that Reply.
DATED THIS 6th day of May 2016.
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC

ByA~~
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of May 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

By TYLER ATKINSON
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE AND OPPOSITION
vs.
TO DEFENDANT'S "MOTION TO
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN
DISMISS TO STRIKE CLARK'S
GOURLEY, P.A., an Idaho Professional ECLARATION AND RECITATION OF
FACTS;" AND "FORMER CLIENT'S
Association; William Fuhrman,
individually, and as an agent of Jones
MOTION TO SEAL DOCUMENTS
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and
CONTAINING INFORMATION
Christopher Graham, individually, and PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGED OR WORK PRODUCT
as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
DOCTRINE

Defendants.
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COME NOW the Plaintiffs (Collectively "Clark") and hereby file their
Motion for Judicial Notice, and Opposition to Defendant's "Motion To Dismiss
[sic] To Strike Clark's Declaration And Recitation of Facts;" And "Former Client's
Motion To Seal Documents Containing Information Protected By Attorney-Client
Privileged Or Work Product Doctrine. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
must GRANT the Plaintiffs Motion for Judicial Notice and DENY the Defendants'
respective motions.
FACTS
Clark and his former clients are embroiled in litigation related to Clark's
representation of the clients in Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al, Ada County
Case No. CV PI 1304325. Notwithstanding all of Clark's hard work for the
. Clients in that case, the Clients although having recovered substantial settlement
funds refuse to pay Clark his fees. All of the facts, allegations and documents
Clark has stated or filed in defense of this Motion to Dismiss, he had previously
stated and filed in Clarkv. Forbush et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217, the suit
involving Clark's pursuit of payment of his attorney fees. Clark filed two
declarations in Clarkv. Forbush; one on March 30, 2016, and the second on April
4, 2016. Clark also filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss on April 22, 2016.
"Former Clients"' Motion is premised on the erroneous conclusion that all
attorney-client communications are privileged. However, that contention is simply
is not true.
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ARGUMENT- JUDICIAL NOTICE
First, Clark asks the Court to take judicial notice of the two Declarations and
a Memorandum filed in Clarkv. Forbush et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217, in
opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which contain the same
documents and facts Clark have presented here.·
IRE, 201 requires a court to take judicial notice of "records, exhibits, or
transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, .... " 1 Here, Clark has
filed documents and stated facts in argument that he had previously filed in a
separate case, without objection. Accordingly, as this information is already of
record in Clark v. Forbush et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217, there is no basis
to strike these pleadings or seal any records. As this information is in the record in
another matter, it is already in the public record; so there is no basis to strike or
seal these records in this case.

ARGUMENT- CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
"Former Clients"' blanket contention that all communications between
counsel and "former clients" is absolutely privileged ignores the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct. While the "former clients" baselessly assert Clark is
somehow acting in "bad faith," the "former clients" fail to even acknowledge the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, or the specific rule that prevents clients from
hiding the ball behind a claim of privilege and work product in litigation with their
former attorney. To the contrary, Rule 1.6 prevents the very thing counsel for
"former clients" is attempting here; to claim a privileged in order to gain an
advantage in litigation brought against them by their former attorney.
1

Clark has attached copies of these documents as exhibits to his Declaration Filed in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial notice.
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RULE 1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of
a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer' in
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish
a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of a client; ....

Here, notwithstanding the "former clients" have directly benefited from
Clark's hard work, they have refused to pay Clark his attorney fees. This rule
allows c;:1ark and similarly situated attorneys the right to disclose communications
that otherwise would be confidential in order to pursue compensation due. The
Court must deny the "former client's" motion as nothing in Rule 1.6 prevents an
attorney like Clark from disclosing confidential information in support of the
Attorney's claims.
CONCLUSION

As the information "former clients" seek to strike is already in the record in
another case, there is no basis to strike that information here. Moreover, Clark is
entitled to "reveal" the information presented according to IRPC 1.6., so there is no
basis to seal any information; either in this case or in Clark v. Forbush. Clark
therefore' respectfully requests the Court GRANT his Request for Judicial Notice
.

.

and DENY all of the "former clients"' motions.
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DATED this 9th day of May, 2016.

Eric R. Clark
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of May, 2016, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following
individual, via facsimile or e-mail transmission, and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@andersenbanducci.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@andersenbanducci.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@anclersenbanclucci.com.
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83 702

Eric R. Clark
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By TYLER ATKINSON

Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
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Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV-OC-1604633

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE AND RESPONSE
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JUDICIAL NOTICE

JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.
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Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman and Christopher
Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill") file this reply in support of Defendants' Motion to Strike 1
the entire Declaration of Eric R. Clark in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed on
May 4, 2016; pages two through five of the factual recitation of Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, also filed on May 4, 2016; and now additionally
the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, filed
on May 9, 2016. Further, Defendants respond herein to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice.

ARGUMENT
A. Under Rule 12(b)(6), Clark's Improper Submission of "Matters Outside the
Pleadings" Should Be Stricken.
Clark's declaration and factual recitation should be stricken under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)( 6) provides that:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (emphasis added).
Clark's submissions are "matters outside the pleadings" and are entirely unnecessary to
the resolution of Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint of
Plaintiffs Eric R. Clark and Clark & Associates, PLLC ("Clark"). Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6)
motion raises three discrete legal issues regarding the allegations in Clark's Amended
Complaint: (1) Clark cannot assert an attorney's lien under Idaho Code§ 3-205 against his
opposing counsel, Jones Gledhill; (2) Jones Gledhill, did not have a duty to protect Clark's

The argument in support of Defendants' Motion to Strike appears in section E of Defendants'
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (filed on May 6, 2016) at pages 6 through 8.
1

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AND RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 2
000054

interest, if any, in his clients' recovery against Jones Gledhill's clients; and (3) Jones Gledhill is
protected from any liability under the litigation privilege for conveying a check from Jones
Gledhill's clients to Clark's co-counsel, The Spence Law Firm ("Spence").
Clark does not contend that Jones Gledhill's legal arguments raise factual questions that
must be resolved through discovery or under Rule 56. To the contrary, Clark's arguments in
opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion are, likewise, purely legal in nature and include statutory
construction arguments regarding (1) the meaning of the phrase "in whosoever hands they may
come" in the attorney lien statute, § 3-205, (2) whether the litigation privilege can apply despite
the attorney lien statute, (3) whether the statute requires the lien to be reduced to a judgment
before attaching, (4) whether the statute requires an attorney-client relationship, and (5) whether
the statute creates a duty of care on behalf of Jones Gledhill.
The extraneous materials Clark submits in his declaration opposing Jones Gledhill's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion do not have any bearing on either parties' legal arguments. Clark's
submissions include his co-counsel agreement with Spence; privileged communications between
Spence and its clients; Clark's correspondence with Spence about his purported lien; a Rule 408
offer from Spence in an attempt to resolve Clark's claim for fees; correspondence between Jones
Gledhill and Spence; and correspondence between Clark and Spence and his former clients.
Similarly, Clark's factual recitation purportedly recounts Spence's internal legal strategy,
Spence's legal advice to its clients, Clark's disagreement with Spence's advice and the clients'
decisions, and Clark's view of the culpability of Jones Gledhill's client.
Clark offers no explanation why he submits his former clients' attorney-client privileged
information, protected work product and otherwise highly confidential information in opposition
to Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. While he points to Rule 1.6 of the Idaho Rules of
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Professional Conduct, that rule does not permit but rather prohibits Clark's disclosure. Rule 1.6
provides generally that, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client. ... " 1.R.P.C. l.6(a) (emphasis added). The exception to this rule upon which Clark relies
does not authorize his disclosure. That exception is that "A lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
... to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client." I.R.P.C. l.6(b) (emphasis added).

This exception has no application in this case. Obviously, this case is not a controversy
between Clark and his former clients. Rather, it is a controversy between Clark and Jones
Gledhill-his former clients' opponent. Furthermore, the nature of Clark's disclosure is neither
reasonable nor necessary. As discussed above, the purely legal questions posed by Jones
Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion will not turn on any advice Spence gave to its clients, on Clark's
disagreement with that advice or on any of the other irrelevant, confidential information Clark
has submitted in the record. None of this information or Clark's conjecture about it is necessary
to the Court's resolution of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
At best, Clark's extraneous submissions and unrelated factual assertions suggest he is
attempting to convert-improperly-Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into one
for summary judgment under Rule 56. Such an attempt is both inappropriate and futile because
there is no basis for the Court to consider Clark's extraneous materials. See, e.g., Alexander
Assocs., Inc. v. FCMP, Inc., No. 10-12355, 2012 WL 1033464, at *7 (E.D. Mich. March 27,

2012 ("[W]hen one party moves to dismiss solely upon the pleadings ... [,] it is inappropriate to
introduce extraneous materials in an attempt to convert the dismissal into one for summary
judgment under Rule 56."). Because Clark has presented "matters outside the pleading" that do
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not bear on Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court should exclude those extraneous
materials by striking them.

B. Under Rule 12(f), Clark's Submission of Matters Immaterial to the Action Should
Be Stricken.
Rule 12(£) of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure provides an independent basis to strike
Clark's declaration and factual recitation in opposition to Jones Gledhill's Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Rule 12(£) grants the Court discretion to strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter." Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(£). Such information includes facts, like those Clark
unnecessarily offers, that are "wholly foreign to the issues," have "no essential or important
relationship to the averments," and are "facts derogatory" to Spence, Clark's former clients, and
Jones Gledhill. See Stewart v. Arrington Cons tr. Co., Inc., 92 Idaho 526, 530, n.1-4, 446 P .2d
895, 899, n. 1-4 (1968).
There can be no dispute that the attorney-client privileged communications involving
Clark's former clients, protected work product and other highly confidential information that
Clark has filed in the record are immaterial, unimportant, not essential and have no relationship
to the substantive averments of Clark's claims against Jones Gledhill. See id. The only issues
currently before the Court are whether Clark may assert a valid attorney lien against Jones
Gledhill and whether that statute creates a duty on behalf of counsel to protect its opposing
counsel's interest in recovering attorney fees. What the fee arrangement may have been among
Jones Gledhill's opponents, what strategic decisions were made in the underlying case, and the
nature of Clark's disagreement with those decisions are all entirely immaterial and irrelevant to
these legal issues.
Clark's failure to explain why it is necessary that he submit his former clients' highly
confidential factual materials in opposition to a purely legal motion suggests that Clark's
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - 5
000057

submissions are nothing more than an effort to taint the record with immaterial and impertinent
matters. Or worse, they are intended to jeopardize his former clients' pending appeal in their
wrongful death action by including otherwise privileged and protected information in the record.
Accordingly, Clark's declaration and factual recitation should also be stricken under Rule 12(f).

C. Judicial Notice is Inappropriate.
In response to his former clients' objections to Clark's disclosure of their confidential
information in the public record, Clark compounds the problem by filing yet more confidential
information in the record in this case. Clark has now filed a declaration in this action attaching
two additional declarations and another memorandum previously filed in his action against his
former clients, Clark v. Forbush, et al, Ada County, CV-OC-1604217 ("Forbush"). 2 (See
Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, filed on
May 9, 2016, at Exs. 1-3.) Each of these papers contains his former clients' confidential
information and are riddled with Clark's factual conjecture.
Relying on Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Clark requests the Court to take
judicial notice of his two declarations and memorandum in Forbush and the confidential
information contained therein. Rule 201 does not support his request, however, but rather
highlights the inappropriateness of Clark's request.
Rule 201 provides that:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it
is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
2

Clark inaccurately asserts that he filed these papers in Forbush without objection. As set forth
in the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford in Support of Memorandum in Support of Former
Clients' Motion to Seal Documents, filed on May 6, 2016, Clark's former clients have repeatedly
warned him that he is not authorized to disclose their confidential information. Indeed, Clark has
stipulated on the record to enter into a protective order in Forbush to protect confidential
information from public disclosure.
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(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources who accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.
Idaho R. Evid. 201 (b) (emphasis added). Rule 201 is limited to "notice of adjudicative facts."

Id. at 201(a). Black's Law Dictionary defines an adjudicative fact as "a controlling or operative
fact, rather than a background fact; a fact that concerns the parties to a judicial or administrative
proceeding and that helps the court or agency determine how the law applies to those parties."
Black's Law Dictionary 610 (th ed. 1999).
Clark's declarations and memorandum in Forbush-all of which set forth Clark's version
of the "facts" related to his relationship with his former clients and Spence-do not meet any of
the requirements of Rule 201. Clark's arguments and conjecture about these facts are reasonably
subject to dispute-Clark has placed at issues these facts by suing his clients. 3 The contents of
Clark's declarations and memorandum are not generally known in the jurisdiction. They are not
capable of accurate and ready determination through sources whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned.
Further, the information will not aid the Court in determining the legal issues in this case
as required for judicial notice. Clark's version of the facts are not controlling or operative facts
related to the legal issues before the Court. Rather, they are extraneous, immaterial and
irrelevant conjecture by Clark. Accordingly, there is no justification or basis for the Court to
take judicial notice of the additional information Clark has filed in response to Jones Gledhill's
motion to strike. Rather, this additional information should also be stricken for the reasons
discussed above.

Clark is also currently seeking leave in Forbush to amend his complaint to add Spence and its
attorneys are defendants.
3
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill respectfully requests this Court to strike in its
entirety the Declaration of Eric R. Clark filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
filed on May 4, 2016; pages two through five of Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, also filed on May 4, 2016; and the Declaration of Eric R. Clark
filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, filed on May 9, 2016.
DATED THIS 27 th day of May 2016.

ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN WOODARD
BRAILSFORD, PLLC

B y ~

AmandaIU3railsf

Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2th day of May 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D

U.S. Mail
0 Facsimile (208) 939-7136
D Hand Delivery
0 FedEx Overnight Delivery
\
IZ] Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN
GOURLEY, P.A., an Idaho Professional
Association; William Fuhrman,
individually, and as an agent of Jones
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and
Christopher Graham, individually, and
a~ an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Motion to Reconsider the
Court's recent dismissal according to Rule 12(b)(6).
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The Plaintiffs bring this motion under IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B), which is timely as
the Court has not entered judgment or 14 days have not passed since judgment has
been entered.
The Plaintiffs have filed a declaration and memorandum in support of this
motion.
The Plaintiffs request oral argument.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2016.

Eric R. Clark
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akb@aswblaw.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
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101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
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ERIC R. CLARK, and CLARK &
AS SOCIATES, PPLC,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV-OC-2016-04633

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Associate, William
Fuhrman, individually, and as an agent of
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and
Christopher Graham, individually, and as an
agent ofJones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE,
MOTION TO SEAL, AND MOTION TO
DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed April 4, 2016.
Plaintiffs seek to enforce an alleged attorney's lien from the settlement funds distributed through
Defendants from an underlying wrongful death action. Because Plaintiffs never took affirmative
adjudicative actions to perfect the alleged attorney's lien, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an underlying wrongful death case. 1 Eric R. Clark and Clark and
Associates, PLLC (collectively "Clark") represented the plaintiffs in that case and Jones Gledhill
Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., through William Fuhrman and Christopher Graham (collectively "Jones
Gledhill") represented the defendants.

In the early stages of litigation in the underlying case,

Clark enlisted the assistance of The Spence Law Firm ("Spence") of Jackson Hole, Wyoming, as
co-counsel. Ultimately, after some three years, the two firms developed irreconcilable
1

Forbush, et al, v. Sagecrest, et al. Ada County Case No. CV-PI-2013-0004325.
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differences as to litigation strategies and Clark withdrew from the case.

Upon withdrawal, Clark sent an e-mail to Jones Gledhill asserting an attorney's lien against the
proceeds from any settlement in the underlying case and asked to be named as a payee on any
settlement check.2

In January 2016, the parties settled the case, and the defendants, through

Jones Gledhill, sent the settlement check to Spence. The check did not list Clark as payee.
Clark now claims over $500,000 for attorney fees from that case. 4

3

Clark has also sued his

former clients and former co-counsel in another
action for the same attorney fees. 5
I
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Clark filed this suit on March 3, 2016, and an Amended Complaint on March 21, 2016. Jones
Gledhill appeared through counsel and filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 4, 2016.

On May 4, 2016, Clark filed "Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss" ("Response Brief') which included four additional pages of facts, and the
Declaration of Eric R. Clark ("May 4th Declaration"), which included nine exhibits. 6

Jones

Gledhill filed a Motion to Strike and a Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss
on May 6, 2016.

Clark's former clients sought to intervene and filed a Motion to Seal

Documents on May 6, 2016. On May 9, 2016, Clark filed a Response to Defendants' Motion to
Strike and the Motion to Seal, and a Motion for Judicial Notice. Clark also filed the Declaration
of Eric R. Clark on May 9, 2016 ("May 9th Declaration"), which included three more exhibits.
Jones Gledhill filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Strike and Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice on May 27, 2016. Clark's former clients also filed a Reply

2

See Amended Compl. at 5.
Id.
See Amended Compl. (filed March 21, 2016).
5
Clarkv. Forbush et al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2016-0004217.
6
See Pls. Mem. Filed in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (filed May 4, 2016); See also, Deel. of Eric R. Clark (filed
May 4, 2016).
3
4
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brief on May 27, 2016 in support of their Motion to Seal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d
1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the issue "is not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673, 183 P.3d 758, 761 (2008). "A motion to
dismiss must be resolved solely from the pleadings and all facts and inferences from the record
are viewed in favor of the non-moving party." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832-33, 243
P.3d 642, 648-49 (2010).

To state a claim for relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading "does not need
detailed factual allegations," however, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1959 (2007). Mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of a cause of
action's elements will not do." Id. There must be "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Id. at 547, 127 S. Ct. at 1960. Stated differently, "[the] complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "As a practical
matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which
the plaintiff includes allegations showing on the face of the complaint that there is some
insurmountable bar to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536,835 P.2d at 1347.

(1) MOTION TO STRIKE

Jones Gledhill contends pages two through five of Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, the Declaration of Eric Clark, and the accompanying exhibits should be stricken or
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying
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disregarded because this is purely a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the Court has no right to consider
outside material. Further, Jones Gledhill asserts the material is irrelevant and extraneous to the
instant case. Clark contends the Court has discretion to consider material outside the pleading,
which converts the motion to one for summary judgment.

The Court may consider outside evidence on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion so long as the Court
converts it into a motion for summary judgment. I.R.C.P. 12(b). However, it is within the
Court's discretion to exclude such evidence and treat the motion as purely a Motion to Dismiss.
See Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 895 P.2d 561 (1995). In this case, the Court

declines to convert the motion to one of summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Court has discretion to strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter." I.R.C.P. 12(f). Such information includes "[f]acts which are wholly foreign
to the issues [or] needless repetition of immaterial averments," "[m]atters having no essential or
important relationship to the averments or unnecessary particulars, history and description or
allegations which have previously been eliminated by way of summary judgment," "[s]tatements
which do not pertain and are not necessary to the issues in questions," and [u]nnecessary matter
or facts derogatory to a person referred to in the pleading." Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., 92
Idaho 526, 529-30, 446 P.2d 895, 898-99 (1968).

The material contained within pages two through five of Plaintiffs' Response Brief, the
Declaration of Eric R. Clark, and the attached exhibits are irrelevant to the instant motion. The
material has no bearing on the legal arguments and is irrelevant, immaterial, and extraneous.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED and pages two through five of
Plaintiffs' Response, Clark's May 4th and May 9th Declarations, and the attached exhibits will
not be considered.

(2) MOTION TO SEAL

The former clients intervened and assert the material contained in pages two through five of
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying
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Plaintiffs' Response Brief to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Declaration of Eric R. Clark,
and Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 are extraneous to Clark's claims and do not address Jones
Gledhill's Motion to Dismiss.

Clark contends that material of this nature may be revealed when reasonably necessary pursuant
to Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct l.6(b)(5), which provides "[a] lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary ... to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client." This argument fails because this case is not between Clark and his client
or former client. That is another case. 7 This case is between Clark and counsel for the opposing
party of his former client. Accordingly, Rule 1.6 does not allow disclosure in this case.

Clark contends the material is already within the public record because the material was
previously filed in another case and therefore sealing is unnecessary. But Clark has stipulated to
a protection order regarding this same material in that other case. 8

Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(a) provides "[t]he public has a right to ... examine and
copy the records of all proceedings open to the public." Rule 32(d) states that "[a] court record
that has been offered or admitted into evidence in a judicial action" is subject to examination,
inspection and copying "unless the custodian judge expressly orders otherwise" (e.g. by sealing
the record). Rule 32(i) states that "[p]hysical and electronic records, may be disclosed, or
temporarily or permanently sealed or redacted by order of the court on a case-by-case basis ....
[a]ny person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose, redact, seal or unseal a part or
all of the records in any judicial proceeding." I.C.A.R. 32(i). "In ruling on whether specific
records should be disclosed . . ., the court shall determine and make a finding of fact as to
whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates."

Id. In making its

determination, trial courts are "referred to the traditional legal concepts in the law of the right to
a fair trial, invasion of privacy, defamation, and invasion of proprietary business records as well
7
8

See Clark v. Forbush et al., Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2016-0004217.
Aff. Of Amanda K. Brailsford ,r 5 (filed May 6, 2016).
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as common sense respect for shielding highly intimate or financially sensitive material about
persons." Id.

Initially, the Court notes the somewhat unusual procedural posture and other particulars of this
motion. First, the requesting persons are not a party to this case, but the former clients of Clark.
Second, the exhibits requested to be sealed were previously filed court documents. Finally, the
Court notes the requested material to be stricken includes the same documents requested to be
sealed. 9

As required by Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i), the Court makes the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law: The former clients' interest in privacy of the confidential material
predominates, given the privileged and confidential nature of the material. The material sought to
be sealed relates to sensitive, if not attorney-client privileged, conversations between co-counsel,
and clients, during Clark's representation of the former clients in the underlying case. Also,
Clark had stipulated to a protection order regarding this same material in the other case where he
sued his former clients and Spence. 10 The Court finds the materials sought to be sealed contain
facts and statements that could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to Clark's
former clients. The Court therefore concludes that it is reasonable, necessary and proper to seal
the requested material.

Accordingly, the Motion to Seal is GRANTED and pages two through five of Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9 of
Eric R. Clark's Declaration filed May 4, 2016 shall be sealed. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 of Eric R.
Clark's March 30 Declaration, attached to Exhibit 1 of the May 9th Declaration shall also be
sealed. Finally, Exhibits 1 and 2 of Eric R. Clark's Second Declaration, attached as Exhibit 2 to
the May 9th Declaration shall be sealed.

9

More material was requested to be stricken than to be sealed. Compare Former Clients' Reply in Support of Mot.
to Seal Information Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, p. 5-6 (filed May 27,
2016) with "Defendants' Reply in Support of Mot. to Strike and Response to Pis.' Mot. for Judicial Notice, p. 8
(filed May 27, 2016).
10
Aff. Of Amanda K. Brailsford ,r 5 (filed May 6, 2016).
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(3) MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Clark contends Idaho Rules of Evidence 201 requires this Court to take judicial notice of records,
exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case. Nothing in the language
of the rule requires a Court to take judicial notice. Instead, the Court may take judicial notice, if
the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute. I.RE. 201. A fact is not subject to reasonable
dispute if it is either (1) "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or
(2) "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably questioned." I.RE. 201 (b).

"A trial court, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, has no right to hear evidence,
and since judicial notice is merely a substitute for the conventional method of taking evidence to
establish facts, the court has no right to take judicial notice of anything, with the possible
exception of facts of common knowledge which controvert averments of the complaint." Taylor

v. Nichols, 149 Idaho 826, 649, 243 P.3d 833 (2010).

The requirement that the facts be

adjudicative, accurate, and/or generally known is a prerequisite to judicial notice.

While the documents at issue were previously filed in another case, the material does not contain
facts of common knowledge. Judicial notice cannot be used to establish adjudicative facts, but is
appropriate once those facts are particularly reliable and accurate.

Here, the information

contained within the documents is not generally known, nor have any indication of being
participle reliable or accurate. The accuracy can be readily questioned. Accordingly, Plaintiffs'
Motion for Judicial Notice is DENIED.

(4) MOTION TO DISMISS

Clark seeks to enforce an alleged attorney's lien from the settlement funds distributed last
January by Jones Gledhill to Spence in the underlying wrongful death action. Clark contends he
effectively created an enforceable attorney's lien under Idaho Code§ 3-205 by simply e-mailing
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying
Motion for Judicial Notice - 7
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Jones Gledhill. Clark then contends he can collect his lien amount from any person who came
into contact with the settlement check.

There are two types of attorney liens in Idaho: possessory liens and charging liens. LC.§ 3-205,
LC. § 3-205; Frazee v. Frazee, 1983, 104 Idaho 463, 660 P.2d 928 (1983). A possessory or
retaining lien is passive. Frazee, at 931, 104 Idaho at 466. Affirmative action is not needed to
"perfect" the possessory lien because the attorney asserting the lien already has "possession" of
the case or file and the client cannot recover the proceeds of a settlement or judgment until the
attorney fees are paid. Possession thus effects perfection without further action. But when an
attorney withdraws from a case, and ceases representing a client, they lose all "possessory" lien
rights.

An attorney's charging lien is not passive, and some affirmative adjudicatory action must be

taken to perfect the lien. "A charging lien is only brought about by some affirmative act of the
party asserting the lien in reducing it to a judgment or order of the court." Id.

"[T]he equitable

source of the charging lien necessitates that an attorney take affirmative steps in an adjudicative

process to perfect and reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court."

Id. at 931; In re

Harris, 258 B.R. 8 (Bkrcy. D. Idaho 2000). Without affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect
his lien by "reducing it to a judgment or order of the court," no authority exists to pay Clark any
amount of money on behalf of his former clients. See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466,660
P.2d 928, 931 (1983); In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8, 14 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2000). The law requires
these affirmative adjudicative actions to strike a proper balance between potential economic
coercion and equity.

Had Clark taken some affirmative adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the amount owed would
have been reduced to an amount certain, taken the form of a court order or judgment, which
would have then been applicable to the parties and their counsel. Violation of that order could
have been enforced by contempt and/or by a damage action against the parties and attorneys.

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying
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But Clark took no such affirmative adjudicative actions to perfect his claimed lien. Neither was
there a contract between Clark and Jones Gledhill. Consequently there was no order or contract
that these Defendants violated. They owed no contractual or other legal duty to Clark to protect
his interests. It was Clark's duty to protect his own interests, which he failed to do.

Perhaps Clark seeks to perfect the claimed lien in the other case against the former clients and
Spence, but the settlement check and proceeds have already gone through the hands of these
Defendants, never to return. Thus, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim that
would entitle him to relief against these Defendants.

Based on the above and foregoing, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against
the Defendants upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion to Strike is GRANTED. The intervenors
Motion to Seal is also GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice is DENIED. Finally,
because Clark failed to take affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect his lien by reducing it to a
judgment or court order, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

Defendants' shall submit a Rule 54(a)-compliant proposed Judgment of Dismissal for the Court's
signature.
IT IS SO ORDERED this i,'{r' day of June, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this lffaay of June, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of
the within instrument to:

Mr. Eric Clark, Esq.
Clark & Associates, PLLC
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Ms. Amanda Brailsford, Esq.
Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, PLLC
101 South Capital Blvd. Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE HARDY
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
C,\}

ERIC R. CLARK, et al,

Case No. eR-OC-2016-04633

Plaintiffs,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

vs.

JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., et al.,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Motion to
Amend filed June 13, 2016. Various Motions were previously argued and heard on June 3, 2016,
wherein.the Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

"On a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence or
authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v.
Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v.
First Nat'! Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, a
motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority. When
deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of
review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. In other
words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision
to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a different
standard, then that standard applies to the motion for reconsideration." Fragnella v. Petrovich,
153 Idaho 266, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), reh'g denied (Aug. 1, 2012).
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While a· Court should liberally allow for leave to amend complaints, there are limits. "The
purpose behind allowing a party to amend its complaint is so all claims will be decided on their
merits and to provide notice of the claim and the facts at issue." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v.

Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,492, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2003). "The grant or denial
of leave to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that is within the
discretion of the trial court and is subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that
discretion." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,
175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991).

The proposed Second Amended Complaint was filed ten days after the hearing on Plaintiffs'
Motion to Dismiss. It does not add new facts that speak to the merits of the case, it merely adds
new Defendants.

The Court has reviewed the briefs, relevant statutes, case law, and the record. In doing so, the
Court reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, the Proposed Amended Complaint, Memoranda,
and Declaration.

These filings do not add any new facts or authorities that bear on the

correctness of the judgment of the court.

To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to add new

Defend8:11ts to this case, those new Defendant would have no liability to Plaintiffs for the same
reasons that the existing Defendants have no liability.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Motion to Reconsider are both DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 'Z-f~y of June, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
~

I hereby certify that on this

zJJ day of June, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct

copy of the within instrument to:
Mr. Eric Clark, Esq.
Clark & Associates, PLLC
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Ms. Amanda Brailsford, Esq.
Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, PLLC
101 South Capital Blvd. Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
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JUL 20 2016
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE HARDY
DEPLITY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

-'
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z.:
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OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633

JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an_ Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill! Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT JS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

/f ,,r"' day of July 2016.

District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that on this
day of
2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
~

Mr. Eric Clark, Esq.
Clark & Associates, PLLC
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, 10 83616
Ms. Amanda Brailsford, Esq.
Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, PLLC
101 South Capital Blvd. Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on th is 8th day of July 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & AS SOCIA TES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D

U.S.Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
~ Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com
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** INBOUND NOTIFICATION: FAX RECEIVED SUCCESSFULLY**
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August 15, 2016 1:37:08 PM MDT
8/15/2016 1:35 PM
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AUG 15 2016
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

By SANTIAGO BARRIOS
OEPUTV

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Objection to Defendants' Motion For
Fees and Costs. The Plaintiffs file their Opposition according to IRCP 54(d)(5) and (e)(6), LC. §
120(3), LC. § 121, and I.C. § 123.
1.

The Plaintiffs object to costs claimed other than those as a matter of right

normally awarded to the prevailing party.

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS -1
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8/15/2016 1:35 PM

2.

FROM:

139-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

876919
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Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 120(3). This

case does not involve a "commercial transaction" between the parties and therefore LC. § 120(3)
does not apply.
3.

Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 121. Clark did

not pursue this case frivolously or without foundation. The Plaintiffs filed this case in good faith
arguing the scope of LC. § 3-205, and that liability attached under these circumstances, as
Defendants had received actual notice Clark was asserting an attorney lien on the proceeds of the
Forbush Settlement, yet failed to inform Clark of any settlement. While the Court was critical of
Clark for not taking judicial action to perfect his lien, the Court disregarded the critical fact that
Jones Gledhill purposefully and intentionally withheld information from Clark that prevented
Clark from timely perfecting his lien.
4.

Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 123.

Defendants have not established frivolous conduct as defined in LC. § 12-123. Moreover, this
section requires the Court to schedule and conduct an evidentiary hearing before awarding fees,
but no such hearing was scheduled.
5.

Tue Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees as unreasonable pursuant to IRCP

54(e)(l). Defendants' claim for fees is outrageous and punitive. This case involved a one-count
claim for negligence and was decided on a 12(b), motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, however,
Defendants seek attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Assuming an average billing rate at $220. 00
per hour, the attorneys would have worked exclusively on this case for an amazing twenty full
eight-hour days, (Four full work weeks.). Then, the Defendants billed over 56 hours (7
complete eight hour days), just to prepare its memorandum of costs. Approximately one-third of
the total billing was charged to pursue costs and attorney fees.
The Plaintiffs request oral argument only if the Court so directs.
The Plaintiffs intend to file a Memorandum in Support of this Objection pursuant to
IRCP 7(b)(3)(D.), and will do so within 14 days.
The Plaintiffs have filed a Declaration in support of this Objection which is served
contemporaneously herewith.
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FROM:

_39-7136 CLARK __ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

876919
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DATED this 15th day of August, 2016.

Eric R. Clark

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or email transmission, and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@andersenbanducci.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@andersenbanducci.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@anclersenbanclucci.com.
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

Eric R. Clark

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 3

000082

** INBOUND NOTIFICATION : FAX RECEIVED SUCCESSFULLY**
TIME RECEIVED
.
August 15, 2016 1:35:12 PM MDT
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan
Gourley, P.A.,

DECLARATION OF
ERIC R. CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES
Judge Hoagland

Defendants.

I, Eric R. Clark, declare and state as follows:
1.
I am one of the Plaintiffs in this case and I have personal knowledge of the facts
as stated herein.

2.

On September 23, 2015, I sent a letter to the Defendants in which I asserted my

attorney lien on any proceeds from settlement with Defendants' clients and I requested that the
DECLARATION OF ERIC R CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS
. AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1
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,939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

876919
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Defendants include my name on any settlement check. See Exhibit 1 to the Amended
Complaint.
3.

The Jones Gledhill Defendants never responded to my September 23, 2015 letter

nor denied my right to an attorney lien. The Defendants did not inform me they did not intend to
comply with my request to protect my lien.
4.

My experience as counsel in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case and other personal

injury cases that it takes anywhere from 30 to 60 days from the date settlement was agreed to
before we received a check.
5.

While the Court was critical that I did not take "some adjudicatory action to

perfect his lien," at no time from the date that the Spence Firm and Jones Gledhill reached a
settlement until Jones Gledhill transferred settlement funds to the Spence Firm in December
2015, or January or February 2016, did either the Spence Firm or Jones Gledhill inform me of
any settlement.
6.

On January 28, 2016 I sent an e-mail to Christopher Graham where I indicated I

believed there was a settlement and requested that Jones Gledhill protect my lien. A true and
correct copy of that e-mail and attached letter is attached as Exhibit 1.
7.

Jones Gledhill did not respond to my January 28, 2016 e-mail.

8.

Attached as Exhibit 2 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I

drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill in response to the letter attached as Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit
of Amanda Brailsford in support of Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs.
9.

Attached as Exhibit 3 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I

drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill which included a copy of a letter I had received from Counsel
for the Spence Firm.
10.

Chris Graham contacted me and stated he was out of town and wanted an

additional 24 hours to discuss the matter before I filed suit. I allowed the additional 24 hours and
actually several more days before filing suit.
11.

Attached as Exhibit 4 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I

drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016, in which I stated my belief that Jones
Gledhill was indemnified by the settlement agreement with the Forbush clients in Forbush v.

Sagecrest, and that they should tender the defense to the Spence Firm. As Brailsford represents
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the Forbush defendants and the Spence Finn in Clark v. Forbush, Canyon Count Case No. CV2016-06347-c, it appears that happened, and Brailsford appeared for Jones Gledhill.
12.

I did not file this case frivolously or without foundation. Jones Gledhill had

notice of my lien in September 2015, was aware of the amount of the settlement in Forbush v.

Sagecrest, and processed and delivered the settlement funds without notifying me of the
settlement or the amount. By withholding necessary and critical information, Jones Gledhill
interfered with my ability to perfect my attorney lien.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho and the laws of the
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2016.

Eric R. Clark

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or email transmission, and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@ aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83 702

Eric R. Clark
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https://blul 76.mat . e.com/oVmail.mvc/PrintMessages?mkt=en-us

Forbush Settlement
From: ERIC CLARK (eclark101@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 1/28/16 1:46 PM
To: Christopher Graham (cgraham@idalaw.com)
1 attachment
Attorney Lien Letter.pdf (28.6 KB)
Chris:
I understand from the Spence Firm's Counsel that there has been a settlement with Anfinson and Bakken. I
have attached a copy of a letter I sent via facsimile on September 23, 2015, in which I asserted an attorney's
lien on the proceeds of any settlement or verdict. Once again, as you have notice of my lien, please ensure
my firm is listed as one of the payees on any settlement check. Thank you.
Very Respectfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named
as recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure
under applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product
doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by
telephone. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in
reliance on the information it contains.
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CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
Real Estate • Business • Litigation
September 23, 2015
Via Facsimile
Michael Elia
Craig Stacey
MOORE & ELIA, LLP
PO Box 6756
Boise, ID 83707
Fax: (208) 336-7031

William A. Fuhrman
Christopher Graham
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A.
Post Office Box 1097
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529

Re: Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al; Ada County Case No. CV - PI 1304325 - Notice
of Attorney Lien
Dear Counsel:
This letter will serve as notice that I am asserting an attorney lien according to LC. § 3-205,
which attaches to any settlement or verdict. Please include my name on any settlement checks
payable to the plaintiffs or any other payments related to a verdict or judgment. Thank you.
Sincerely,

Eric R. Clark

P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
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Clark v Jones Gledhill
ERIC CLARK
Tue 2/23/2016 6:33 PM

To:Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>; Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrn1an@idalaw.co111>;

Cc:Brad Andrews <bandrews@isb.idaho.gov>;

Bill and Chris:
Thank you for your letter dated today. However, I disagree as your interpretation of the lien statute does not
follow the clear language.

3-205. ATTORNEYS' FEES -- LIEN. The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained
by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action
or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor
and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected by any
settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
The logical reading of this statue addresses money that belongs to the client, like settlement funds, which
someone else may possess. If "bar counsel" says otherwise, then I would like to see that opinion. If you have
such an opinion from bar counsel in writing, please send it to me. (Since you have mentioned Bar Counsel, I
am cc'ing him on my response.)
We have not placed a lien "in favor of opponent's lawyer," as you claim, but specifically on the settlement
funds. "The language of§ 3-205 grants an automatic lien on a "fund" created by the efforts of the attorney, so
long as the five specific elements set forth in Skelton v. Spencer. 102 Idaho 69, 625 P.2d 1072 (1981), are
satisfied.~ See also, In re Secaur, 83 I.B.C.R. 175, 176-7 (Bankr.D.ldaho 1983). The function of the statute is
to give an attorney an interest in the fruits of his labors. Skelton, 102 Idaho at 75, 625 P.2d at 1078. But
here, as was the case in Fitzgerald v. Colonial Savings & Loan (In re Karterman), 97.4 I.B.C.R. 115
(Bankr.D.Idaho 1997), there was no "fund" created by the efforts of Daugherty." In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476
(Bankr.ldaho, 1999).
The attorney lien is not limited to the "lawyer's own client" as you claim, but on the "fund." As you possessed
settlement proceeds which constitute the client's money, and which certainly resulted from my work, then you
had a duty to safeguard those funds. Both Frazee and Goldberg are factually distinguishable. It is ridiculous
and contrary to the very purpose of a lien that a lien only applies AFTER the client receives the money, which
apparently is your argument.
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Additionally, the record speaks for itself. Judge Copsey dismissed A.O. Smith because she claimed they could
not reasonably anticipate a plumber removing a safety device as that would be outrageous and reckless. (I
think we both agree that was an impermissible finding of fact as summary judgment) You are correct that Judge
Copsey initially denied our motion to amend against Anfinson. However, the proper course for competent
counsel would have been to file a motion to reconsider as we had Copsey's A.O. Smith ruling and Anfinson's
deposition which proved his employees were untrained. I think it is a reasonable argument to assert that
sending untrained employees to work on water heaters that could kill people if not serviced correctly is "an
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct," as Kenny Calkins opined about Anfinson. Perhaps
someday at a deposition, we will understand why the Spence Firm's failed to pursue what would have appeared
to be a "slam dunk" motion to amend after Judge Copsey's comments on January 15, 2015.
Finally, Logan's letter exemplifies just why you should have honored by lien. He claims we have a "dispute"
about the "amount owed." However, The Spence Firm has withheld every penny, not just any disputed
amount, and did not even inform me there was a settlement. As Jones Gledhill failed to honor my lien, the
Spence Firm has the ability to use these funds to try to extort a settlement with me. I consider that as your
fault, and intend to pursue my claim.
Will you accept service of my complaint? Thanks!

Very Respectfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the
information it contains.
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Extortion letter from Spence Firm
ERIC CLARK
Wed 2/24/2016 8:06 AM

To:Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrtnan@idalaw.com>; Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>;
Cc:Amanda K. Brailsford <akb@andersenbanducci.com>;

1 attachment (45 KB)
Ex 2 - LT Clark reg Spence Finn Offer.pdf;

Bill and Chris:
Here is the extortion letter I received from the Spence Firm when I demanded payment of my entitled fees after
finding out on my own there was a settlement with Anfinson Plumbing. Notice that the Spence Firm denies it
owes me any fees, which is contrary to Logan's letter to you. The Spence Firm is now able to use these funds
to extort a settlement because you failed to protect my lien. If the Spence Firm misled you by representing they
would protect my lien in order for you to release those funds, then I would like those facts in a declaration or if
the representations were in writing, then a copy of that writing from the Spence Firm. If not, then I am going to
proceed and file my complaint. Thanks.
Very Respectfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the
information it contains.
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February 19, 2016

Via Email and Regular Mail:
Mr. Eric R. Clark

~l~wK@~i:i~R{;J;).tk;}JL®JiY,,,9t)m.:
Clark & Associates, PLLC
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Re:

Clark, et al. v. The Spence Law Firm, et al.

Eric,

I have confinned that the Anfinson settlement was for policy limits of $1,000,000.
The Spence Finn's position is that you are not entitled to payment of $140,000 that you contend
you are owed under the co-counsel agreement as a result of the Anfinson settlement. The clients
discharged you months before they reached this settlement; the settlement was not in existence
when you were discharged. Nonetheless. The Spence Firm is offering you $140,000. This offer
is unconditional with the exception of a full and complete release of any and all of your claims
related to the Forbush matter against The Spence Firm, its attomeys, and your former clients.
This offer is open until Monday, February 29, 2016 at 5:00 p.m.
Thank you.
Sincerely,.
. .

-~,·

•

~-1

.

.

j7

./
.. ·. ),-. ,·t --t_:,..
rfe'd;U.tk/4,,11Jlyf
<~

f'

Amanda K. Brailsford

1

AKB/ajg

ANDERSEN BAt~DUCCI PLLC

101 S CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 1600 BOISE, IDAHO 83702
TEI. \208\ 342-4411

FAX \2081 342-4455

www.andersenbandut:ci com
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Clark v. Jones Gledhill
ERIC CLARK
Thu 3/10/2016 7:56 AM

To:Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>;

Chris:
Sorry for the delay. We are filing the lien claim lawsuit this morning. Will you accept service?
I would imagine that the settlement agreement has indemnity and hold hannless language potentially
addressing this lawsuit. Accordingly, please let me know if you are tendering the defense to the Spence Firm
or the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case. Thanks!

Very Respectfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the
information it contains.
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

Judge Hoagland

Defendants.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Memorandum in support of their
Objection to Defendants' Motion For Fees and Costs.
INTRODUCTION
This case involved a single-count complaint for negligence that was decided on a Motion
to Dismiss. Notwithstanding the minimal proceedings in this matter, the Defendants claim
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attorney fees of in excess of $35,000.00, with nearly one-third of this amount charged for
preparing a motion for costs and fees.
The Court found that the Plaintiffs (collectively hereafter as "Clark") had not ''taken
some adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the amount owed would have been reduced to an
amount certain," but agreed with Clark that the Defendants had Clark perfected his lien, 1 then
such order or judgment, ''would have then been applicable to the parties and their counsel." 2
1. The Defend ants are not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 120(3).

It is unclear from the Defendants tortured argument how they arrived at the ultimate
conclusion that a negligence case involves a commercial transaction, but that apparently is the
argument. These Defendants argue in reference to the Forbush v. Sagecrest case that their
"respective clients, who later settled, for commercial purposes, ... ," somehow establish that
negligence case involved a "commercial transaction." Do the Defendants really believe the

Forbush v. Sagecrest case; alleging claims for negligence and wrongful death involved a
commercial transaction?
The reality, the gravamen of this case as pied is negligence for disregarding an attorney
lien. The issues presented involved the scope and enforceability of that lien. However, the
Defendants failed to cite to any case that states the gravamen of a negligence case gives rise to a
commercial transaction. Even if the Court were to construe this as a lien foreclosure case, a lien
foreclosure does not involve a commercial transaction. Sims v. Jacobson, _

Idaho _, 342

P.3d 907, 912 (2015).
As there was no "commercial traction" as the gravamen of any claim in this case by any

stretch of the imagination, I.C. § 120(3) does not apply.
2. The Case was not brought frivolously or without foundation.

The Court must have an "abiding belief' the case was filed frivolously and without
foundation in order to award attorney fees. "A district court should only award fees 'when it is
left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously,

1

Clark respectfully notes that it was impossible under the circumstances for Clark to have proceeded to
perfect his lien without lmowledge of the settlement or the amount thereof; information known only to the
Defendants here and the Spence Law Firm.
2
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8.
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unreasonably, or without foundation.' C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 'when a party pursues an action which
contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and without
foundation.' Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes
it fails as a matter oflaw. GulfChem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890,
894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, '[a] misperception of the law, or of one's
interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position
adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.' Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265
(Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)." Garner v. Povey,
151 Idaho 462, 468, 259, P.3d 608, 614 (2011). Moreover, "[w]here a case involves a novel
legal question, attorney fees should not be granted under I.C. § 12-121." Campbell v. Kildew,
141 Idaho 640,652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005), citing Graham v. StateFarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
138 Idaho 611, 614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003).
This case involved the the scope and enforceability ofldaho's Attorney Lien statute, and
Clark presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's liability under this statute.
Clark prevailed on this issue as the Court ultimately ruled that a perfected lien under the
circumstances would have been "applicable to the parties and their counsel. "3 Accordingly, the
Court has rejected the Defendants arguments in their Motion to Dismiss that any "litigation
privilege" applied; that counsel cannot enforce an attorney lien against opposing counsel; and
that defendants owed no duty of reasonable care. 4
There certainly is not much decisional law of record regarding the scope of the attorney
lien statute. Clark raised genuine issues in this litigation including the liability for opposing
counsel; an issue which Clark prevailed. Moreover, Clark asserted the legitimate claim for
liability of opposing counsel when counsel withheld critical information which prevented Clark
from timely perfecting his lien. If opposing counsel would have been liable had Clark perfected
his lien, why then would opposing counsel escape liability when they interfered with Clark's

3

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8.
4
Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, pp, 4, 5, and 8.
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ability to obtain a perfected lien in the first place? As the Supreme Court noted in Frazee v.

Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 466, 660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983), a "charging lien of an attorney is
equitable in nature .... " Accordingly, all equitable defenses apply, including "unclean hands"
and estoppel. If Clark failed to timely obtain a perfected attorney lien because the Defendants,
who knew Clark was asserting a lien, purposefully and intentionally withheld information from
Clark, then equity should intervene to prevent the Defendants from raising the lack of a perfected
lien as a defense.
Lien statutes are by nature remedial. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. SUMPER, 139 Idaho
846, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960, (2004). As remedial legislation, Idaho's Attorney Lien Statute must
be interpreted "broadly to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins.

Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 959 (2000). "Variously phrased, the intent of the law on
this point is to allow the attorney an interest in the fruits of his skill and labors. The lien secures
his right to compensation for obtaining the recovery or 'fund' for his client." Skelton v. Spencer,
102 Idaho 69, 77, 625 P.2d 1072, 1080 (1981). Consequently, a reasonable interpretation of l.C.

§ 3-205 is that an attorney lien, perfected or not, creates a security interest in the proceeds of the
lawsuit. Clark presented reasoned argument that notwithstanding the lack of a "perfected" lien,
liability attached according to the statute, based on the undisputed facts that the Defendants had
knowledge of Clark's lien claim and because Defendants possessed the funds to which Clark's
lien attached. Clark also argued in good faith that based on the Court's ruling that perfection is
ultimately required to enforce the lien, and Clark was seeking to perfect the lien, at best the case
was not yet ripe and any dismissal should have been without prejudice.
Additionally, the Court has discretion whether or not to consider evidence outside of the
record submitted in support of the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it is a sound tactic to present
additional evidence in opposition to a motion to dismiss, in case the Court exercises its
discretion. Here Clark presented evidence related to the creation of his lien and background facts
in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case. Just because the Court decided not to consider this evidence
does not support any claim that offering the evidence in the first place was in any manner
frivolous.
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Under the circumstances presented here, the Court must conclude that Clark pursued this
case in good faith and not frivolously and without foundation, notwithstanding the Court's
ultimate ruling.

3. The Defendants failed to establish "frivolous conduct" as defined by I.C. § 123.
Clark incorporates the same argument in opposition to Defendants' claim for attorney
fees pursuantto J.C. § 12-121, and argues if the Court denies attorney fees according to J.C. §
12-121, it must also deny attorney fees under J.C. § 12-123 as this statute has a more stringent
standard. If the Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees according to J.C. § 12-121, they
certainly are not entitled to attorney fees based on a more stringent standard of conduct.
First, as clearly stated in this statute; an award of attorney fees according to J.C. § 12-123
is a "sanction." Clark presented evidence by way of declaration concerning his attempts to
resolve this case without litigation and presented reasoned interpretation of case law in response
to the Defendants' letter dated February 23, 2016. 5 Clark also requested confirmation of
Defendant's assertion that they had allegedly obtained an opinion from "Bar Counsel," who
coincidentally used to be a partner at Jones Gledhill. However, the Defendants never responded
to Clark's request for additional information or corroborated any alleged opinion from Bar
Counsel notwithstanding Clark afforded the Defendants' extra time to respond before Clark filed
suit. 6 Clark did not believe that simply because the funds allegedly were now in Wyoming, that
the Defendants lacked liability and proceeded accordingly. Moreover, as discussed above, this
Court has rejected the Defendants' arguments in their February 23, 2016 letter that Clark's lien
was limited to a claim against his clients and not against opposing counsel.
I.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to find, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, that
Clark's conduct in the case was ''frivolous," as defined in that statute. The Defendants must
prove that Clark asserted a claim which was "not supported in fact or warranted under existing
law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law." Here Clark presented reasoned argument that his lien attached to the proceeds
from the Anfinson settlement, regardless of whether his lien was ultimately perfected. That
5

See Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford In Support of Defendants' Motion For
Attorney Fees And Costs.
6
See Exhibit 2, 3, and 4, attached to the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition To Defendants'
Motion For Costs and Attorney Fees.
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position is supported by the clear language of LC. § 3-205. "From the commencement of an

action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a
party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict,
report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands

they may come; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after
judgment. (Emphasis added.)
While the Court apparently placed the burden on Clark to perfect his lien, the Court
apparently did not consider the fact that only the Defendants and the Spence firm had
information necessary for Clark to perfect his lien. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 731 P.2d
813, (Idaho App., 1986), requires knowledge of the amount of the attorney lien as a prerequisite
to perfection of an attorney lien. As Clark argued in good faith in support of his motion to
reconsider; "Here, Clark had no idea what the judgment amount was; first because when he was
discharged there was no settlement or "fund," and second, because his former clients and the
Defendants here refused to inform Clark when they settled." The reality, only the Defendants
and the Spence firm knew there was a settlement and the terms of that settlement and they also
each knew Clark was asserting a lien on the proceeds of those funds. Under these circumstances
Clark could not perfect his lien until he obtained information only the Defendants possessed but
did not release to Clark.
Moreover, the Court's ruling that even if Clark had perfected his lien, the money is
already gone, so "no harm no foul," appears to conflict with J.C. § 3-205. There are no
provisions in this statute that terminate liability just because a liable party no longer has the
money. With all due respect, such a contention would seem to undermine the very purpose of
the statute.
Finally, as a "sanction" J.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to determine whether or not "any
party was adversely affected by the conduct if found to be frivolous." J.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(iii).

(Emphasis Added.) In this case, it appears that Jones Gledhill tendered the defense of this case
to the Spence Firm and Former Clients, pursuant to an indemnity and hold harmless clause in the
settlement documents. Accordingly, Spence's counsel appeared in this case for Jones Gledhill
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and the Spence Firm likely is paying attorney fees. 7 If Jones Gledhill is not responsible for any
attorney fees and therefor is not a "party adversely affected" by any alleged frivolous conduct,
then Jones Gledhill is not entitled to any attorney fees. These facts need to be addressed in the
evidentiary hearing required by I.C. § 12-123 if in fact the Court elects to conduct such a
hearing.
4. The attorney fees claimed are not in any stretch of the imagination
"reasonable;" the fee claimed are outrageous and punitive.
Defendants bear the burden of proving their claim for attorney fees is reasonable.
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258, 262 (2008). Pursuant to 54(e)(3), the

two criteria relevant here are; (A) Time and labor required; and (B) Novelty and Difficulty of the
Questions.
a.

Time and labor. This was a single count negligence claim decided on an IR.CP

12(b) motion. There was no discovery exchanged, nor depositions taken. Nor were there any
other pleadings or motions. The Defendants did not even file an Answer. Notwithstanding,
Defendants claimed attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Defendants' counsel billed in excess of
159 hours on this case; 56 of which was billed for time for preparing the motion for costs and

attorney fees. 8 Other than their exorbitant billing records, the Defendants offer no explanation as
to how billing over 159 hours under the circumstance of this case was in any way reasonable.
The Defendants double billed for the same work performed by two or more attorneys. (See, e.g.
on March 14, 2016, March 15, 2016, March 22, 2016, and March 23, 2016). The Defendants
billed 14.8 hours just for legal research in support of motion to dismiss. "RAM" billed 18.8
hours related to research and drafting just the motion to dismiss. This case reeks of the situation
where attorneys drastically increases their hours well above what they actually billed just
because their party won. The Court should not condone such conduct and deny the motion for
fees outright.

7

Curiously, in her brief, Brailsford claims "Jones Gledhill was required to retain the services of its
counsel of record, who in tum had to familiarize themselves with both this case and also the underlying
case."(Memo, p. 14.) However, Brailsford already represented the Spence Firm and the Fonner Clients
in the ''underlying case." It is therefore unclear why Brailsford now had to "familiarize" herself with a
case in which she was already involved?
8
Brailsford's Affidavit, Exhibit C.
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Novelty and Difficulty. This case involved the scope ofldaho's attorney fee

statute, not the interpretation of the tax code. The case did present the novel issue of whether an
attorney lien attaches to proceeds held by opposing counsel thereby subjecting opposing counsel
to liability, but ultimately, the Court rejected the Defendants' arguments on this issue.
c.

Billing for Attorney Fees. The Defendants billed in excess of 56 hours just to

assert a claim for attorney fees. The amount billed for attorney fees is a glaring example of
"padding" the bills well above that counsel actually charged for their services. Again, the Court
cannot condone such conduct and must deny these fees as patently unreasonable.
Considering the nature of the minimal proceedings, charging in excess of 159 hours is not
in any way reasonable. Accordingly, the Court must deny the motion for attorney fees in its
entirety as unreasonable under the circumstances.
5. Costs.

As the prevailing party, the Defendants are entitled to recover their costs as a matter or
right, which is limited to their filing fee. The Defendants have not established any basis for this
Court to award any of the discretionary costs claimed.
CONCLUSION

Clark respectfully requests the Court deny the Defendants' Motion for Costs and
Attorney Fees for the following reasons; 1) The Case does not involve a "commercial
transaction, and therefor I.C. § 12-120 does not apply; 2) The Case was not brought or pursued
frivolously or without foundation and presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's
liability pursuant to an attorney lien; 3) The Defendants failed to establish any conduct was
frivolous as defined by LC. § 12-123; and 4) The Defendants failed to establish its attorney fees
demanded were reasonable under the circumstances. Defendants are entitled to recover their
filing fee, and nothing more.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016.

Eric R. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or email transmission, and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

Eric R. Clark
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

By SANTIAGO BARRIOS
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Grahmµ, individually,_
and as an agent of Jones Gledl).ill Fuhrman
Gourley, P,.A.,
DefendantsRespondents.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., AN IDAHO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION; WILLIAM FUHRMAN,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A.; AND CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES
GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A., AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The Plaintiffs appeal against the above-named Defendants to the Idaho Supreme Court
from the Judgment entered July 20, 2016, _a copy of which is attached.
2. Appellants hereby appeal as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
above-referenced Judgment according to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l).
3. ISSUES ON APPEAL:
(i)

Whether the District Court erred when it ruled it was "beyond doubt" that the

Plaintiffs. could prove no set of facts entitling the Plaintiffs to any relief and granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss?
(ii)

Whether the Appellants are entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal?

4: The Appellants have a right to appeal since the Judgment described in paragraph 1
above is an appealable order as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l).
5. Appellants do not request the preparation of any transcript.
6. Appellants request a scanned copy of the clerk's record to include the ONLY the
following documents in addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
03/10/2016 Complaint Filed
03/21/2016 Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Amended
0410412016
Complaint
04/04/2016 Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Amended Complaint
05/04/2016

Declaration of Eric R. Clark in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss

05/04/2016

Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss

05/06/2016 Defendant's Reply In Support of Motion To Dismiss
Plaintiffs Motion For Judicial Notice And Opposition To Defendants
"Motion To Dismiss To Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of
05/09/2016 Facts;" And "Former Clients Motion To Seal Documents Containing
Information Protected By Attorney-Client Privileged Or Work Product
Doctrine
Declaration Of Eric R Clark Filed In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For
Judicial Notice And Opposition To Defendants Motion To Dismiss To
05/09/2016 Strike Clarks Declaration And Recitation Of Facts;" And "Former
Clients Motion To Seal Documents Containing Information Protected
By Attorney-Client Privileged Of Work Producf Doctrine
05/27/2016 Defen.dants' Reply in Support of Motion to Strike and Response to
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice
06/13/2016 Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider
06/13/2016 Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint
Plaintiffs Memorandum Filed in Support of Motion for
06/13/2016
Reconsideration and Motion to Amend Complaint
Declaration of Eric R Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to
06/13/2016
Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion
0612812016
to Seal and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice
06/28/2016 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Amend Complaint
07/20/2016 Judgment
08/15/2016 Plaintiffs' Objection to Costs and Attorney fees
Declaration in support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Costs and Attorney
08/15/2016
fees
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants'
08/18/2016
Motion for Fees and Costs
7. No Exhibits are requested.
8. I hereby certify that:
(a) a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporters ifrequired,
(b) the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript of the hearings noted
above has been paid;
(c) the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;
(d) the appellate filing has been paid; and
(e) service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 or 20.1.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2016.

Eric R. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 st day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via US Mail, and
addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen
Amanda K. Brailsford
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

Eric R.. Clark
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NO., _ _ _--=::-=----A.M, _ _ _ _
.FJLEO
..r.M, _ _ __

JUL ~ 0 2016
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISff.t,(!=f:HANIEHARDY
, OEl'UTY
OF THE STATE OF ID/\1-1O, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA ----v
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,

Case No. CV-OC- I 604633
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

JONES GLEDHILL PUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an ldaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an ·
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Glcclhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, ,p .A.,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiffs' claims againsl Defendants are dismissed with prejud~cc.
DATED this

/ ~1J> day of July 2016.

SAMUELA. HOAGLAND
SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

J', ~

I hereb.y certify that on this ~day of
2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct
copy of the within instrument to:
~
·

Mr. Eric Clark, Esq.
Clark & Associates, PLLC
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Ms. Amanda Brailsford, Esq.
Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, PLLC
101 South Capital Blvd. Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

gref>Hfl..N\Wr,rv::!'I
By------•-.-=-------

Deputy Court Clerk

~
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NO.-----"ciF1ii"i:LEno
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A.M.----P.M-~-,.....

AUG O2 2016
C~FUSTOPHE::'t n. RICH, C!cr!,
C, DARAH TA'!LOFl
c:.:l'-U1i

-0::::
0

Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
Facsimile: 208.342.4455

Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES
AND COSTS

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code
§§12-120(3), 12-121, 12-123, Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 1
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Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham moves this Court for an award of fees and costs. This motion
is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
and the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford in Support of Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees
and Costs, both of which are filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED THIS 2 nd day of August 2016.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC

Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of August 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D
IZ!

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com

~~
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Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
Facsimile: 208.342.4455

Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

vs.

JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.
Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher
Graham (together, "Jones Gledhill") by and through their counsel ofrecord, hereby submit this
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memorandum in support of their motion for fees and costs. Filed in support of the motion is the
Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford ("Brailsford Aff. ").

INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit, filed by Eric R. Clark and his law firm, Clark & Associates, PLLC
(together, "Clark"), was frivolous. Clark incredulously alleged that anyone who touched
settlement money arising from a case on which he formerly worked could be liable to him if they
did not proactively protect his purported charging lien. Under this frivolous legal analysis, Clark
alleged that his opposing counsel, Jones Gledhill, William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
were liable to him in the amount of $500,000. Clark has now acknowledged (in support of his
motion for reconsideration) that Idaho law and the facts known to him all along would not allow
him to enforce his alleged, unperfected lien. That is, he has acknowledged that neither the facts
nor the law warrant the lawsuit he brought.
In this case, Clark also inexplicably chose to file in the public record confidential and
privileged information obtained through his representation of his former clients, thereby
attempting to make that information available both to the general public and also to Jones
Gledhill-the very lawyers who opposed his former clients. Rather than rectifying this error
upon request, Clark forced Jones Gledhill to strike the impertinent information. Ultimately,
Clark's frivolous allegations failed, and this Court should award Jones Gledhill costs and
attorney fees as a result.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2016, Clark filed his Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
("Amended Complaint"), alleging that Jones Gledhill failed to protect his interest in a purported
attorney's lien. On April 4, Jones Gledhill moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint because
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Clark had no claim against Jones Gledhill under Idaho law. Before Clark filed his lawsuit, Jones
Gledhill expressly warned him that any such action would be frivolous, and it provided Clark with
supporting authority, including the very same authority upon which this Court relied to dismiss
Clark's Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim, Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d
928 (1983). (See Brailsford Aff. at Ex. A (attaching letter from Graham to Clark dated February 23,
2016).)
On May 4, Clark opposed Jones Gledhill's motion to dismiss. Without explanation or
purpose, Clark included in his opposition certain information that was subject to his Former Clients'
attorney-client privilege or was otherwise protectable, confidential information. On May 6, Clark's
Former Clients specially appeared under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32 and moved to seal
their confidential information, and Jones Gledhill moved to strike the confidential information and
Clark's other irrelevant submissions. On May 9, Clark opposed the motions to seal and strike and
exacerbated his wrongful disclosures by filing additional confidential information in the public
record, which in tum required Jones Gledhill and the Former Clients to seek relief from these
disclosures. 1
The Court heard the motions to dismiss, seal and strike on June 3, at which time the Court
ruled from the bench that it would grant Jones Gledhill's and the Former Clients' motions. The
Comi also indicated it would issue a written order in conformity with that ruling. Ten days after the
hearing, on June 13-before the Court issued its written order-Clark filed a motion for

1

Clark also sought judicial notice of filings made in Clark v. Forbush et al, Ada County Case
No. CV-OC-1604217. Defendants responded that judicial notice was not appropriate. This issue
was heard at the same time as the motions to dismiss, seal and strike. The Court denied Clark's
motion because, on their face, the documents to be noticed did not meet the requirements of Rule
201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 3
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reconsideration and a motion to amend his complaint. Clark sought to amend his complaint by
adding Anfinson Plumbing and its insurance carrier as defendants.
Significantly, Clark argued that his motion to amend his complaint was based on an
argument purportedly made by Jones Gledhill's counsel concerning Clark's failure to name all
appropriate defendants. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Amend Complaint (hereafter Motion for Reconsideration) at p. 6 ("During oral
argument ... counsel for the Defendants argued that others had handled the settlement funds and
therefore the pleadings were deficient because these other parties were not named.").) In fact,
counsel's argument was the opposite-namely, the argument was that Clark's interpretation of
Idaho Code § 3-205 was absurd and could lead to the inclusion of many inappropriate defendants.
(Brailsford Aff. at Ex. B, pp. 24-25 (6/3/16 Hearing Transcript); id. at pp. 30-31 ("I hope the court
understands and I think that it does that my argument is not that Anfinson Plumbing and the
insurance company should be added to this case. They had no notice of the lien and my argument is
the ridiculousness of the interpretation of the statute such that ["Jin whosoever's hand the proceeds
may come["] can suddenly be a defendant. ... ").) Upon receipt of Clark's motions for
reconsideration and amendment, Jones Gledhill' s counsel began work on responses.
On June 28, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to
Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice (the
"Order"). The Court dismissed Clark's Amended Complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because Clark failed to take any steps to adjudicate and perfect
his alleged lien. It granted the motion to strike because Clark presented immaterial and irrelevant
information beyond the pleadings, and it granted the motion to seal because Clark had disclosed the
F01mer Clients' confidential information. Additionally, the Court denied Clark's motions for
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reconsideration and amendment, noting that Clark's motion for reconsideration did not add any new
facts or authorities that had any bearing on the correctness of the Court's Order.
The Court entered judgment on July 19, dismissing all of Clark's claims with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover its fees and costs incurred in this matter because
(1) Jones Gledhill is the prevailing party; (2) this action was frivolously filed and pursued; and (3) a
commercial transaction is integral to this action and is the basis for recovery in Clark's Amended
Complaint.
A. Jones Gledhill is the Prevailing Party.

"In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial
court must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to
the relief sought by the respective parties." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). "[T]he issue ... is not who
succeeded on more individual claims, but rather who succeeded on the main issue of the action."

Hobson Fabricating C01p. v. SEIZ Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 49,294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012). In
that regard, "[b]oth a party's successes in bringing claims and in defending against them are
important to the prevailing party analysis." Id at 50. A successful defense can make a defendant a
prevailing party. See, e.g., Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141
Idal10 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005) (reversing trial court's failure to find a successful
defendant as prevailing party as an abuse of discretion). "Avoiding liability is a significant benefit
to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more
exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is
for a plaintiff." Id.
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Here, Clark filed an action seeking to recover on an alleged attorney's lien. Jones Gledhill
moved to dismiss Clark's claim on the basis that Clark failed to state a claim as a matter oflaw.
This Court agreed with Jones Gledhill and granted its motion to dismiss in its entirety. 2
Consequently, Jones Gledhill avoided all liability, which is the "most favorable outcome that could
possibly be achieved." Id Clark's Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Therefore,
Jones Gledhill is the prevailing party.

B. Clark Brought This Lawsuit Frivolously, Unreasonably and Without Foundation.
Clark brought and pursued this lawsuit frivolously and without foundation. Therefore, fees
and costs may be awarded to Jones Gledhill pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. Additionally, Clark
should have known his suit was frivolous upon a reasonable inquiry into the law, and he has offered
no legitimate argument for a good faith extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
Accordingly, Jones Gledhill can also recover its fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-123.

See also Idaho R. Civ. P. 11.
1. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Fees and Costs Under§ 12-121.
Attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to§ 12-121 if the action was
brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Akers v. Mortensen, 160 Idaho
286,371 P.3d 340,343 (2016). Although courts previously construed this authorization narrowly
by finding that it did not authorize fees when there was any legitimate triable issue of fact, the Idaho
Supreme Court has since rejected that "overly strict application," thereby allowing courts to
apportion fee awards among frivolous and non-frivolous claims. See Idaho Military Historical

Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,632,329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014), reh'g denied (Aug. 6,
2014) (upholding fee award where "litigation ... should never have been necessary."). In Idaho

2

Moreover, although the proper inquiry is whether Jones Gledhill succeeded on the main issue of
this action, which it did, Jones Gledhill also succeeded on every other motion in this case.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 6
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Military Historical Society, the Court concluded that an attempt to recover on a meritless assertion
of a lien is frivolous, foundationless conduct. Id.
In that case, the parties disputed the ownership and possession of an aircraft. Id. at 627-30.
After the defendants stored and maintained the aircraft for months, they refused to release it to the
plaintiff and asse1ied a lien on the aircraft for the value of services provided. Id. The plaintiff sued
for damages and possession of the aircraft, and the defendants counterclaimed asserting their
alleged lien. Id. Ultimately, the plaintiff failed to prove its damages but defeated the defendants'
lien assertion. Id. The trial court found the plaintiff was the prevailing patiy and awarded $73,675
in attorney's fees pursuant to§ 12-121. Id. The Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, noting
that successfully defeating the lien was a significant portion of the underlying suit and explaining
that the defendants' assertion of the lien was "without foundation" because there was no evidence
the defendants were entitled to receive payment for the services they performed on the aircraft. Id.
at 631. Indeed, the Court stated that litigation to obtain possession of the aircraft should never have
been necessary because there was no factual dispute that the defendants voluntarily stored and
serviced the aircraft, and thus, there was no factual basis for their assertion of a lien. Id. at 632.
Here, there is no factual basis for Clark to enforce his purported lien against Jones Gledhill.
Clark alleged that Jones Gledhill was obligated to protect his alleged (but admittedly unperfected)
lien on settlement funds. Indeed, the entirety of Clark's Amended Complaint was premised on his
assertion of an attorney's lien and the allegation that Jones Gledhill failed to protect or honor it.

(See Order at 7 ("Clark seeks to enforce ai1 alleged attorney's lien ...."); see also Exhibit 1 to the
Amended Complaint.) Idaho law is clear, however, that a "charging lien is only brought about by
some affi.1mative act of the party asserting the lien in reducing it to a judgment or order of the
court." (Order at 8 citing Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466 660 P.2d 928,931 (1983).) There
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was never any dispute that Clark had not taken adjudicatory action to perfect his alleged charging
lien. Accordingly, "no authority exists to pay Clark any amount of money on behalf of his former
clients." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, this Court further noted that, while Clark may be
attempting to perfect his lien in other litigation against the Former Clients, that attempt has no effect
on Jones Gledhill because "the settlement check and proceeds have already gone through the hands
of' Jones Gledhill. Id. at 9.
Importantly, Clark never took the position that his alleged charging lien was perfected; he
did not do so either in his written opposition to Jones Gledhill's Motion to Dismiss or at oral
argument. Instead, Clark conceded in his motion for reconsideration that unperfected liens cannot
be enforced: "A lien is not enforceable or collectable until such time it is ultimately reduced to
judgment, because the actual damages are not yet dete1mined." (Motion to Reconsider at p. 3.)
Clark further conceded that he "had no idea what the judgment amount was" and that his suit
purportedly filed to "perfect his lien" is ongoing. (Id. at p. 4.) Based upon these concessions, Clark
essentially acknowledges that his effort to enforce an unperfected lien against Jones Gledhill was
not warranted by either law or fact.
Accordingly, Clark's decision to file suit against Jones Gledhill-who, as the Court has
aptly noted, can never be the subject of any action by Clark to enforce his lien because the subject
funds have passed through their hands, never to return-was by his own assessment frivolous and
without foundation thereby warranting an award of fees and costs under § 12-121.
2. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Fees and Costs Under§ 12-123.
Similarly, attorney's fees may be awarded to a party adversely affected by the frivolous
filing of a civil action, an assertion of a frivolous claim, or even the taking of a frivolous position in
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a civil action under § 12-123 ;3 see also Rule 11 (c) (allowing this Court to assess sanctions, sua

sponte, for frivolous filings) and Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
87, 95, 803 P.2d 993, 1001 (1991) (a party is required to make a reasonable inquiry under the
circumstances into the validity of the facts and law underlying a claim made). 4 Under§ 12-123,
frivolous conduct includes that which is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. Idaho Code§ 12-123(1)(b)(ii).
For example, in Ackerman v. Bonneville County, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's sanctions against the plaintiff for failing to make a statutory interpretation argument not
founded in good faith. In that case, the plaintiff petitioned for a "Writ of Mandate, and/or
Prohibition to be issued against the City ofldaho Falls, Bonneville County, and [the honorable]
William P. Hollerich prohibiting [him] from presiding over cases in Bonneville County .... " 140
Idaho 307, 310, 92 P.3d 557, 560 (Ct. App. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 The plaintiff
argued that Judge Hollerich, a Clark County magistrate judge, was a "de facto" Bonneville County
magistrate judge due to the number of cases he heard in Bonneville County and, thus, was required
by statute to be retained by Bonneville County voters. Id. The Ackerman court explained that, for a

3

While similar to an award of fees under § 12-121, § 12-123 can provide for fees in situations
where the former cannot. Namely, it does not require that Jones Gledhill be a prevailing party,
as it allows an award of fees to any party adversely affected by the frivolous conduct. Also,
notably, in addition to finding that an act was without foundation in fact or law,§ 12-123 is
phrased in the conjunctive, indicating that there must also be no good faith argument for an
extension of the law.
4

Clark failed to conduct a reasonably inquiry, despite that Jones Gledhill voluntarily provided
Clark with the dispositive authority before Clark filed his lawsuit and informed him that filing his
Complaint would not meet Rule 11 's standards. (Brailsford Aff. at Ex. A.)

5

The plaintiff in Ackerman essentially sought to disqualify Judge Hollerich from presiding over the
plaintiff's DUI case by filing for a writ on statutory grounds. See id at 309-10. While factually
distinguishable from this case, Ackerman is instructional on the baseless nature of Clark's claims.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 9
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writ to issue, the petitioner must establish a "clear right to the relief sought." Id. at 311. The
plaintiff cited Idaho Code§ 1-2220 to support his argument that Judge Hollerich's service in
Bom1eville County was improper. Id. The court, however, disagreed and explained that the statute
was unambiguous, requiring Judge Hollerich to be elected in the county in which he was appointed,
not in the county in which he hears cases. That the plaintiff had advanced an alternate interpretation
of that statute did not change its unambiguous nature. Id. at 312. Notably, the court stated that the
plaintiff had provided no authority under which the court could transform a magistrate elected in
one county into a magistrate for another county, and no authority regarding "de facto" magistrate
judges. Id.
Here, Clark argues that plain language of the attorney lien statute, Idaho Code§ 3-205,
allowed him to bring this action (as in Ackerman). (See Clark's Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pp. 6-8.) Clark's argument fails for numerous reasons. First,
Clark's reliance on that statute as the basis of his claim is misplaced altogether as it does not address
when an attorney's lien can be enforced. Second, the fact that Clark has put forth an "alternate"
interpretation of that statute does not mean he has put forth a good faith argument for an extension
or modification of the law. See Ackerman, 140 Idaho at 312, 92 P.3d at 562. Finally, even if
Clark's interpretation of§ 3-205 is considered, this action is still frivolous because his interpretation
does not cure the fatal deficiency in this action: he cam1ot enforce his purported (but in any event
unperfected) lien. Indeed, in his Motion for Reconsideration Clark admits that: (1) Frazee v.

Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,660 P.2d 923 (1983), requires an attorney to take affirmative steps to perfect
a charging lien; (2) he has not done so; and (3) as a result, his alleged lien is not enforceable at this
point. (Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 2-5.) Simply put, Clark does not offer any authority
suggesting that he can enforce his lien against Jones Gledhill prior to perfecting it, let alone when
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Jones Gledhill no longer possesses the subject funds. Thus, as in Ackerman, Clark's position is
unsupported by the facts and not subject to any reasonable extension or modification of the law. As
a result, Jones Gledhill should be awarded its fees and costs under§ 12-123.
3. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Fees and Costs Under§ 12-120(3).
Finally, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) authorizes an award of fees to any prevailing party if a
commercial transaction is the gravamen of, or integral to, the lawsuit and the commercial
transaction constitutes the basis for which a party is trying to recover. Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154
Idaho 866, 873-74, 303 P.3d 225, 232-33 (2013). A commercial transaction is anything other than a
transaction "for personal or household purposes." Idaho Code § 12-120(3); Goodspeed, 154 Idaho
at 874,303 P.3d at 233. Section 12-120(3) "does not require that there be a contract between the
parties before the statute is applied; the statute only requires that there be a commercial
transaction. In other contexts, this Court has given a broad meaning to the word transaction." In

re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 146 Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222
(1997) (finding that attorneys, while not literal parties to a settlement "transaction," were "so
intimately intertwined" with it that a malpractice claim against them arose out of that
transaction). "Each party to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial
purpose." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co. Inc., 152 Idaho at 756,274 P.3d at 1271 (citations omitted).
Attorneys enter into representation agreements for commercial purposes. See Reynolds v. Trout

Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idal10 21, 27,293 P.3d 645,651 (2013). While actions based
on statutory provisions are not typically commercial transactions, see, e.g., Kelly v. Silverwood

Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 631, 903 P .2d 1321, 1328 (1995) (not a commercial transaction when a
party is attempting to enforce a purely statutory right), the proper inquiry in that regard is
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whether the claim asserted depends on a commercial transaction in order to exist at all. See, e.g.,
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 152 Idaho 495,501,272 P.3d 467,473 (2012) (addressing a
proper statute of limitation, explaining that "even though statutes provide a critical element for
recovery, the action is primarily a contract action instead of an action authorized by a specific
statutory provision .... Both cases depended on a contractual relationship in order for the
plaintiff to have any claim .... ").
In this case, both Clark and Jones Gledhill-each being attorneys and law firmsengaged in their representation of their respective clients, who later settled, for commercial
purposes, giving rise to the "fund" upon which Clark attempted to recover by way of this lawsuit.
Although Clark and Jones Gledhill were not themselves party to the ultimate underlying
transaction (the settlement of a lawsuit) they were so intimately intertwined with that lawsuit that
it suffices as the commercial "transaction" underlying the instant action. Moreover, although
Clark enantly relied on a statute in bringing his claim, this action was in fact his attempt to
recover on an alleged charging lien that only (allegedly) exists by virtue of the underlying
commercial transaction. Because Jones Gledhill prevailed in this action and Clark based his
Amended Complaint on an underlying commercial transaction, Jones Gledhill is entitled to
recover its fees and costs.

C. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover the Following Fees and Costs.
1. Rule 54 Awards Costs to a Prevailing Party.
Prevailing parties are entitled to certain costs as a matter of right. Idaho R. Civ. P.
54(d)(l)(A), (C). Included in those costs are court filing fees. Id. at (d)(l)(C)(i). This Court can
also award other costs that were necessary and exceptional so long as reasonably incuned. Id. at
(d)(l )(D). When the nature of a case itself is exceptional, the costs incU1Ted are recoverable.
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Hayden Lake Fire Port. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005).

Discretionary costs can include print and copy expenses. Richard J & Esther E. Wooley Trust v.
DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 187,983. P.2d 834, 841 (1999).

In this case, Jones Gledhill incurred and paid a $136.00 filing fee which is recoverable as
a matter of right. (Brailsford Aff. at Ex. C.) Additionally, given the above-described frivolous
nature of this case, it is exceptional and Jones Gledhill should be awarded its discretionary fees.
In that regard, Jones Gledhill incurred $93.20 in print and copy expenses and $148.75 for a
transcript of the Court's June 3 hearing. (Id) That hearing was the basis upon which (prior to
any written order being issued) Clark: (1) moved for reconsideration; and (2) moved to amend in
light of comments purportedly (but not actually) made by Jones Gledhill 's counsel during that
hearing. Consequently, ordering the transcript of that hearing was reasonable and necessary.
In total, Jones Gledhill's costs amount to $499.95, of which $136 is awardable as a matter
of right.
2. Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover the Following Attorney's Fees.
As described above, Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover its attorney's fees under§§ 12121, 12-123, 12-120(3), and Rule 11. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(l). This Court, in awarding
fees to Jones Gledhill, can consider the following factors:
(A) the time and labor required;
(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability
of the attorney in the particular field of law;
(D) the prevailing charges for like work;
(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;
(G) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(H) the undesirability of the case;
(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(J) awards in similar cases;
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(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research),
if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case;
(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
See id. at (e)(3 ).

Jones Gledhill was required to retain the services of its counsel of record, who in turn had
to familiarize themselves with both this case and also the case underlying case. This matter-in
which Clark alleged damages of over $500,000-was resolved quickly and efficiently on a
reasonable hourly basis. Jones Gledhill also had to oppose Clark's request for judicial notice and
to strike impertinent, immaterial information that Clark inexplicably filed in the public record.
Moreover, this case was relatively undesirable as Clark brought suit alleging wrongdoing by
fellow members of the bar and a well-regarded local firm.
The bios of attorneys employed by Jones Gledhill' s counsel of record are provided for the
Court's review. (See Brailsford Aff. at Exs. D, E, F, and G.) The hourly rates assessed by such
counsel are reasonable and commensurate with market rates in the area for the level and type of
service provided. Finally, although minimal, legal expenses related to automated legal research
were incurred (and are awardable under Rule 54(e)(K)) in the amount of$193.14.
Accordingly, attorney's fees, including electronic research, in the amount of $35,416.50
are properly awardable to Jones Gledhill. (See Brailsford Aff. at Ex. C.)
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill's instant motion should be granted for fees and
costs in the total amount of $35,987.59.
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DATED this 2nd day of August 2016.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC

rBy

AmandaK.Brailsf
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of August 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D

U.S.Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
IZ] Email: eclark@ericrclarkattomey.com

~

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 15

000125

.:~~----~----_-_-:f."1:-:::L~--:z-M=-~-~
. . ....$~-:
AUG O2 2016
CHRISTOPl-lf.R El. RICH, Cleric
By ~AFtAff 1'AYLOR
Ol!PUTV

_,
<::r.:

:z

-

(..!)

0:::

0

Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
Facsimile: 208.342.4455
Attorneys.for Jones Gledhill Furhman Gourley, P.A.
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV-OC-1604633
AFFIDAVIT OF AMANDA K.
BRAILSFORD IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, 'individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.
County of Ada
State of Idaho

)
):ss
)

Amanda K. Brailsford, first being duly sworn, subscribes and states as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF AMANDA K. BRAILSFORD IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
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1.

I am one of the attorneys representing Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,

P.A., William Fuhrman, and Chris Graham (collectively "Jones Gledhill") in this action.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of a letter that Chris Graham and Bill

Fuhrman sent to Eric Clark on Febmary 23, 2016.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a copy of the Court Reporter's transcript for the

hearing held on June 3, 2016 in this case.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a tme and accurate accounting of the fees and costs

incurred by Jones Gledhill in this case, including the hours expended, the billing rate associated
with those hours, the description of services provided, and the date that they were provided. The
attorneys who provided services are identified on Exhibit C by their initials:
Steven B. Andersen

SBA

Amanda K. Brailsford

AKB

Rachel A. Murphy

RAM

Zach S. Zollinger

zsz

5.

The fees and costs reflected in Exhibit C were necessarily, reasonably, and actually

incurred by Jones Gledhill in this proceeding. Such costs are awardable as a matter of right
pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(C) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and in the Court's discretion
under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) of the same. Such fees are warranted and awardable as costs pursuant to
Rule 54(e). Further, the hourly rates for the identified attorneys are reasonable for the market and
experience of the identified timekeepers, and are comparable to rates charged by other professionals
providing comparable litigation services in the region.
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Attached hereto as Exhibits D, E, F, and Gare brief summaries of the attorneys

6.

who worked on this case as identified in Exhibit C.
DATED this 2nd day of August 2016.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC

A ~
Attorneys for Jones Gledhill Furhman Gourley, P.A.
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2 nd day of August 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of August 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
[:g] Email: eclark@ericrclarkattomey.com

~~
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JONES • GLED.HILL • FUHRl\tIAN • GOURLEY, P.A.
,'\ T T O R N E Y S

,\ T

L ;\
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William A. Fuhrman
Christopher P. Graham

February 23, 2016

Via Facsimile Only 939"7136
Eric R. Clark,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
1402 N. Echo Creek Place
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616-4088
Re:

Your Threatened Lllwsuir

Dear Eric:
We are in receipt of your draft Complaint. Please take a look at cases such as In re
Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476, 484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) and Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 465,
660 P.2d 928,930 (1983), both of which state that the plain language of the attorney lien statute
"only allows for a lien in favor of a lawyer against that lawyer's own client." There is absolutely
nothing written in Idaho Code § 3"205 or the caselaw interpreting that statute that authorizes an
attorney lien "in favor of an opponent's lawyer." The Complaint you sent us is factually 1 and
legally baseless and, if filed, will likely result in attorney fees and possibly Rule I I sanctions being
assessed against you.
Prior to settling the lawsuit with your former clients, we discussed the matter of your
attorney lien with Bar Counsel and were likewise told that, regardless of being placed on "notice"
of your attorney lien, we had no obligation to include your name on the settlement check issued to
your former clients.

1

Paragraph 19 in particular is grossly inaccurate. As you recall, prior to the time The Spence Law Firm became
involved in the case, Judge Copsey denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to include a prayer for punitive
damages againsl Anfinson Plumbing, despite the "extreme deviation" affidavit from Kenny Calkins. It is highly
doubtful that Judge Copsey would have reversed her prior decision, particularly after Mr. Calkins testified in his
deposition that he had changed his mind since signing the affidavit and believed Daniel Bukken's conduct did not
even rise to the level of recklessness.
The 91b & Idaho Center + 225 North 9,h Street, Suite 820
P. 0. Box 1097 + Boise, Idaho 83701
Phone (208) 331-1170 + Facsimile (208) 331-1529
E-Mail Address: bfuhnnan@idalaw.com
cgraham@idulaw.com
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Eric Clark
Feb.23,2016
Page-2
That being said, our understanding is that the money you allege you are owed pursuant to
your attorney lien is being held in trust by The Spence Law Finn. 2 Consequently, there is no need
whatsoever for you to file a Complaint against us or our law firm. Your dispute is with your former
clients and The Spence Law Firm, and we strongly encourage you to refrain from making any
further threats.

Very truly yours,

:/,_ ,()/)

/)

~

~:nnan

Very truly yours,

~

Christopher P. Graham

WAF/CPG/pu

2

Please sec the attached letter from Tyson Logan.
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February 23, 2016
Chris Graham
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.
cgraham@idalaw.com
Dear Chris,
Thank you for your February 23 email. We reviewed Mr. Clark's draft complaint against Jones
Gledhill. Mr. Clark should not have a claim against Jones Gledhill. He previously asserted an
attorney's lien against us in an August 25, 2015 letter. We have communicated with Mr. Clark
about his claimed lien, but we disagree with the amount he has asserted he is owed. This letter
is to confirm that The Spence Law Firm, LLC, is holding the full amount of Mr. Clark's claimed
lien, $140,000.00 - proceeds from the settlement paid by Anfinson's insurer - in trust, and will
continue to do so until the issue of that attorney's lien is resolved. Please feel free to share this
email with Mr. Clark, as it should resolve his threats against Jones Gledhill.

Sincerely,

Tyson E. Logan

THE SPENCE LAW FIRM, LLC • 15 S.JACKSON ST.• P.O. BOXS48 • JACKSON, l\lY 83001 • 307·733·7290 • 307·733-5248 FAX• SPENCELAWYERS.COM
C.ERRY LSrENCE,l'C• t;[l,T\\' SPENCE,l'C. ROBEKT A.1:RAUSE,rc • It. IIANIELFLECl(,l'C•C.BRYANUL\IERIJl,rc •MELC ORCIL\RJllll,PC• EMIL\'R RANI.IN.re. ~1.1:IIJSTELN IL\Nll.l'C •T\'SON E LOGAN.PC
J. IIOUGLASMCCALI.A,rC • llOY A JACUnSONJR.PC• OFCllUNSEL• LARISSAA.MCCALLA • MAIU-T..ARON0\\1n • CRA."IT ll. LAWSON• ELIZl\6£TIIA RIC:IL\RO~ • SOAll I\' IIREI\'• MICIL\ELF LUT7.·MSOC/Ar£.f
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02/23/2016 TUE 15:14
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FAX
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*********************
*** FAX TX REPORT ***
*********************
TRANSMISSION OK
NO.
DEPT. ID
DESTINATION ADDRESS
SUBADDRESS
DESTINATION ID
ST. TIME
TX/RX TIME
PGS.
RESULT
JOB

J

2313
9

9397136

02/23 15:12
01'47
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roNES. GLEDf-IILL. FUHRMAN. GOURLEY~ P.A.
.

.:\ITQRNEYS

AT

L,;\\V/

William A. ruhrman
Christopher P. Graham

February 23, 2016
Via Facsimile Only 939-7136

Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
1402 N. Echo Creek Place
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616-4088
Re:

Your Threatened Lawsuit

Dear Eric:
We are in receipt of your draft Complaint. Please take a look at cases such as In re
Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476,484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) and Frazee v. Frazee, 104 ldaho 463,465,
660 P.2d 928, 930 (1983), both of which state that the plain language of the attorney lien statute
"only allows for a lien in favor of a lawyer against that lawyer's own client." There is absolutely
nothing written in Idaho Code § 3-205 or the caselaw interpreting that statute that authorizes an
attorney lien "in favor of an opponent's lawyer." The Complaint you sent us is factually 1 and
legally baseless and, if filed, will likely result in attorney fees and possibly Rule 11 sanctions being
assessed against you.
Prior to settling the lawsuit with your former clients, we discussed the matter of your
attorney lien with Bar Counsel and were likewise told that, regardless of being placed on "notice"
of your attorney lien, we had no obligation to include your name on the settlement check issued to
your fonner clients.
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1

2

IN THE DISTRICT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

Case No. CVOC 2016 -

04633

4
ERIC CLARK,
5

Plaintiff,
6
vs.
7

JONES GLEDHILL,

ET AL.,

8

Defendants.
9

10
11

12

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

13

Motion to Dismiss hearing held on June 3, 2016
before the Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Court
Judge.

14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25

CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044
1 of 11 sheets

Page 1 to 1 of 35
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2
1 •

June 3, 2016
10:00 a.m.

1
2

2

3

MOTION TO DISMISS

4

3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

APPEARANCES:
THE PLAINTIFF, MR. ERIC CLARK, WAS IN PRO SE.
FOR THE DEFENDANT, MS. AMANDA BRAILSFORD.
THE COURT: All right. Good morning,
everybody. This is the case of Eric R. Clark versus Jones
Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., etcetera. Eric Clark is
present representing himself. And we've got Ms.
Brailsford for the defense.
We're here on a 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
Before we do that, just for the record, once I opened the
file, I realized that I had had a prior professional
relationship with Mr. Clark. I sent out a notice. We
received no information that either party would like me to
recuse myself. I just want to confirm for the record at
this point in time that's correct because really it's
speak now or forever hold your peace.
So either party wants me to -- wants me to
recuse myself, I would do so. If not, I'm ready to
proceed.
MS. BRAILSFORD: We don't, Your Honor. But
I have had one repeat question and I wonder if I could
inquire. What the meaning of a common professional
relationship is?
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044
4
So rather than the customary process, I
think, Ms. Brailsford, I'll let you kind of argue those
two motions and Mr. Clark can kind of argue his motion for
judicial notice. We'll just address those in a single
back and forth and then go straight to the Motion to
Dismiss.
MS. BRAILSFORD: Certainly, Your Honor. I
think once the court hears the Motion to Dismiss, it will
become evident why the Motion to Strike and the motion to
seal need to be granted because of the nature of the
merits of the Motion to Dismiss and the facts that Mr.
Clark has submitted into the record do not fairly relate
to the Motion to Dismiss and are extraneous.
The reason, Your Honor, for both the motion
to strike and the motion to seal is that I'm appearing
today on behalf of the law firm of Jones Gledhill, Mr.
Fuhrman and Mr. Grant, who are all defendants. They're
opposing the complaint in a Motion to Dismiss under
12(6)(6).
Rule 26 -- or I'm sorry. Rule 12(B)(6)
provides, Your Honor, that if a motion -- if on motion
asserting the defense number six to dismiss for failure of
a pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044

06/29/2016 02:11:57 PM

5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

3
THE COURT: Eric represented the parents of
a decedent and I represented the driver in a motor vehicle
collision in Gooding County, and we tried that case for
ten days, I think, in Gooding. And so that we were
roughly on the same side of the case. And so there were
lots of depositions and things of that nature and,
frankly, strategizing in that case.
Subsequent to that time, Mr. Clark moved his
office to the Treasure Valley area and we talked back and
forth at various times about various cases and matters of
that nature. And then at one point in time, he hired me
to testify as a pharmacist in a -- turns out it was a
legal malpractice case and it did result in actual trial
testimony. Though it was a legal malpractice case, I only
testified as to pharmacy-type issues.
MS. BRAILSFORD: Thank you for the
explanation, Your Honor. We have no objection.
THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, I
suppose what we ought to do is take up arguments on the
motions to strike and motion to seal before we actually
address the 12(B)(6).
So let's address those first and I think
probably the motions to strike and seal should come first
and then maybe the motion for judicial notice second, I
suppose. And then we can address the Motion to Dismiss.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

5
as one for summary judgement and disposed of as provided
under Rule 56.
Mr. Clark in opposition to the Rule 12(6)(6)
motion has put numerous documents into the record that
have absolutely no relationship to the question of whether
he can assert an attorney's lien against Jones Gledhill.
Whether that is a claim that is afforded under Idaho law,
which we submit is not and is contrary to Idaho law. But
what we want to make clear in the record is that we -that this is not a motion for summary judgement. The fact
that Mr. Clark has submitted these numerous different
records in -- or numerous different documents into the
record, which include things such as attorney/client
privileged communications between Mr. Clark, his former
clients and the Spence Law Firm, letters related to his
fee arrangement with the Spence Law Firm, different
comments on the strategy and Mr. Clark's belief about the
Anfinson defendants.
And none of those from the perspective of
the Jones Gledhill defendants, Your Honor, none of those
documents address the Motion to Dismiss. They're
extraneous and improper in the record and for that reason
we request that the court strike them so that the record
is clear that the court is not considering them under the
Rule 12(B)(6) motion. And those documents would include
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044
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6
1

the declaration of Eric Clark filed in opposition to the

7
1

clients; Travis Forebush, Gretchen Heimus and Brianna
Holloway.

2

defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on May 4th

2

3

of this year. Pages 2 through 5 of the plaintiff's

3

Mr. Clark has filed a separate lawsuit down

4

memorandum filed in opposition to the defendant's Motion

4

5

to Dismiss, which was also filed on May 4th. And then
subsequently the declaration of Eric Clark filed in
support of the plaintiff's motion for judicial notice,

5

the hall in Judge Hippler's courtroom against those
clients and also he's proposing an amendment to add the

which was also filed -- was filed this year on May 9th.
None of those documents, none of that

8

6

7
8
9
10

commentary has any relationship to the question about

6

7
9

Spence Law Firm to that lawsuit.
The former clients appear in this action,
Your Honor, under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32,
which allows any party to appear in any action to protect

10

their confidential information from public disclosure.

11

whether Mr. Clark can assert an attorney's lien under the

11

12

Idaho Code Section 3 - 205. It's completely extraneous.

12

The documents that the former clients seek
to have sealed are identified specifically in pages five

13

For that reason, it's proper for the court to exclude it
under Rule 12(6)(6).

13

and six of their reply in support of the motion to seal

14

information protected by the attorney/client privilege and

There's an additional basis to strike it and
that, Your Honor, is Rule 12(F), which provides the court
discretion to strike any redundant, immaterial,

15
17

the work product doctrine.
The basis for the client's motion, Your
Honor, is that Mr. Clark represented the former clients --

impertinent or scandalous matters. We submit that all of
the information that we've identified here that Mr. Clark

18

and I call them former clients because they were his

19

has submitted is immaterial to the question before the
court, which is purely a legal question, based upon both

20

former clients not because they're my former clients
obviously. He represented the former clients in a
wrongful death action called Forebush versus Sage Crest.

Jones Gledhill's argument as well as Mr. Clark's opposing
argument on the 12(8)(6) motion.

22
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25
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In addition, Your Honor, I appear on a
limited capacity today on behalf of Mr. Clark's former
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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Anfinson.
The case remains pending. So ultimately the
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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Mr. Fuhrman and Mr. Graham of Jones Gledhill represented a
defendant in that case. The one I mentioned earlier,
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8
former clients settled against the Anfinson defendants.
But the Forebush versus Sage Crest wrongful death case is
currently before the Idaho Supreme Court. And there are

9

1
2

that, the clients are appearing under the Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 32 to ask the court to seal certain

3

documents.

two remaining defendants. In the event that appeal is
successful, there will be a remand for trial.
The former clients of Mr. Clark are very

4

Now, Your Honor, the Motion to Strike is
general and relates to all documents that we've identified

concerned about Mr. Clark's possession of confidential
information that he has an obligation to maintain as

7

that don't bear on having a relationship to are immaterial
to the Rule 12(6)(6). And the reason we have a motion to

8

seal, which is different, is that, you know, I guess,

confidential, and that information includes just simply
information about their representation under the Idaho

9
10
11
12

frankly, I'm not sure how it work in the Clerk's Office.
I think if there's a Motion to Strike, the records remain
in the records such that they can be reviewed on appeal.
And so then it requires the motion to seal to make sure

13

that nobody can go into the Clerk's Office and review
whatever remains in the record.
Now, we're mindful of the court's obligation
to give public access to records in a public proceeding,

5

6

13

Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6(A). The attorney/client
privilege under Idaho Rule of Evidence 502. And the Work
Product Doctrine under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

14

26(6)(3).

14

15

Of course, as a representative of the former
clients in the currently pending Forebush versus Sage

15

Crest action, Mr. Clark possesses information that is
confidential and highly sensitive to the former clients
and their right to ultimately recover against the

17

and for that reason we have tried to limit what the former

18

clients are requesting be sealed such that it merely
protects the confidential information about their legal

remaining defendants.
And in this case Mr. Clark, for reasons
unknown to me and without explanation, has submitted a

20

11
12

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

19

plethora of documents that contain privileged information,
which are now in the record, could be discovered by the
remaining active defendants in that case. And to prevent
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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21

22
23
24
25

representation, about their attorney/client communications
and about work product related to their pending action.
So the court will see when we identify in
our briefing what is to be sealed and what is to be
stricken. They're a little bit different for that reason.
They're two reasons, Your Honor, that the
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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10

11

1

court has the ability to seal these records. One is under

1

record the various ways which I think that that could

2

the Administrative Rule 3(G)(1). It very clearly states

2

unfold. I've worked with many clever counsel and many
clever opposing counsel. I think there are ways that they

3

that the documents and records to which access is

4

otherwise restricted by law are confidential and exempt

3
4

5

from disclosure.
So it's not even -- there is no obligation

6

presented to the jury of a comparative fault nature, for
example, if there's a remand. And Mr. Clark's view on the

for anyone to show up and seal the records. The

7

fault of defendants who have been dismissed from the

obligation is on behalf of the attorney who should know
that these documents are confidential and protected by law

8

action might be useful information, for example.

6

7
8
9

5

can do that. There are issues that will undoubtedly be

So for that reason, the former clients

9

10

not to submit them in the record in the first instance.

10

request that the court seal the records and then for

11

So they're perse protected from disclosure in the record.
Second basis, Your Honor, is that Rule 30-21

11

purposes of making sure the record is clear on the
12(8)(6) motion, Your Honor, Jones Gledhill requests that

12

12
13

14

of the Administrative Rule provides that the court has
discretion in certain instances to protect people's

15

confidential information. And the two subparts that are

15

know that Mr. Clark is going to raise this and maybe it

16

16

will reduce reply. And that he contends that we have --

17

applicable in this case, we believe, are 32(1)(5), which
preserves the right to a fair trial. And 32(1)(3), which

17

that the former clients have waived any objection to the

18

avoids economic or financial loss by the disclosure of

18

19

confidential information.
Again, there is a significant concern that
opposing counsel in the pending action could get their

filing of their protected information in the record
because he has filed the same confidential protected

20

13

20
21

22
23
24
25

14

19
21

22
23
24
25

hands on this information, glean from it easily Mr.
Clark's insight into the case and use that against his
former clients.
You know, I hesitate to explain on the
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK

the documents as identified be stricken from the record.
And one more point, Your Honor, because I

information in the other case.
It's a little bit different, Your Honor, and
it deals with the procedure before any lawsuits were
filed. Mr. Clark was repeatedly warned by my firm that he
was not authorized to disclose the client's confidential
information.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK

SRL-1044

SRL-1044

12

1

13

1

2

On May 3rd we had a deposition in the other
case; Mr. Clark's case against his former clients. Off

2

3

the record in that deposition we discussed the concerns

3

4

4

6
7

that we had about the disclosure of confidential
privileged information in the record in that case. On the
record we entered into a stipulation whereby Mr. Clark
agreed that he would stipulate to a protective order to

6
7

I have an obligation to protect the confidential
information from disclosure. There's no reason for Jones
Gledhill to know that. They've been very good sports

8

protect the information and reasonably acknowledged that

8

about not demanding to see it and understanding why we're

9

since he is suing the clients for recovery in the case, if
he jeopardizes that case, it in turn jeopardizes his

9

10
11

interests.

12

not preparing for it. But Mr. Clark's filing it in this
case has, you know, compounded both the representation of
the party that should be entitled to know what's filed
against them as well as unlawfully disclosed his former

5

10
11

So we were comfortable at that point that we

12

5

In this case he has attempted to disclose it
to Jones Gledhill and the Jones Gledhill defendants. I
have not shared the information that has been filed
against them with them, which they understand why because

13

had an agreement and being mindful of the court's

13

client's privileged communications and unnecessarily.

14

overburdened calendar, that we could resolve it outside
the courtroom ourselves and come to an agreement.
The very next day in this case Mr. Clark

14

Again, I have -- there is no explanation for
what he has done that I'm aware of.
Currently in the other case we had been

filed the plethora of records that contained his former
client's confidential privileged information. In this
case, Your Honor, it's particularly egregious because

17

those communications at least in the other case were filed
in a case where the parties were already privy to the

20

information. The clients were privy to the information;
Mr. Clark's privy information. Still in the public
record, which is improper, but it was not a further
disclosure.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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negotiating a protective order and Mr. Clark had not
responded to my most recent communication. So I recently
filed a motion to get that protective order entered. It's
through that process that we hope to get the documents in
that case sealed so that they cannot be reviewed by the
public and in particular by anybody associated with the
defendants who currently have a pending action against Mr.
Clark's former clients.
One more thing. Mr. Clark has asserted that
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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15

14

he has the right under Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6(B)(S) to disclose this information. That provision
says -- it's an exception to the general provision, which
says as an attorney thou shalt not reveal any information

1

2
3
4

about your client's representation without permission or
consent of the clients.

5

16 -- I'm sorry. 1.6(B)(S) is a limited
exception, which provides a lawyer may reveal information
relating to representation of a client to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a claim
or a defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the client and the lawyer.
Several points on this. Although this rule
might provide that he has the limited ability to share
with the court certain privileged information in his other
case, there's nothing in here that says that that
information can -- that this rule trumps the Idaho Court
Administrative Rule that says such things are perse
confidential and should not be disclosed in the public
record. You should still have an obligation to seal the
documents.

7

Second, this is certainly not a controversy
between Mr. Clark and his client. This is a controversy
between Mr. Clark and his opposing counsel in the former
case, Jones Gledhill. So the rule is inapplicable.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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And, finally, Your Honor, we do not see how
Mr. Clark could reasonably believe that throwing all this
information into the record in this case is reasonable in
light of the issues before the court, which is purely
interpretation of a statute.
I'll move on to the judicial -- is that what
you want me to do, Your Honor? Is move on to judicial
notice now?
THE COURT: Yes. Sure.
MS. BRAILSFORD: It's Mr. Clark's motion,
but I'll steal the thunder and go first.
The opposition of Jones Gledhill to the
motion for judicial notice, Your Honor, appears at page
six through eight of the defendant's reply in support of
the Motion to Strike. That was filed on May 27th. So we
joined those briefs and I wanted to make sure that the
court understood that that's where the supporting argument
for opposition to the motion for judicial notice.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a
judicially noticed fact must be one -- must not be one
subject to reasonable dispute. And that is because it is
either generally known within the jurisdiction or capable
of accurate and ready determination to resort by sources
whose accuracies cannot be questioned.
Certainly the information that Mr. Clark has
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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filed in this case, which includes correspondence between
his clients, correspondence between Spence and the
clients, correspondence between Mr. Clark and Spence, is
not something that is known within the jurisdiction. It's
-- much of it is Mr. Clark's conjecture and is not
reasonably susceptible to being determined as accurate.
Further, Rule 201 is limited to adjudicated
facts and adjudicated facts are those that are controlling
or operative, not background facts, and that help the
court apply the law of the party's dispute. So judicial
notice, Your Honor, would be proper if, you know, the
crime witness said: I can't remember what day I saw the
car run the red light, but I remember I had been up early
that morning to watch Neil Armstrong walk on the moon for
the first time and watch Walter Cronkite report that.
At which point the court can take judicial
notice that the car ran the red light on July 20th, 1969.
In this case though there's no such similar
issue. The information that Mr. Clark has put into the
record is entirely extraneous to the proceedings before
this court. There is no basis to determine that they're
accurate, that they're known in the jurisdiction or that
they had any operative meaning in this case.
Mr. Clark's submissions meet none of the
required criteria, and for that reason it's entirely
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044

5 of 11 sheets

17
1
2
3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

inappropriate to judicially notice papers file in another
matter.
Do you have any questions, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Nope.
MS. BRAILSFORD: All right. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Clark.
MR. CLARK: Good morning, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MR. CLARK: Your Honor, regarding the 12(B)
motion or regarding the documents that we filed, I believe
under a 12(B) motion the party is entitled to supplement
the record with what it believes is relevant information
even though the original party has not filed any
extraneous information. That gives the judge the
authority to decide whether the court is going to consider
extraneous information or not.
And that's what we did in this case. We
provided the information that we believed was relevant to
the facts and to give the court the proper background
information related to the party's claims. And that's
what we did. And the court is free to take that
information and use it as it will with regard to the -its decision on the 12(B)(6) motion.
With regard to the motion to seal and
strike. Again, the defendants finally got around to
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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specifically identifying what documents they thought were
relevant in their reply brief; not in their opening brief.
So we believed they've waived any comment to specifically
identify the documents. And regardless, none of these
documents -- the documents appeared in the other case and
I'm entitled under Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct to provide information to the court that I believe
is pertinent to the defense of any claim against my
clients.
Ms. Brailsford talked a little bit about
these proceedings with the protective order. She didn't
mention that subsequent to the discussion on the
protective order the defendants in the Clark versus
Forebush case have filed a counterclaim and that I believe
directly affects my entitlement to provide information in
my defense.
With regard to the issue of judicial notice;
again there's -- the court can take judicial notice of
documents filed in another case. The documents filed in
the other case were not subject to any type of protective
order. There was no move to strike those documents in the
prior case. So I don't think there's any merit to the
argument that they should be stricken by this court.
Your Honor, really that's all I have with
regard to the response to the Motion to Strike, the motion
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044
20
concerned about his wrongful disclosure of information, he
filed more information.
And with regard, Your Honor, to the
counterclaim that is pending against Mr. Clark in Judge
Hippler's courtroom; that has no bearing on this case.
Mr. Clark has no justification for filing information in
the record in this case because there is a counterclaim
against him in another case.
So with regard to the Motion to Dismiss,
Your Honor, it turns on and only needs to turn on and can
only turn on the basic facts. And those facts are Mr.
Clark represented the former clients in Forebush versus
Sage Crest. Jones Gledhill represented a defendant, the
Anfinson Plumbing and an employee. Mr. Clark co-counseled
with the Spence Law Firm. Mr. Clark's representation was
terminated. Mr. Clark notified Jones Gledhill that he was
asserting an attorney's lien under Idaho Code Section 3 205. The former clients eventually settled with Anfinson.
Anfinson's insurance carrier issued a check to the Spence
Law Firm, sent it to Jones Gledhill, who in turn forwarded
it on to the Spence Law Firm. Mr. Clark hasn't accepted
funds from the Spence Law Firm for his payments for
reasons that are -- I can't disclose but are unrelated to
the motion. And now Mr. Clark has sued Jones Gledhill and
Mr. Fuhrman and Mr. Graham for failure to protect his
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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to seal. I think the court has discretion in granting
either one and I just -- I'll rely on the court's
discretion to do that.
THE COURT: All right. If that's all you
have, let's hear the 12(6)(6) arguments.
MS. BRAILSFORD: Your Honor, briefly on
reply, if I may.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. BRAILSFORD: Mr. Clark has argued that
we have waived our right to a Motion to Strike and motion
to seal because we failed to identify in our opening
briefs. The documents that we sought to have stricken and
sealed, in fact, both in the motion, not the -- in both
motions and the brief those are identified.
So the motion filed on May 6th identifies
the information the clients seek to have sealed. The
Motion to Strike filed on May 6th likewise identifies the
information Jones Gledhill seeks to have stricken. In
response to those motions Mr. Clark filed yet more
confidential information in the record. And so for that
reason on reply we have a complete list of everything that
we seek to have sealed and stricken.
The reason that some of that information is
not identified in the motions is because Mr. Clark in
response to the motions where his former clients are
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044
21
interests in his client's recovery against the opposing
party represented by Jones Gledhill.
The nature of Mr. Clark's claim is that he
has an attorney's lien, according to him, on his former
client's recovery against Anfinson. That that lien
attached to the settlement funds in Jones Gledhill's hands
and that Jones Gledhill owed Mr. Clark a duty to include
his name as a payee on the check.
Your Honor, no such claim exists under Idaho
law. And, in fact, Mr. Clark's claim is contrary to Idaho
law. Idaho's law is clear that there are five
requirements to an attorney's lien. Those are set forth
in Skelton versus Skelton, 102 Idaho 69. And Mr. Clark's
attorney's lien does not meet any of those provisions.
But more directly, Your Honor, the case law
provides that an attorney cannot have an attorney's lien
against his opponent or his opposing counsel. In Re:
Goldberg. 235 BR 476, which is an Idaho bankruptcy case,
it says it most plainly, Your Honor. The plain language
of Idaho Code 3 - 205 allows only for a lien in favor of a
lawyer against that lawyer's own client.
"There is nothing in Section 3 - 205 or case
law that authorizes an attorney's lien in favor of any
opponent's lawyer." That's a direct quote, Your Honor, at
page 484.
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044

Page 18 to 21 of 35

000141

6 of 11 sheets

22

I

23

1

Goldberg relies on Frasey and Frasey is

1

allegations don't say the funds came from Jones Gledhill,

2

equally clear. It provides -- and this is a quote -- "an

2

which they did not.

3

attorney lien cannot be levied against the property of the

3

4

opposing party who is a total stranger to the contract

4

5

under which the attorney claims money." In this case Mr.

5

mails it to Jones Gledhill, who in turn mails it on to

6

Fuhrman, Mr. Graham, Jones Gledhill, a total stranger to

6

Spence. At no time did Jones Gledhill have possession of

7

Mr. Clark's claim for attorney's fees against his clients
under either a relationship or a contract with those

7
8

any actual proceeds or funds. It simply conveyed a

8
9

clients.

9

the right to access the funds.

10

Jones Gledhill expressly warned Mr. Clark

In fact, what happened is the Anfinson
insurance carrier writes a check to the Spence Law Firm,

negotiable instrument that gave somebody, Spence Law Firm,

10

In short, Your Honor, the plain language of

that he did not have a claim before he filed a lawsuit

11

the statute is very clear. The attorney who appears for a

12

against them. Indeed in that warning they cited Frasey

12

party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or

13

and Goldberg to him. Nonetheless, Mr. Clark filed his

13

counterclaim. His client's. Under the case law Mr. Clark

11

14

lawsuit anyway. On reply to the -- or in response to the

14

can't enforce a lien against Jones Gledhill because the

15

motion, Mr. Clark attempts to distinguish Goldberg and

15

statute does not authorize a lien against his opponent, is

16

Frasey on the basis there is a settlement fund in this

16

not adjudicated the reasonableness of the fees, and Jones

17

case.

17

Gledhill never controlled the funds.

To the contrary, Your Honor. There was no

18

18

Now, there is a suggestion, Your Honor, in

19

fund in Jones Gledhill's hands. The funds that Mr. Clark

19

the Frasey case that there might be an attorney's lien in

20

seeks we know to be and he knows to be in the Spence Law

20

a non fund situation. A situation where the party doesn't

21

Firm's trust account. Still today. Jones Gledhill never

21

actually have possession of the funds, but that's only

22

had control over the actual settlement fund. In fact, Mr.

22

where the lien is adjudicated. It violates the due

23

Clark's allegations at paragraph 21 of the complaint admit

23

process of Mr. Clark's clients and the Spence Law Firm to

24

this. He says Anfinson Plumbing and Bakken -- that's the

24

have this court enter an order that there is an attorney's

25

Anfinson employee -- sent a check to Spence. Even his own

25

CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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lien against Jones Gledhill when Jones Gledhill has no
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24
1

ability to oppose Mr. Clark's claim to the fees.

2

It doesn't know what the fee arrangement was

1

instrument, well, you know, Jones Gledhill had it. Did

2

Mr. Fuhrman handle it? I don't know. I don't think

3

between Spence and the former clients and Mr. Clark. It

3

there's any direct proof that he handled it. Did Mr

4

doesn't know what work they claim he did and didn't do.

4

Graham handle it? Well, maybe. Somebody must have. Did

5

It doesn't know what concerns they have about payment.

the insurance carrier's financial institution handle it?
carrier handle it? Yes. Did the mail carrier handle it
when they delivered the check?

6

It's completely in the dark. There's no way that Jones

7

Gledhill can come in and litigate whether or not the fee

5
6
7

8

that Mr. Clark contends he's owed is reasonable.

8

9
10

These failures, Your Honor, are not overcome
by Mr. Clark's only other argument. In that he claims

Absolutely. They had the proceeds. Did the insurance

9
10

It is a literal reading of: "In whosoever's
hands the proceeds may come" are liable for the attorney's

11

he's entitled to recover on his lien against anyone who

11

lien. That's a Pandora's box every time there's an

12

came into contact with the settlement proceeds. He bases

12

attorney's fee dispute that anybody who is a stranger and

13

that upon the statutory language that says that the lien

13

completely unrelated and has no idea what's going on

14

attaches to proceeds in whosoever's hands the proceeds may

14

suddenly gets notice of a lien and sued by Mr. Clark.
There's no end to that interpretation.

15

come. But proceeds has to mean the actual money;

15

16

certainly can't mean a negotiable instrument. Jones

16

17

Gledhill had no ability to pencil in Eric Clark's name on

17

18

Anfinson's insurance carrier's check to the Spence Law

18

client's recovery. Jones Gledhill had the obligation to

19

Firm. It's probably illegal to do that. I don't know.

19

finalize a settlement, to obtain a stipulation for

20
21

As a practical matter, Mr. Clark's

Jones Gledhill did not have the obligation,
Your Honor, to protect Mr. Clark's interests in his

20

dismissal and to make sure that the court was apprised

interpretation of the statute makes innumerable strangers

21

that the parties had settled and could vacate the trial.

22

to his right to the fee potentially liable for those fees

22

23

just in this case alone. Who handled the proceeds in the

23

if it could have, which it couldn't have -- but if it were

24

case? Well, if you assume, which I think is an incorrect

24

to have put Mr. Clark's name on the check, then

25

assumption, that the proceeds means the negotiable

25

CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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If Jones Gledhill were to put Mr. Clark's --

potentially it would interfere with its own client's
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27

1

interest to conclude the case. Jones Gledhill acted on

1

actually against Jones Gledhill, Mr. Fuhrman and Mr.

2

behalf of its client's best interests, not Mr. Clark's, as

2

Graham.

3

the case should be.

3

4

Now, for that reason, Your Honor, because

4

THE COURT: I'm good. Thank you. Mr.
Clark.
MR. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor. I heard

5

Jones Gledhill was acting on behalf of its client's

5

6

interests in a litigation, it is immune for its conduct

actually in the record. So I hope you can sort through
those.

7

under the litigation privilege, which is also set forth in

6
7

8
9

our brief. The litigation privilege provides that it

8

protects attorneys against civil actions by their client's

9

10

adversary against civil action, which arises as a result

10

Exhibit Number Five, which is the letter I sent to counsel

11

of their conduct and communications in the representation

11

asserting my lien.

12

of a client related to a judicial proceeding.

12

13

Mr. Clark contends that this privilege

counsel discuss a lot of facts that I don't believe are

We provided a notice of lien as declaration

THE COURT: That brings up my first

13

question. The first place I looked for was Exhibit A of
the amended complaint. I couldn't find it,

14

contradicts the attorney's lien statute. Well, it only

14

15

contradicts Mr. Clark's misinterpretation of the

15

MR. CLARK: It --

16

attorney's lien statute. In fact, the attorney's lien

16

THE COURT: Or Exhibit One.

17

statute says you can't have a lien against your opponent.

17

MR. CLARK: My copy of the amended complaint

18

The litigation privilege says you can't sue your opponent

18

19

to recover your fees against your client.

19

20

So under Idaho law, they dovetailed.

has the exhibit.
THE COURT: The original --

20

MR. CLARK: Maybe it doesn't.

21

They're very consistent. It's Mr. Clark's reading of them

21

THE COURT: -- does not.

22
23
24
25

which is inconsistent.

22
23
24
25

MR. CLARK: Well, it's Exhibit One of the

So if the court has any questions, I'm happy
to answer them. otherwise, we request an entire dismissal
of Mr. Clark's complaint. It's an amended complaint

original complaint and Exhibit Five of my declaration. If
it wasn't included on the amended complaint, I apologize
to the court.

CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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2

THE COURT: We did ultimately find it in
Exhibit Five. I assume that's the same thing.

3
4

MR. CLARK: I believe it is, Your Honor. I
apologize to the court.

5

Case then settled in January for a million

1

action, that's exactly what is happening here. We're

2

Bening the client's cause of action from -- in the

3

possession of co-counsel or opposing counsel.

4

Your Honor, we cited to the Skelton versus

5

Spencer (sic) case where the court has said: "The intent

6
7

dollars. We had some following E-mails between Jones

6

of the law on this point is to allow an attorney an

Gledhill and myself. We disagreed on the law. And so

7

interest in the fruits of his skill and labor." That's

8

once I determined that the funds had actually been paid to

8

Skelton versus Skelton, 102 Idaho at 77.

9

my friend at the Spence firm, I served -- I filed the

11

Law Firm offered me the funds. Well, that's simply not

9
10
11

12

true. We wouldn't be here if we had reached a settlement

12

no protection. There is no protection of the interests of

13

with the Spence firm.

13

the attorney if there's a ruling that the lien doesn't

14

arise until the client gets the funds. That's simply

10

claim and I think Ms. Brailsford suggested that the Spence

14

We believe -- we agree with counsel that

Now think about the operation of the lien.
How effective is a lien if it doesn't apply until the
client gets the money? The money is then gone. There's

15

this is a statutory interpretation case. I also disagree

15

ridiculous. That undermines the entire intent of the lien

16

with counsel that there's any case law on point regarding

16

statute. That's our basis.

17

the facts of this case. With regard to 32-05, we believe

17

18

the language from commencement of an action -- and I'm

18

19

paraphrasing -- the attorney who appears for a party has a

19

determine the intent of the legislature when looking at

20

lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim,

20

the particular statute.

21

which attaches to the verdict report and decision or

21

22
23
24
25

judgment in the client's favor and proceeds thereof in

22
23
24
25

whosoever's hands they may come.
Well, if the client has a cause of action
and the client is being compensated based on that cause of

The section interprets it defeats the very
purpose of the lien and it's the court's duty when -- to

Now, there are some argument that we never
touched the check. So, therefore, Jones Gledhill doesn't
have any liability. Well, that's somewhat ridiculous
considering the relationship of Jones Gledhill to the
funds and to their client.

CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK

CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK

SRL-1044

SRL-1044

06/29/2016 02:11:57 PM

Page 26 to 29 of 35

8 of 11 sheets
000143

30
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

Now, based on that argument it appears that
there are additional parties that should be joined in the
case including possibly insurance company and possibly
Anfinson Plumbing themselves. And apparently if there is,
the litigation privilege -- litigation privilege does
apply, then we should be allowed to amend our pleadings to
add the parties that should be -- apparently based on
counsel's argument -- should be in the case.
Your Honor, unless you have some questions,
that's all I have. We'll defer our arguments in our
brief.
THE COURT: No. I don't, but I do think
that the plaintiff does get the final word.
MS. BRAILSFORD: Thanks, Your Honor. Oh,
I'm sorry. The defense?
THE COURT: Or defendant.
MS. BRAILSFORD: I took the opportunity even
though you misstated it. Thank you.
THE COURT: The movant.
MS. BRAILSFORD: I'll be quick. I hope the
court understands and I think it does that my argument is
not that Anfinson Plumbing and the insurance company
should be added to this case. They had no notice of the
lien and my argument was the ridiculousness of the
interpretation of the statute such that in whosoever's
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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6
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15
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20
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25

hand the proceeds may come can suddenly be a defendant,
and I think it's precisely the suggestion that Mr. Clark
-- that he would add them as, you know, the kind
of judicial injustice that should be avoided by
interpreting the statute to -- limited to the case law as
it has now, which is that you have an attorney's lien
against your client.
Now, it is not Jones Gledhill's obligation
to protect Mr. Clark's interests in his recovery against
his clients. The attorney's lien statute is not intended,
Your Honor, to provide a surefire payment for the
plaintiff's counsel or the defense counsel who has a
dispute with their former client. It is to provide them
some security as against a -- vis-a-vis their client.
Similar to a hospital lien provides the hospital.
So with that said, Your Honor, I have
nothing further other than we request that the court grant
the Motion to Dismiss, the Motion to Strike and the Motion
to Seal and deny the Motion For Judicial Notice.
Unless you've got any further questions,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: No. I think I'm good.
MS. BRAILSFORD: Thank you.
THE COURT: Counsel, there's two kinds of
attorney lien. The possessory lien and the charging lien,
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
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5

6
7
8

9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

and the way the possessory lien is enforced is when the
attorney has the funds in his possession, then he can make
sure he gets paid from the funds in his possession.
In this situation Mr. Clark could not have a
possessory lien because at the time the case was settled,
he was no longer representing the parties.
So it really boils down to the effect and
consequences of the statute, Idaho Code Section 3 - 205.
And, quite frankly, I've always understood that for an
attorney's lien to be effective, it had to be perfected.
It had to meet the requirements set forth in Skelton. And
that it had to be -- that the attorney asserting the
charging lien had to take affirmative action to reduce the
lien to a judgment or order of the court.
My basic understanding in all of that is
that in order to be perfected, that the client in this
circumstance would have the due process and fair
opportunity to contest the nature and extent of the amount
claimed owed, etcetera. So that the lien would either be
-- or the amount owed in this case would either be
resolved by stipulation and consent or by some
adjudicatory process. Neither of those occurred in this
case.
What we have at best is a letter from -- or
an E-mail from Mr. Clark essentially saying: I'm
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044

9 of 11 sheets

1
2

3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

asserting a lien or intending to assert a lien. But I
don't think that he ever actually had a lien and I don't
think that the lien that he claimed had ever been
perfected.
As a consequence, I don't think that the law
firm owed him any duty because I don't think that he had a
valid and perfected lien at that point in time.
The facts in 12(8)(6) fundamentally mean
that I assume essentially that whatever was alleged in the
complaint is true. And, therefore, we have the facts laid
out in the complaint, which is why Exhibit One was
critical to the analysis, which as mentioned was not
attached to the original. And I first started looking for
it because I had a copy from my staff attorney to review
all of this and it wasn't with my copy. So the first
place I went was to the file and it wasn't in the file and
so we dug around and eventually found it at item six. But
taking everything in the amended complaint as true, I
don't believe that plaintiff has essentially alleged a
cause of action under the law and, therefore, the case
would be dismissed under Rule 12(8)(6).
As to the other material provided, I agree
that it's immaterial and extraneous to what I needed to
make a decision in this case and those materials as
indicated will be stricken from the record. And given the
CHRISTINE ANNE OLESEK
SRL-1044

Page 30 to 33 of 35

000144

06/29/2016 02:11:57 PM

34
1 motion to seal, the court will grant that motion to seal
2 as well.
3
We're going to prepare a written order that
4 outlines all of that because I have to make the necessary
5 findings under the Idaho Administrative Rules and such.
6 So we'll get all of that done, but I have looked at all of
7 that and I think fundamentally that is and should be the
8 final result in this case.
9
So we'll get a written decision out here in
1O the next week or so, and the case will be dismissed at
11 that time.
All right. Court is adjourned.
12
MR. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor.
13
MS. BRAILSFORD: Thank you, Your Honor.
14
(That completes the proceedings for this
15
16 date.)
17
********
18

19
20
21

22
23
24

25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2
3

4

5

I,

6

County of Ada,

7

Christine Anne Olesek,
State of Idaho,

Official Court Reporter,
hereby certify:

That I am the reporter who took the proceedings had

8

in the above-entitled action in machine shorthand and

9

thereafter the same was reduced in typewriting under my

10

direct supervision; and
That the foregoing transcript contains a full,

11

true

12

and accurate record of the proceedings had in the above

13

and foregoing cause, which was heard in Boise,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

14
15

29,

Idaho.

I have hereunto set my hand June

2016.

16
17
18

19
20

/Christine Anne Olesek, RPR/

21

Christine Anne Olesek, RPR,

22

Idaho CSR No.

Official Court Reporter
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Date

I Staff I Billed I

Gross

Rate

Description

ATTORNEYS FEES

3/10/2016

AKB

1.8

$ 250.00

$

450.00

Communicate with Clark regarding acceptance of
service; conferences with clients; begin analyzing
issues related to motion to dismiss.

3/14/2016

SBA

1.3

$ 250.00

$

325.00

Review complaint and related materials.

3/14/2016

AKB

4

$ 250.00

$ 1,000.00

Review complaint; conduct initial research related to
lien statute; analyze and outline motion to dismiss
arguments; prepare for meeting with clients.

3/14/2016

RAM

0.3

$ 205.00

$

61.50

Analyze legal and factual bases for motion to dismiss
complaint.

3/15/2016

SBA

1

$250.00

$

250.00

Meeting with clients.

3/15/2016
3/22/2016
3/22/2016

AKB
AKB
RAM

1
0.5
0.5

$ 250.00
$250.00
$ 205.00

$
$
$

250.00
125.00
102.50

Meeting with clients.
Review amended complaint.
Review amended complaint.

3/23/2016

RAM

3.3

$ 205.00

$

676.50

Conduct legal research in support of motion to
dismiss.

3/24/2016

RAM

4.7

$ 205.00

$

963.50

Conduct additional legal research in support of
motion to dismiss; draft introduction and background
sections of motion to dismiss.

3/25/2016

RAM

2

$ 205.00

$

410.00

Begin drafting argument section of motion to dismiss.

3/28/2016

SBA

0.7

$ 250.00

$

175.00

Review and revise motion to dismiss; meeting with
clients.
Legal research in support of motion to dismiss
regarding duty of attorneys to non-clients; continue
drafting motion to dismiss, including argument on
attorney's lien and negligence claims.

3/28/2016

RAM

6.8

$ 205.00

$ 1,394.00

3/30/2016

RAM

1

$ 205.00

$

205.00

Revise memorandum in support of motion to dismiss.

3/30/2016

AKB

1.9

$ 250.00

$

475.00

Communicate with client regarding motion to
dismiss; review and revise draft memorandum in
support of motion to dismiss.
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Date

I Staff I Billed I

Description

Gross

Rate

4/1/2016

RAM

0.2

$ 205.00

$

41.00

Revise memorandum in support of motion to dismiss.

4/4/2016

RAM

0.4

$ 205.00

$

82.00

Assist in filing motion to dismiss and supporting
memorandum.

4/4/2016

AKB

2.8

$ 250.00

$

700.00

Review and revise draft brief in support of motion to
dismiss; schedule hearing; draft notice of hearing;
draft motion to dismiss.

4/7/2016

AKB

0.9

$ 250.00

$

225.00

Review notice of intent to seek default; communicate
with opposing counsel regarding same; draft
stipulation to consent to service by email.

$ 1,650.00

Review Clark's opposition to motion to dismiss;
outline arguments; review declaration and
attachments; communicate with clients; communicate
with Clark regarding disclosure of attorney-client,
work product, confidential information in record;
research authorities regarding motion to strike; begin
drafting moton to strike.

5/4/2016

AKB

6.6

$ 250.00

5/5/2016

AKB

7.5

$ 250.00

$ 1,875.00

Research motion to strike under Rule 12(:f); draft
declaration supporting motion to strike; draft motion
for order shortening time to hear motion to strike;
continue drafting motion to strike extraneous
materials; review response to motion to dismiss and
outline reply.

5/6/2016

AKB

8

$ 250.00

$ 2,000.00

Draft reply brief; schedule hearing; draft notice of
hearing; finalize documents for filing.

5/9/2016

AKB

0.7

$ 250.00

$

175.00

Draft email to court staff regarding schedule of
various motions and scheduling conference; review
settlement demand; communicate with client.

5/10/2016

AKB

0.4

$ 250.00

$

100.00

Communicate with Court's staff hearing date;
communicate with Clark regarding same.

900.00

Communicate with Court regarding hearing for
motions; review notice of hearing; review Clark's
brief in opposition to motion to dismiss; review
Clark's reply to motion to strike and seal record;
review Clark's declaration for judicial notice; review

5/11/2016

AKB

3.6

$ 250.00

$

EXHIBITC
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Date

I Staff I Billed I

Description

Gross

Rate

Clark's first and second declarations in opposition to
motion to dismiss and outline source of attachments.

5/26/2016

AKB

7.5

$ 250.00

$ 1,875.00

Review Clark's declarations and motion for judicial
notice; research and read authorities regarding Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 12(f); research and read Rule 201
and related authorities regarding judicial notice; begin
draft of motion to strike declarations; begin draft of
opposition to motion for judicial notice.

5/27/2016

AKB

10

$ 250.00

$ 2,500.00

Drafting reply in support of motion to strike; continue
drafting opposition to motion for judicial notice;
proof and finalize flings.

6/2/2016

AKB

7.4

$ 250.00

$ 1,850.00

Review notice :from court regarding possible basis to
disqualify court because of prior "common
professional relationship" with Clark; communicate
repeatedly with clients; prepare for oral argument on
motion to dismiss complaint; prepare for oral
argument on motion to strike filings.

6/3/2016

AKB

2.6

$ 250.00

$

650.00

Meeting with client; attend hearing and argue
motions; communicate with clients.

6/10/2016

AKB

1.7

$ 250.00

$

425.00

Review motion for reconsideration of Court's
(anticipated) judgment dismissing complaint; review
motion to amend and supporting briefing seeking to
add Anfinson and its insurance carrier as defendants;
communicate with clients.

6/14/2016

AKB

0.8

$ 250.00

$

200.00

Meeting with clients.

6/15/2016

AKB

0.6

$ 250.00

$

150.00

Briefly research and read authorities governing
deadline for memorandum of fees and costs.

6/20/2016

AKB

0.7

$ 250.00

$

175.00

Review notice of hearing and calendar; communicate
with client regarding hearing.
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Date

I Staff I Billed I

Description

Gross

Rate

6/24/2016

zsz

0.7

$ 205.00 · $

143.50

Review Clark's motion to amend and motion for
reconsideration.

6/28/2016

AKB

2.3

$ 250.00

575.00

Review order granting motion to dismiss; review
order denying motion for reconsideration;
communicate with clients.

$

Arrange for transcription of hearing for purposes of
obtaining fees and costs related to Clark's
misrepresentation of argument as basis for motion to
amend.

6/29/2016

AKB

0.3

$ 250.00

$

75.00

6/30/2016

zsz

2

$ 205.00

$

410.00

Research various bases for fees and costs.

750.00

Review memorandum decision; review denial of
motion for reconsideration and amendment;
communicate with client; briefly research basis for
obtaining fees and costs.

7/1/2016

AKB

3

$250.00

$

7/5/2016

zsz

2.4

$ 205.00

$

492.00

Review case history and hearing transcript; continue
researching legal bases relating to memorandum in
support of motion for fees and costs; review court
orders on motions.

7/6/2016

zsz

0.5

$ 205.00

$

102.50

Review newly promulgated Rule 54 requirements
concerning judgments; draft proposed judgment.

7/7/2016

AKB

1

$250.00

$

250.00

Review article by Justice Eismann on preparing final
judgments; review and revise final judgment; email
proposed final judgment to Clark

7/8/2016

AKB

1

$250.00

$

250.00

Conference with clients.

7/11/2016

zsz

3

$ 205.00

$

615.00

Research and analyze case law related to award of
attorney's fees.

7/12/2016

zsz

4.9

$ 205.00

$ 1,004.50

Further research into bases for award for fees and
costs, specifically concerning commercial
transactions; begin outlining memorandum in support
of motion for fees and costs.

7/19/2016

zsz

2.1

$ 205.00

$

Legal research relating to motion for fees and costs
and continue drafting of same.

430.50
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Date

I Staff I Billed I

Rate

Gross

Description

Continue drafting memorandum in support of motion
for fees and costs.

7/20/2016

zsz

5.8

$ 205.00

$ 1,189.00

7/21/2016

zsz

4.7

$ 205.00

$

963.50

Continue drafting memorandum in support of fees
and costs.

7/24/2016

zsz

2.9

$ 205.00

$

594.50

Continue drafting memorandum in support of motion
for fees and costs.

7/25/2016

AKB

0.5

$250.00

$

125.00

Communicate with clients.

7/25/2016

zsz

3.7

$ 205.00

$

758.50

7/26/2016

zsz

3.5

$ 205.00

$

717.50

7/27/2016

AKB

3.7

$250.00

$

925.00

Review and revise draft brief for fees and costs.

7/27/2016

zsz

1.3

$ 205.00

$

266.50

Revise memorandum in support of fees and costs.

7/28/2016

AKB

3.6

$250.00

$

900.00

Review billings; begin preparing exhibit showing fees
and costs incurred; begin drafting affidavit in support
of memorandum for fees and costs.

7/28/2016

zsz

3.3

$ 205.00

$

676.50

Final revisions to memorandum in support of fees and
costs.

8/1/2016

zsz

.8

$ 205.00 · $

164.00

Review exhibits and affidavit of A.Brailsford in
support of motion for fees and costs in light of Rule
54 requirements.

8/2/2016

zsz

.5

$ 205.00

$

102.50

Final preparation of exhibits and memorandum in
support of fees and costs.

8/2/2016

AKB

2

$ 250.00

$

500.00

Final review of and revisions to memorandum in
support of motion for fees and costs in preparation for
filing.

FEES

Draft memorandum in support of motion for fees and
costs.
Draft memorandum in support of motion for fees and
costs.

$35,416.50
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Date

I Staff I Billed I

Description

Gross

Rate

COSTS

3/31/2016
6/24/2016
4/30/2016
5/31/2016
6/30/2016
5/31/2016
6/30/2016
COSTS
TOTAL (FEES
and COSTS)

$
$
$
$
$
$

136.00
148.75
11.00

$

31.87

$

571.09

68.20
14.00
161.27

Filing Fee
Transcript of 6/3/2016 Hearing
Print I Copy Expense
Print / Copy Expense
Print / Copy Expense
West Law Expense
West Law Expense

I $ 35,987.59 I
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STEVEN ANDERSEN
P: 208.342.4411
F: 208.342.4455
E: sba@aswblaw.com

V: Download Vcard Uirnages/uploads/vcards/SBA.vcf}
Steven Andersen has represented both plaintiffs and defendants as trial counsel in over 100 jury trials throughout
Idaho, the lntermountain West, West Coast and Pacific Northwest regions. He is a recognized expert in products
liability, professional liability, business tort, insurance claims, governmental liability and agriculture.
Steven has represented clients at trial in partnership dissolutions, prosecution and defense of patent infringement
claims, product defect cases, royalty disputes, professional liability, insurance bad faith, and engineering and
construction disputes.
Steven is admitted to practice before all state and federal courts for Idaho, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Federal Circuit.
He has extensive experience in contingent and alternative fee arrangements, general commercial litigation and
intellectual property litigation (see below).
Contingent and Alternative Fee Arrangements

Steven maintains a practice for carefully selected and deserving plaintiffs who have complex products liability claims
(such as tire failures, seat belt design and food contamination), premises liability (such as road design, Dram Shop and
unsafe public areas), medical devices, aircraft defects, medical negligence, lender liability, federal tort claims, insurance
bad faith and business torts.
In 2011 and 2013, Steven was named Plaintiffs' Lawyer of the Year (!about/top-honors) for the state of Idaho by Best
Lawyers in America.
·
Steven obtained Idaho's largest affirmed personal injury verdict of $7.8 million and a $56 million verdict for a defective
agricultural fungicide. He recently achieved a $17.8 million verdict for four plaintiffs in a multi-party products liability
claim. Over his career, he has obtained dozens of verdicts and settlements in excess of $1 million with total verdicts and
settlements for plaintiffs of approximately $256 million.
In addition, Steven has extensive experience representing institutional clients, individuals and industries on an
alternative-fee basis, which includes fixed fees, mixed fees that blend contingent and hourly components, fee
arrangements with lower rates, and benchmark payments and incentives.
General Commercial Litigation

Steven represents companies and industries in a variety of complex commercial disputes. Typically, he represents
defendants in claims such as lender liability defenses, aviation manufacturing defect defenses, product defenses,
royalty claims and trade secret appropriation defenses. Steven tried to successfully verdict the only Idaho case involving
the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, obtaining complete injunctive relief against expropriation of computer
information. He has also successfully defended local banks in claims involving breach of contract, failure to lend and
other alleged improper bank conduct. In a recent commercial dispute, he obtained a $10.1 million settlement on a
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Additionally, Steven has represented plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust claims, including claims involving patent
misuse and horizontal and vertical tying, as well as price-fixing cases.

Intellectual Property Litigation
Steven has acted as lead trial counsel in various forms of intellectual property litigation, including trial to successful
verdicts in cases involving claims of disputed inventorship and defense of patent infringement claims. He has also led
the prosecution of patent infringement, including jury trials for willful infringement, defense of trade dress claims,
Lanham Act violations, antitrust and patent misuse issues, trade secret violations, and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
claims.
Steven has obtained jury verdicts invalidating otherwise infringed claims of patents in suit, proven willful infringement
and induced infringement of certain patents in suit, and verdicts dismissing all claims for royalties under otherwise
infringed claims of patents in suit. He has also obtained verdicts defeating claims of inequitable conduct and recently
successfully defeated a $24 million royalty and treble damage claim for patent infringement.
At trial, Steven has never lost an intellectual property case. His cases have covered a wide range of products, devices
and methods such as technology for a potato sprout inhibition, sonar devices, bioassay devices, smoke protection
devices, software infringement, identity theft, Wi-Fi design and installation, and radar detector.
Aside from his legal experience, Steven has a mechanical and technical background as a plumbing tradesman.

Representative Work

Plaintiff Cases
Lead trial counsel for international farm conglomerate who alleged crop and soil damage from a recalled fungicide.
Achieved a $56 million jury verdict.
Lead trial counsel for Idaho potato and beet growers who alleged crop and property damage from herbicide drift.
Achieved a $17.8 million jury verdict. The trial was the longest jury trial in Idaho history and the verdict covered only
four plaintiffs. Their verdict set the precedent for over 100 other claims, all of which were successfully settled post trial.
Lead trial counsel for an injured driver who alleged flawed road failure. Achieved a $7.5 million court verdict under the
federal Tort Claims Act, which was affirmed on appeal.
Lead trial counsel for multiple injured parties due to unsafe public event. Achieved liability verdict in bifurcated cases
that allowed settlement of multiple party claims against multiple defendants determined by the jury to be liable.
Lead trial counsel for Dram Shop case alleging overselling of alcohol and resultant multiple wrongful death claim.
Achieved multi-million dollar jury verdict and punitive damages awarded.
Lead trial counsel on wrongful death claim involving unique mishandling of heavy equipment. Achieved $2.4 million
outcome.

Professional Activities
"

Past President, Idaho Trial Lawyers Association

•

Past President, Idaho Chapter of American Inns of Court

•

Member, American Bar Association, Litigation and Business Section

•

Member, American Association for Justice

•

Lawyer Representative to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2007-201 0

• Martindale Hubble "AV Preeminent" rating

Publications/Speaking Engagements
Steven has lectured statewide on topics of trial preparation and advocacy. He has published materials and articles on
legal ethics, discovery techniques, and trials.
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The Realities of Expert Witness Reports (published materials)-U.S. Court's Conference, District of Idaho, 2009
Voir Dire-New Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century (published materials)-U.S. Court's Conference, District of
Idaho, 2010
The Electronic Medium- Effective Evidence Presentation (published materials)-U.S. Court's Conference, District of
Idaho
Success in the Courtroom-Tri-State Federal Bar Conference, 2012
Over Aggression- The Ethical and Legal Implications (published materials) - Idaho Law Foundation
Honors and Aw ards

• Named in Nationa l Trial Lawyers Top 100 Tria l Lawyers
• Named in The Best Lawyers in America, 2003-2016
• Named in Best Lawyers Lawyer of the Year 2011, Personal Injury Litigation - Boise
•

Named in Best Lawyers Lawyer of the Year 2013, Personal Injury Litigation - Plaintiffs Boise

• Named in Mountain States Super Lawyers, 2007-2016
• Named in Benchmark for Litigation, 2013-2015
• Named in Chambers USA for Business for General Commercia l Litigation, 2006-2015
• AV Preem inent Martindale Hubbell rating

• Played a B-3 organ in a 70's rock band
• Favorite place in the world is Salzkommergut
• Repeatedly recognized as one of The Best Lawyers in America

EDUCATION
Brigham Young University, B.A., summa cum laude, 1977
Brigham Young University, J.D., with honors, 1980

ADMISSIONS
United States District Court of Idaho
Idaho Supreme Court
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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AMANDA BRAILSFORD
P: 208.342.4411
F: 208.342.4455

E: akb@aswblaw.com

V: Download Vcard Uimages/uploads/vcards/AKB.vc:f)
For many years, Amanda has successfully represented clients in complex civil litigation in both federal and state courts.
Her representation has included extremely complicated cases involving numerous parties and also multi-district class
action litigation. Amanda has diverse expertise in numerous areas, including all aspects of employment law, trade
secrets, agricultural law, products liability, bad faith insurance, professional legal malpractice, personal injury, business
disputes, and state and federal antitrust violations. In addition to her trial work, Amanda has successfully handled many
state and federal appeals.
Amanda's overarching strength is her ability to master the facts and the applicable law of any dispute in order to bring
about successful results as quickly as possible. She has been repeatedly recognized as a leading attorney in her legal
community by Chambers USA.
Representative Work

Plaintiff Cases
Co-counsel in a case that won a $17 million verdict against a major chemical company and eventually prompted the
manufacturer of a defective product-that caused catastrophic crop damage in Idaho-to settle the remaining claims.
Involved representation of more than 100 agricultural growers.
Obtained a multi-million dollar settlement against a national telecommunications organization for its failure to properly
design and deploy wireless Internet access at hundreds of locations throughout the United States.
Secured a multi-million dollar settlement in a personal injury action against more than 10 different defendants who
were responsible for client's personal injuries when they defectively constructed a home contaminated with mold,
failed to remediate it, and then sold it without disclosing the contamination.

Defense Cases
Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a physician against a medical group seeking to enforce an unconscionable
non-compete agreement.
Won an opposition to a preliminary injunction against a banking executive by a bank that sought to enforce a noncompete agreement. This prompted the settlement of the case against the executive with treble payment of the
damages on his counterclaim against the bank.
Successfully settled a dangerous employment law claim against a large, publicly traded company for a nominal amount.
Obtained a defense jury verdict for an inventor sued by a plaintiff, who wrongfully claimed proceeds from the sale of
his invention.
Professional Activities
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• Member, University of Idaho Law Advisory Council
• Leadership Boise, 1998-2000
Honors and Awards

• AV Preeminent Martindale Hubbell rating
• Recognized by Chambers USA: America's Leading Lawyers for Business for labor and employment, 2009-

2016

• Has a green thumb and the garden to prove it
• Played Ruth in a production of Noel Coward's Blithe Spirit
• Recognized by Chambers USA: America's Leading Lawyers for
Business for Labor and Employment

EDUCATION

University of ldaho,J,D ., sum ma cum laude, Alumni Award for
Excellence, 1993
University of Idaho, B.A., English Pre-law, cum laude, Phi Beta
Kappa, Phi Kappa Phi U of I, Outstanding Senior Award, 1989
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

Partner, Holland & Hart LLP, 2003-2013, Associate, 1995-2002
Law Clerk, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for the Honorable
Thomas G. Nelson, 1993-1995
ADMISSIONS

State Bar of Idaho, 1993
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
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RACHEL MURPHY
P: 208.342.4411
F: 208.342.4455
E: ram@aswblaw.com
V: Download Vcard Uimages/uploads/vcards/RAM.vcO
Drawing on her extensive experience representing individuals and entities in state and federal appellate courts, Rachel
Murphy provides appellate and legal counsel to individuals and companies at all stages of civil litigation and before
administrative agencies. Her areas of expertise include appeals, employment discrimination, and contract disputes.
Rachel's greatest strength is her ability to focus on and succinctly relay pivotal legal and factual issues, facilitating the
quick and successful resolution of disputes.
Representative Work

While at Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, Rachel has defended multiple international corporations against
charges of employment discrimination before state and federal agencies. She was co-counsel in a hundred-million
dollar title insurance dispute relating to a four-season mountain resort that resulted in a successful settlement on the
eve of trial. And she successfully defended attorneys against misconduct allegations before the Idaho State Bar,
including an appeal to the Hearing Committee of the Professional Conduct Board.
As an Assistant Attorney General, Rachel successfully defended the State of Illinois in high-profile appeals of first
impression, including challenges to the moment of silence in schools statute, property tax cap law, and enforcement of
the wage law. She also routinely defended against employment discrimination and constitutional tort suits, saving the
State hundreds of thousands of dollars in liability. On the plaintiff side, Rachel successfully defended an appeal of an
anti-trust action brought by the Attorney General against makers of LCD panels, convincing the appellate court that the
suit was not a class action.
As an Associate with Paul, Weiss, Rachel represented a major bank in a massive securities fraud class action arising out
of the collapse of WorldCom. She also advised major motion picture studios, Broadway producers, not-for-profit
theaters, directors, and authors on all aspects of entertainment law, including rights acquisition, financing, and
production.

Professional Activities

Secretary/Treasurer, ISB Appellate Practice Section
Member, Idaho Women Lawyers
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Stanford Law School, J.D., Order of the Coif, 2002
Williams College, B.A., History, summa cum laude Phi Beta
Kappa, 1997

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Office of the
Illinois Attorney Gene ral, 2006-2013
Assoc iate, Paul , Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, 20032006
Law Clerk, Honorable Marjorie 0. Rendell, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, 2002-2003

ADMISSIONS
State Bar of Idaho, 2013
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
State Bar of Illinois, 2006 (inactive)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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ZACH ZOLLINGER
P: 208.342.4411
F: 208.342.4455

E: zsz@aswblaw.com
V: Download Vcard Uimages/uploads/vcards/ZSZ.vcf)
Zach counsels clients on a variety of complex civil litigation issues. Prior to joining Andersen Schwartzman Woodard
Brailsford, he attended law school at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. While there Zach spent time working for
the Child Advocacy Law Clinic, the oldest child welfare law clinic in the country. He represented children and parents in
Michigan state court foster-care proceedings, gaining valuable litigation experience arguing motions, preparing for trial
and successfully helping clients reach their goals. He also interned at a large Chicago law firm and for a federal district
court judge.
At the University of Oregon, Zach participated in community economic development and coached the University of
Oregon Women's Club Soccer team. For his community involvement he received the Centurion Award, given only to 100
undergraduate students who exhibit leadership and a commitment to the community.
Zach is an Idaho native who enjoys spending his free time camping and fishing the Idaho outdoors with his wife and
two dogs. During football season you'll find him in front of a TV cheering for the Oregon Ducks.

EDUCATION
The University of Michigan Law School, J.D., cum laude Associate
Editor Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law
Review, 2013
The University of Oregon, S.S. Economics, with honors Awarded
Centurion Award for leadership and service to the community,
2008

ADMISSIONS
State Bar of Idaho
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697

By SANTIAGO BARRIOS
OEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Objection to Defendants' Motion For
Fees and Costs. The Plaintiffs file their Opposition according to IRCP 54(d)(5) and (e)(6), LC.§
120(3), LC. § 121, and LC. § 123.
1.

The Plaintiffs object to costs claimed other than those as a matter of right

normally awarded to the prevailing party.

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS -1
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The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 120(3). This

case does not involve a "commercial transaction" between the parties and therefore LC. § 120(3)
does not apply.
3.

The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 121. Clark did

not pursue this case frivolously or without foundation. The Plaintiffs filed this case in good faith
arguing the scope of LC. § 3-205, and that liability attached under these circumstances, as
Defendants had received actual notice Clark was asserting an attorney lien on the proceeds of the
Forbush Settlement, yet failed to inform Clark of any settlement. While the Court was critical of
Clark for not taking judicial action to perfect his lien, the Court disregarded the critical fact that
Jones Gledhill purposefully and intentionally withheld information from Clark that prevented
Clark from timely perfecting his lien.
4.

The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 123.

Defendants have not established frivolous conduct as defined in LC. § 12-123. Moreover, this
section requires the Court to schedule and conduct an evidentiary hearing before awarding fees,
but no such hearing was scheduled.
5.

The Plaintiffs object to a claim for attorney fees as unreasonable pursuant to IRCP

54(e)(l). Defendants' claim for fees is outrageous and punitive. This case involved a one-count
claim for negligence and was decided on a 12(b), motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, however,
Defendants seek attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Assuming an average billing rate at $220. 00
per hour, the attorneys would have worked exclusively on this case for an amazing twenty full
eight-hour days, (Four full work weeks.). Then, the Defendants billed over 56 hours (7
complete eight hour days), just to prepare its memorandum of costs. Approximately one-third of
the total billing was charged to pursue costs and attorney fees.
The Plaintiffs request oral argument only if the Court so directs.
The Plaintiffs intend to file a Memorandum in Support of this Objection pursuant to
IRCP 7(b)(3)(D.), and will do so within 14 days.
The Plaintiffs have filed a Declaration in support of this Objection which is served
contemporaneously herewith.

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 2
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DATEDthis 15th day of August, 2016.
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Eric R. Clark

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or email transmission, and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@andersenbanducci.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@andersenbanducci.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@anclersenbanclucci.com.
ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

Eric R. Clark

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS - 3
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DEPUTY

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,

DECLARATION OF
ERIC R. CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES
Judge Hoagland

Defendants.

I, Eric R. Clark, declare and state as follows:
1.
I am one of the Plaintiffs in this case and I have personal knowledge of the facts
as stated herein.

2.

On September 23, 2015, I sent a letter to the Defendants in which I asserted my

attorney lien on any proceeds from settlement with Defendants' clients and I requested that the
DECLARATION OF ERIC R CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS
. AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1

ORIGINAL
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Defendants include my name on any settlement check. See Exhibit 1 to the Amended
Complaint.
3.

The Jones Gledhill Defendants never responded to my September 23, 2015 letter

nor denied my right to an attorney lien. The Defendants did not inform me they did not intend to
comply with my request to protect my lien.
4.

My experience as counsel in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case and other personal

injury cases that it takes anywhere from 30 to 60 days from the date settlement was agreed to
before we received a check.
S.

While the Court was critical that I did not take "some adjudicatory action to

perfect his lien," at no time from the date that the Spence Firm and Jones Gledhill reached a
settlement until Jones Gledhill transferred settlement funds to the Spence Firm in December
2015, or January or February 2016, did either the Spence Firm or Jones Gledhill inform me of
any settlement.
6.

On January 28, 2016 I sent an e-mail to Christopher Graham where I indicated I

believed there was a settlement and requested that Jones Gledhill protect my lien. A true and
correct copy of that e-mail and attached letter is attached as Exhibit 1.
7.

Jones Gledhill did not respond to my January 28, 2016 e-mail.

8.

Attached as Exhibit 2 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I

drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill in response to the letter attached as Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit
of Amanda Brailsford in support of Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs.
9.

Attached as Exhibit 3 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I

drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill which included a copy of a letter I had received from Counsel
for the Spence Firm.
10.

Chris Graham contacted me and stated he was out of town and wanted an

additional 24 hours to discuss the matter before I filed suit. I allowed the additional 24 hours and
actually several more days before filing suit.
11.

Attached as Exhibit 4 a true and correct copy of an an e-mail correspondence I

drafted and sent to Jones Gledhill on March 10, 2016, in which I stated my belief that Jones
Gledhill was indemnified by the settlement agreement with the Forbush clients in Forbush v.

Sagecrest, and that they should tender the defense to the Spence Firm. As Brailsford represents

DECLARATION OF ERIC R CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2
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the Forbush defendants and the Spence Finn in Clark v. Forbush, Canyon Count Case No. CV2016-06347-c, it appears that happened, and Brailsford appeared for Jones Gledhill.
12.

I did not file this case frivolously or without foundation. Jones Gledhill had

notice of my lien in September 2015, was aware of the amount of the settlement in Forbush v.

Sagecrest, and processed and delivered the settlement funds without notifying me of the
settlement or the amount. By withholding necessary and critical information, Jones Gledhill
interfered with my ability to perfect my attorney lien.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho and the laws of the
United States, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief
DAIBDthis 15th day of August, 2016.

Eric R. Clark

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or email transmission, and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@ aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

Eric R. Clark

DECLARATION OF ERIC R. CLARK FILED OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COSTS
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Forbush Settlement
From: ERIC CLARK (eclark101@hotmail.com)
Sent: Thu 1/28/16 1:46 PM
To: Christopher Graham (cgraham@idalaw.com)
1 attachment
Attorney Lien Letter.pdf (28.6 KB)
Chris:
I understand from the Spence Firm's Counsel that there has been a settlement with Anfinson and Bakken. I
have attached a copy of a letter I sent via facsimile on September 23, 2015, in which I asserted an attorney's
lien on the proceeds of any settlement or verdict. Once again, as you have notice of my lien, please ensure
my firm is listed as one of the payees on any settlement check. Thank you.
Very Resp~ctfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named
as recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure
under applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product
doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by
telephone. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in
reliance on the information it contains.

EXHIBIT 1
I ofl
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CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
Real Estate • Business • Litigation
September 23, 2015
Via Facsimile
Michael Elia
Craig Stacey
MOORE & ELIA, LLP
POBox6756
Boise, ID 83707
Fax: (208) 336-7031

William A Fuhrman
Christopher Graham
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A
Post Office Box 1097
Boise, Idaho 83701
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529

Re: Forbush, et al, vs. Sagecrest, et al; Ada County Case No. CV - PI 1304325 - Notice
of Attorney Lien
Dear Counsel:

This letter will serve as notice that I am asserting an attorney lien according to LC. § 3-205,
which attaches to any settlement or verdict. Please include my name on any settlement checks
payable to the plaintiffs or any other payments related to a verdict or judgment. Thank you.
Sincerely,

Eric R. Clark

P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
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Clark v Jones Gledhill
ERIC CLARK
Tue 2/23/2016 6:33 PM

To:Christopher Graham <cgraharn@idalaw.com>; Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrman@idalaw.com>;
Cc:Brad Andrews <bandrews@isb.idaho.gov>;

Bill and Chris:
Thank you for your letter dated today. However, I disagree as your interpretation of the lien statute does not
follow the clear language.

3-205. ATTORNEYS' FEES -- LIEN. The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, which is not restrained
by law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a
counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action
or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in his client's favor
and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected by any
settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
The logical reading of this statue addresses money that belongs to the client, like settlement funds, which
someone else may possess. If "bar counsel" says otherwise, then I would like to see that opinion. If you have
such an opinion from bar counsel in writing, please send it to me. (Since you have mentioned Bar Counsel, I
am cc'ing him on my response.)
We have not placed a lien "in favor of opponent's lawyer," as you claim, but specifically on the settlement
funds. "The language of§ 3-205 grants an automatic lien on a "fund" created by the efforts of the attorney, so
long as the five specific elements set forth in Skelton v. Spencer, 102 Idaho 69, 625 P.2d 1072 (1981), are
satisfied. 13 See also, In re Secaur, 83 I.B.C.R. 175, 176-7 (Bank.r.D.Idaho 1983). The function of the statute is
to give an attorney an interest in the fruits of his labors. Skelton, 102 Idaho at 75, 625 P.2d at 1078. But
here, as was the case in Fitzgerald v. Colonial Savings & Loan (In re Karterman), 97.4 I.B.C.R. 115
(Bank.r.D.Idaho 1997), there was no "fund" created by the efforts of Daugherty." In re Goldberg, 235 B.R. 476
(Bank.r.ldaho, 1999).
The attorney lien is not limited to the "lawyer's own client" as you claim, but on the "fund." As you possessed
settlement proceeds which constitute the client's money, and which certainly resulted from my work, then you
had a duty to safeguard those funds. Both Frazee and Goldberg are factually distinguishable. It is ridiculous
and contrary to the very purpose of a lien that a lien only applies AFTER the client receives the money, which
apparently is your argument.

EXHIBIT2
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Additionally, the record speaks for itself. Judge Copsey dismissed A.O. Smith because she claimed they could
not reasonably anticipate a plumber removing a safety device as that would be outrageous and reek.less. (I
think we both agree that was an impermissible finding of fact as summary judgment) You are correct that Judge
Copsey initially denied our motion to amend against Anfinson. However, the proper course for competent
counsel would have been to file a motion to reconsider as we had Copsey's A.O. Smith ruling and Anfinson's
deposition which proved his employees were untrained. I think it is a reasonable argument to assert that
sending untrained employees to work on water heaters that could kill people if not serviced correctly is "an
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct," as Kenny Calkins opined about Anfinson. Perhaps
someday at a deposition, we will understand why the Spence Firm's failed to pursue what would have appeared
to be a "slam dunk" motion to amend after Judge Copsey's comments on January 15, 2015.
Finally, Logan's letter exemplifies just why you should have honored by lien. He claims we have a "dispute"
about the "amount owed." However, The Spence Firm has withheld every penny, not just any disputed
amount, and did not even inform me there was a settlement. As Jones Gledhill failed to honor my lien, the
Spence Firm has the ability to use these funds to try to extort a settlement with me. I consider that as your
fault, and intend to pursue my claim.
Will you accept service of my complaint? Thanks!
Very Respectfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the
information it contains.
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Extortion letter from Spence Firm
ERIC CLARK
Wed 2/24/2016 8:06 AM

To:Bill Fuhrman <bfuhrrna11@idalaw.co111>; Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.co111>;
Cc:Arnanda K. Brailsford <akb@andersenbanducci.corn>;

1 attachment (45 KB)
Ex 2 - LT Clark reg Spence Firm Offer.pdf;

Bill and Chris:
Here is the extortion letter I received from the Spence Firm when I demanded payment of my entitled fees after
finding out on my own there was a settlement with Anfinson Plumbing. Notice that the Spence Firm denies it
owes me any fees, which is contrary to Logan's letter to you. The Spence Firm is now able to use these funds
to extort a settlement because you failed to protect my lien. If the Spence Firm misled you by representing they
would protect my lien in order for you to release those funds, then I would like those facts in a declaration or if
the representations were in writing, then a copy of that writing from the Spence Firm. If not, then I am going to
proceed and file my complaint. Thanks.
Very Respectfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the
information it contains.
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AN DER SEN i]At·J [)~Jee~
SCHWARTZMAN

WOODARD; rlRAILSFORD

February 19, 2016

Via Email and Regular Mail:
Mr. Eric R. Clark

cc.1ark@b·itR:(J~irb~JJ9t'tW:Y~<;nrn:
Clark & Associates, PLLC
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

Re:

Clark, et al. v. The Spence Law Firm, et al.

Eric,

I have confinned that the Anfinson settlement was for policy limits of $1,000,000.
The Spence Firm's position is that you are not entitled to payment of $140,000 that you contend
you are owed under the co-counsel agreement as a result of the Anfinson settlement. The clients
discharged you months before they reached this settlement; the settlement was not in existence
when you were discharged. Nonetheless. The Spence Firm is offering you $140,000. This offer
is unconditional ·with the exception of a full and complete release of any and all of your claims
related to the Forbush matter against The Spence Firm, its attomeys, and your former clients.
This offer is open until Monday, Febmary 29, 2016 at 5:00 p.m.
Thank you.
Sincerely,

.~'
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Amanda K. Brailsford '
AKB/ajg

ANDERSEN l3At~DUCCI PLLC
101 S CAPITOL BLVD., SUITE 1600 BOISE, IDAHO 83702

TEI

\2081 342-4411

FAY. \208[ 342-4455

www.ander~enbandui:ci com
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Clark v. Jones Gledhill
ERIC CLARK
Thu 3/10/2016 7:56 AM

To:Christopher Graham <cgraham@idalaw.com>;

Chris:
Sorry for the delay. We are filing the lien claim lawsuit this morning. Will you accept service?
I would imagine that the settlement agreement has indemnity and hold harmless language potentially
addressing this lawsuit. Accordingly, please let me know if you are tendering the defense to the Spence Firm
or the Plaintiffs in the Forbush case. Thanks!

Very Respectfully,
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
Office: (208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
eclark@EricRClarkAttorney.com
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This transmission is intended only for the use of the individual(s) named as
recipients. It may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or protected from disclosure under
applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you
are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please notify the sender immediately by telephone. Do not
deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the
information it contains.
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ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Case No. CV OC-1604633
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

Judge Hoagland

Defendants.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Memorandum in support of their
Objection to Defendants' Motion For Fees and Costs.
INTRODUCTION
This case involved a single-count complaint for negligence that was decided on a Motion
to Dismiss. Notwithstanding the minimal proceedings in this matter, the Defendants claim
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attorney fees ofin excess of$35,000.00, with nearly one-third of this amount charged for
preparing a motion for costs and fees.
The Court found that the Plaintiffs (collectively hereafter as "Clark") had not ''taken
some adjudicatory action to perfect his lien, the amount owed would have been reduced to an
amount certain," but agreed with Clark that the Defendants had Clark perfected his lien, 1 then
such order or judgment, ''would have then been applicable to the parties and their counsel." 2
1. The Defend ants are not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 120(3).
It is unclear from the Defendants tortured argument how they arrived at the ultimate

conclusion that a negligence case involves a commercial transaction, but that apparently is the
argument. These Defendants argue in reference to the Forbush v. Sagecrest case that their
"respective clients, who later settled, for commercial purposes, ... ," somehow establish that
negligence case involved a "commercial transaction." Do the Defendants really believe the

Forbush v. Sagecrest case; alleging claims for negligence and wrongful death involved a
commercial transaction?
The reality, the gravamen of this case as pled is negligence for disregarding an attorney
lien. The issues presented involved the scope and enforceability of that lien. However, the
Defendants failed to cite to any case that states the gravamen of a negligence case gives rise to a
commercial transaction. Even if the Court were to construe this as a lien foreclosure case, a lien
foreclosure does not involve a commercial transaction. Sims v. Jacobson,

Idaho_,342

P.3d 907,912 (2015).
As there was no "commercial traction" as the gravamen of any claim in this case by any
stretch of the imagination, I.C. § 120(3) does not apply.
2. The Case was not brought frivolously or without foundation.
The Court must have an "abiding belief' the case was filed frivolously and without
foundation in order to award attorney fees. "A district court should only award fees 'when it is
left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously,

1

Clark respectfully notes that it was impossible under the circumstances for Clark to have proceeded to
perfect his lien without knowledge of the settlement or the amount thereof; information known only to the
Defendants here and the Spence Law Firm.
2
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8.
J\IIEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
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unreasonably, or without foundation.' C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 'when a party pursues an action which
contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and without
foundation.' Id. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes
it fails as a matter oflaw. GulfChem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890,
894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, '[a] misperception of the law, or of one's
interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position
adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.' Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265
(Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)." Garner v. Povey,
151 Idaho 462, 468, 259, P.3d 608, 614 (2011). Moreover, "[w]here a case involves a novel
legal question, attorney fees should not be granted under I.C. § 12-121." Campbell v. Kildew,
141 Idaho 640,652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005), citing Graham v. StateFarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
138 Idaho 611, 614, 67 P.3d 90, 93 (2003).
This case involved the the scope and enforceability of Idaho's Attorney Lien statute,. and
Clark presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's liability under this statute.
Clark prevailed on this issue as the Court ultimately ruled that a perfected lien under the
circumstances would have been "applicable to the parties and their counsel. " 3 Accordingly, the
Court has rejected the Defendants arguments in their Motion to Dismiss that any "litigation
privilege" applied; that counsel cannot enforce an attorney lien against opposing counsel; and
that defendants owed no duty of reasonable care. 4
There certainly is not much decisional law of record regarding the scope of the attorney
lien statute. Clark raised genuine issues in this litigation including the liability for opposing
counsel; an issue which Clark prevailed. Moreover, Clark asserted the legitimate claim for
liability of opposing counsel when counsel withheld critical information which prevented Clark
from timely perfecting his lien. If opposing counsel would have been liable had Clark perfected
his lien, why then would opposing counsel escape liability when they interfered with Clark's

3

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss
and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, p. 8.
4
Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, pp, 4, 5, and 8.
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ability to obtain a perfected lien in the first place? As the Supreme Court noted in Frazee v.

Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 466, 660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983), a "charging lien of an attorney is
equitable in nature .... " Accordingly, all equitable defenses apply, including "unclean hands"
and estoppel. If Clark failed to timely obtain a perfected attorney lien because the Defendants,
who knew Clark was asserting a lien, purposefully and intentionally withheld information from
Clark, then equity should intervene to prevent the Defendants from raising the lack of a perfected
lien as a defense.
Lien statutes are by nature remedial. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. SUMPER, 139 Idaho
846, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 960, (2004). As remedial legislation, Idaho's Attorney Lien Statute must
be interpreted "broadly to effectuate the intent of the legislature." Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins.

Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 438, 18 P.3d 956, 959 (2000). "Variously phrased, the intent of the law on
this point is to allow the attorney an interest in the fruits of his skill and labors. The lien secures
his right to compensation for obtaining the recovery or 'fund' for his client." Skelton v. Spencer,
102 Idaho 69, 77, 625 P.2d 1072, 1080 (1981). Consequently, a reasonable interpretation ofl.C.
§ 3-205 is that an attorney lien, perfected or not, creates a security interest in the proceeds of the

lawsuit. Clark presented reasoned argument that notwithstanding the lack of a "perfect~d" lien,
liability attached according to the statute, based on the undisputed facts that the Defendants had
knowledge of Clark's lien claim and because Defendants possessed the funds to which Clark's
lien attached. Clark also argued in good faith that based on the Court's ruling that perfection is
ultimately required to enforce the lien, and Clark was seeking to perfect the lien, at best the case
was not yet ripe and any dismissal should have been without prejudice.
Additionally, the Court has discretion whether or not to consider evidence outside of the
record submitted in support of the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it is a sound tactic to present
additional evidence in opposition to a motion to dismiss, in case the Court exercises its
discretion. Here Clark presented evidence related to the creation of his lien and background facts
in the Forbush v. Sagecrest case. Just because the Court decided not to consider this evidence
does not support any claim that offering the evidence in the first place was in any manner
frivolous.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
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Under the circumstances presented here, the Court must conclude that Clark pursued this
case in good faith and not frivolously and without foundation, notwithstanding the Court's
ultimate ruling.
3. The Defendants failed to establish "frivolous conduct" as defined by I.C. § 123.

Clark incorporates the same argument in opposition to Defendants' claim for attorney
fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-121, and argues if the Court denies attorney fees according to I. C. §
12-121, it must also deny attorney fees under I.C. § 12-123 as this statute has a more stringent
standard. If the Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-121, they
certainly are not entitled to attorney fees based on a more stringent standard of conduct.
First, as clearly stated in this statute; an award of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-123
is a "sanction." Clark presented evidence by way of declaration concerning his attempts to
resolve this case without litigation and presented reasoned interpretation of case law in response
to the Defendants' letter dated February 23, 2016. 5 Clark also requested confirmation of
Defendant's assertion that they had allegedly obtained an opinion from "Bar Counsel," who
coincidentally used to be a partner at Jones Gledhill. However, the Defendants never responded
to Clark's request for additional information or corroborated any alleged opinion from Bar
Counsel notwithstanding Clark afforded the Defendants' extra time to respond before Clark filed
suit. 6 Clark did not believe that simply because the funds allegedly were now in Wyoming, that
the Defendants lacked liability and proceeded accordingly. Moreover, as discussed above, this
Court has rejected the Defendants' arguments in their February 23, 2016 letter that Clark's lien
was limited to a claim against his clients and not against opposing counsel.
I.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to find, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, that
Clark's conduct in the case was ''frivolous," as defined in that statute. The Defendants must
prove that Clark asserted a claim which was "not supported in fact or warranted under existing
law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law." Here Clark presented reasoned argument that his lien attached to the proceeds
from the Anfinson settlement, regardless of whether his lien was ultimately perfected. That
5

See Exhibit A attached to the Affidavit of Amanda K. Brailsford In Support of Defendants' Motion For
Attorney Fees And Costs.
6
See Exhibit 2, 3, and 4, attached to the Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition To Defendants'
Motion For Costs and Attorney Fees.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
FEES AND COSTS - 5

000183

8/18/2016 12:10 PM

FROM:

939-7136 CLARK _ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

876919

PAGE: 006 OF 009

position is supported by the clear language of I.C. § 3-205. "From the commencement of an

action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a
party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict,
report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands

they may come; and can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after
judgment. (Emphasis added.)
While the Court apparently placed the burden on Clark to perfect his lien, the Court
apparently did not consider the fact that only the Defendants and the Spence firm had
information necessary for Clark to perfect his lien. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 731 P.2d
813, (Idaho App., 1986), requires knowledge of the amount of the attorney lien as a prerequisite
to perfection of an attorney lien. As Clark argued in good faith in support of his motion to
reconsider; "Here, Clark had no idea what the judgment amount was; first because when he was
discharged there was no settlement or "fund," and second, because his former clients and the
Defendants here refused to inform Clark when they settled." The reality, only the Defendants
and the Spence firm knew there was a settlement and the terms of that settlement and they also
each knew Clark was asserting a lien on the proceeds of those funds. Under these circumstances
Clark could not perfect his lien until he obtained information only the Defendants possessed but
did not release to Clark.
Moreover, the Court's ruling that even if Clark had perfected his lien, the money is
already gone, so "no harm no foul," appears to conflict with I.C. § 3-205. There are no
provisions in this statute that terminate liability just because a liable party no longer has the
money. With all due respect, such a contention would seem to undermine the very purpose of
the statute.
Finally, as a "sanction" I.C. § 12-123 requires the Court to determine whether or not "any
party was adversely affected by the conduct if found to be frivolous." I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(iii).

(Emphasis Added.) In this case, it appears that Jones Gledhill tendered the defense of this case
to the Spence Firm and Former Clients, pursuant to an indemnity and hold harmless clause in the
settlement documents. Accordingly, Spence's counsel appeared in this case for Jones Gledhill
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and the Spence Firm likely is paying attorney fees. 7 If Jones Gledhill is not responsible for any
attorney fees and therefor is not a "party adversely affected" by any alleged frivolous conduct,
then Jones Gledhill is not entitled to any attorney fees. These facts need to be addressed in the
evidentiary hearing required by LC. § 12-123 if in fact the Court elects to conduct such a
hearing.
4. The attorney fees claimed are not in any stretch of the imagination
"reasonable;" the fee claimed are outrageous and punitive.

Defendants bear the burden of proving their claim for attorney fees is reasonable.

Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258, 262 (2008). Pursuant to 54(e)(3), the
two criteria relevant here are; (A) Time and labor required; and (B) Novelty and Difficulty of the
Questions.
a.

Time and labor. This was a single count negligence claim decided on an IRCP

12(b) motion. There was no discovery exchanged, nor depositions taken. Nor were there any
other pleadings or motions. The Defendants did not even file an Answer. Notwithstanding,
Defendants claimed attorney fees in excess of $35,000. Defendants' counsel billed in excess of
159 hours on this case; 56 of which was billed for time for preparing the motion for costs and

attorney fees. 8 Other than their exorbitant billing records, the Defendants offer no explanation as
to how billing over 159 hours under the circumstance of this case was in any way reasonable.
The Defendants double billed for the same work performed by two or more attorneys. (See, e.g.
on March 14, 2016, March 15, 2016, March 22, 2016, and March 23, 2016). The Defendants
billed 14.8 hours just for legal research in support of motion to dismiss. "RAM" billed 18.8
hours related to research and drafting just the motion to dismiss. This case reeks of the situation
where attorneys drastically increases their hours well above what they actually billed just
because their party won. The Court should not condone such conduct and deny the motion for
fees outright.

7

Curiously, in her brief, Brailsford claims "Jones Gledhill was required to retain the services of its
counsel of record, who in tum had to familiarize themselves with both this case and also the underlying
case."(Memo, p. 14.) However, Brailsford already represented the Spence Firm and the Fonner Clients
in the ''underlying case." It is therefore unclear why Brailsford now had to "familiarize" herself with a
case in which she was already involved?
8
Brailsford's Affidavit, Exhibit C.
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Novelty and Difficulty. This case involved the scope ofldaho's attorney fee

statute, not the interpretation of the tax code. The case did present the novel issue of whether an
attorney lien attaches to proceeds held by opposing counsel thereby subjecting opposing counsel
to liability, but ultimately, the Court rejected the Defendants' arguments on this issue.
c.

Billing for Attorney Fees. The Defendants billed in excess of 56 hours just to

assert a claim for attorney fees. The amount billed for attorney fees is a glaring example of
"padding" the bills well above that counsel actually charged for their services. Again, the Court
cannot condone such conduct and must deny these fees as patently unreasonable.
Considering the nature of the minimal proceedings, charging in excess of 159 hours is not
in any way reasonable. Accordingly, the Court must deny the motion for attorney fees in its
entirety as unreasonable under the circumstances.
5. Costs.

As the prevailing party, the Defendants are entitled to recover their costs as a matter or
right, which is limited to their filing fee. The Defendants have not established any basis for this
Court to award any of the discretionary costs claimed.
CONCLUSION

Clark respectfully requests the Court deny the Defendants' Motion for Costs and
Attorney Fees for the following reasons; 1) The Case does not involve a "commercial
transaction, and therefor LC. § 12-120 does not apply; 2) The Case was not brought or pursued
frivolously or without foundation and presented the "novel legal question" of opposing counsel's
liability pursuant to an attorney lien; 3) The Defendants failed to establish any conduct was
frivolous as defined by LC. § 12-123; and 4) The Defendants failed to establish its attorney fees
demanded were reasonable under the circumstances. Defendants are entitled to recover their
filing fee, and nothing more.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016.

Eric R. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via facsimile or email transmission, and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@ aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

Eric R. Clark
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Electronically Filed
9/7/2016 3:33:01 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Elyshia Holmes, Deputy Clerk

Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
Facsimile: 208.342.4455
Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
FEES AND COSTS

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.
Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., William Fuhrman, and Christopher
Graham (together, “Jones Gledhill”) by and through their counsel of record, hereby submit this
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reply in support of their motion for fees and costs and in opposition to the Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion for Fees and Costs (“Plaintiffs’ Memo”).
INTRODUCTION
Clark’s opposition to Jones Gledhill’s motion sets forth many arguments (some new,
some seen before), but nonetheless fails to address the deficiency which is fatal to his claim.
This was Clark’s best opportunity to explain how his claim—even if ultimately a failure—was
based on a good faith reading of Idaho law as it currently exists, or as it should. Yet, his primary
(and misplaced) contention is that this lawsuit was not frivolous because he put forth an
argument regarding the plain language of Idaho Code § 3-205 (Idaho’s attorney-lien statute).
Secondarily, he offers several conclusory arguments that, in addition to being inapposite, are
unconvincing and are therefore only briefly addressed below. 1 Ultimately, and most
importantly, none of Clark’s arguments speak to whether attempting to enforce his alleged lien
against Jones Gledhill prior to perfecting it is permissible. As a result, it is clear that while Clark
claims that there are many genuine legal issues raised by his lawsuit, he cannot avoid that his
claim is and always has been baseless because he never perfected his purported lien. In short,
this lawsuit should never have been filed—as Clark was told before he did so—and Jones
Gledhill should not have been required to defend against it.
ARGUMENT
Clark admits that Idaho law requires his lien be perfected before he can enforce it, and
admits that his lien is not (and never has been) perfected. Accordingly, Clark’s lawsuit was
frivolous and without foundation, entitling Jones Gledhill to attorney fees under Idaho Code

1

In order to ensure Clark’s arguments are fully addressed, the entirety of Jones Gledhill’s
memorandum in support of their motion for fees and costs is incorporated herein as if restated in
full.
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§§ 12-121 and 12-123. Additionally, as the prevailing party, Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because a commercial transaction forms the
gravamen of this lawsuit.
I.

Jones Gledhill is the Prevailing Party.
Clark does not legitimately contest that Jones Gledhill is the prevailing party. In

determining the prevailing party, “the issue . . . is not who succeeded on more individual claims,
but rather who succeeded on the main issue of the action.” Hobson v. Fabricating Corp. v. SE/Z
Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45, 59, 294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012). Jones Gledhill obviously prevailed
upon the main issue—that Clark is not entitled to recover against it under the attorney lien
statute, Idaho Code § 3-205. That the Court did not address each argument Jones Gledhill
asserted in support of its position does not mean, as Clark asserts, that he prevailed on those
“issues.” (See Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 3 (arguing Clark prevailed on “issues”). Accordingly, to
the extent any avenue for the recovery of fees, discussed below, is limited to prevailing parties it
is properly available to Jones Gledhill.
II.

Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Under § 12-121.
This lawsuit was Clark’s attempt to enforce his alleged attorney’s lien. Clark concedes

that in order to enforce such a lien, it must first be perfected. (See Defendants’ Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Fees and Costs (“Defendants’ Memo.”), at p. 8 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Reconsider at p. 3.)). Clark also admits that his lien has not been perfected. (Id.)
Accordingly, Clark admits that he cannot enforce his alleged lien under Idaho law, yet brought
suit against Jones Gledhill seeking to do so. Because there is no dispute as to the relevant facts
and law, which 1) are unchanged since the filing of this lawsuit, and 2) make Clark’s lawsuit
untenable, the lawsuit was pursued frivolously.
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In opposition, Clark first cites case law for the proposition that if a lawsuit contains
“fairly debatable issues” it should not be deemed frivolous or without foundation. (Plaintiffs’
Memo., at p. 3.) Substantively, however, Clark fails to offer any fairly debatable interpretation
of law that would allow him to enforce an un-perfected lien and, therefore, fails to offer any
fairly debatable proposition of law that could have allowed his claim to survive. Instead, Clark
focuses on other, ultimately non-dispositive issues and arguments raised in this matter (e.g., can
opposing counsel be liable under Idaho’s attorney-lien statute, or whether Jones Gledhill had a
duty to inform Clark of a settlement). The outcome on those issues is of no effect; his claim is
and has always been improper because his alleged lien has never been perfected. For example, if
Clark’s claim had been undisputedly barred by an applicable statute of limitation—and Clark
conceded that the facts barring his claim existed at the time it was filed—the frivolity of such a
filing is not avoided by arguing that if it were (hypothetically) not time-barred, he could assert
his claim against opposing counsel.
Moreover, the arguments raised by Clark in his opposition are simply unavailing. If
Clark believes his claim has some merit because an unclean hands defense (somehow) applies
because Jones Gledhill did not immediately inform him of the settlement (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p.
4), he never raised this issue before and it, nonetheless, fails to address that this Court has
already stated that Jones Gledhill had no duty to protect Clark’s interest. (June 28, 2016
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to
Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice, at p. 9.) If Clark believes that lien statutes are
remedial in nature and thus deserve a broad interpretation (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 4), he still
fails to explain how a broad interpretation of Idaho’s attorney-lien statute abrogates the
requirement that a lien be perfected. Finally, if Clark believes that providing documents beyond
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the Complaint in response to a motion to dismiss is not frivolous—and that therefore his claim
was not frivolous—(Plaintiffs’ Memo. at p. 4), he misunderstands Idaho law. The presence of a
single, non-frivolous issue does not prevent this Court from finding Clark pursued this action
frivolously. See Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 632, 329 P.3d
1072, 1080 (2014), reh’g denied (Aug. 6, 2014).
Because Clark admits that Idaho law and the facts of this case prevent him from
enforcing his lien, his decision to file this lawsuit—a lawsuit to enforce that lien—is indisputably
frivolous and without foundation. And despite this opportunity to demonstrate the meritorious
nature of his claim under the facts or the law, Clark has not done so. Accordingly, attorney fees
are properly awardable under § 12-121.
III.

Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Under § 12-123.
Here, too, Clark has failed to show that his lawsuit is not frivolous and without

foundation. His efforts to do so—once again—fail to address the uncontested factual assertion
that his alleged lien was never perfected or the uncontested legal reality that such a lien must be
perfected in order to enforce it. Indeed, similar to the discussion, supra, regarding § 12-121,
Clark’s attempts to argue for a plausible extension, reversal, or modification of existing law miss
the mark.
Specifically, Clark argues that he has made tenable arguments regarding when an
attorney’s lien attaches under § 3-205. This does not address the fatal deficiency in his claim,
i.e., a lack of perfection. This distinction is recognized by Clark himself: “…Clark presented
reasoned argument that his lien attached to the proceeds from the Anfinson settlement, regardless
of whether his lien was ultimately perfected.” (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 5.) In other words, Clark
argues that because he purportedly raised a viable issue regarding whether he has a lien at all
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(and when any such lien arose), this lawsuit was not frivolous; however, Clark still fails to grasp
that the reason his claim was fatally flawed is because even if he were right about when and to
what his lien attached, he still cannot enforce it unless it is perfected. As a result, Clark’s
argument regarding the plain language of § 3-205 is not an argument for the extension, reversal,
or modification of law that could cure his complaint’s fatal deficiency.
Clark’s other arguments regarding § 12-123 fail for that reason as well, but are also
otherwise unavailing. Clark argues that Idaho law requires knowledge of the amount of an
attorney lien as a “prerequisite” to its perfection. (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 6.) Clark seems to
believe that because it would have been difficult for him to determine what the amount of his
lien was, he need not do so. This argument is belied by the fact that Clark admits that he is
currently attempting (by way of a separate suit against his former clients and the Spence Law
Firm) to determine the existence and amount of his attorney’s lien. In other words, while Clark
argues that he was somehow prevented from determining the amount of his lien, in actuality he is
in the midst of doing so. To the extent Clark argues that the Court made a “no harm no foul”
ruling, (id.), because Jones Gledhill no longer possesses the funds at issue, it should be noted
only that it appears the Court’s reading of the statute is in line with its plain language. The
statutory language allows the lien to attach to proceeds of a settlement “in whosoever hands they
may come;” it does not allow a claim against “whosoever hands they ever may have been,” as
Clark advocated. See Idaho Code § 3-205.
Finally, Clark’s assumption that, because Jones Gledhill shares counsel with Clark’s
former clients and the Spence Law Firm, Jones Gledhill has not been adversely affected is
without support in the record and, moreover, is a narrow and unsubstantiated interpretation of
whether Jones Gledhill was “adversely affected” by Clark’s frivolous filings. Jones Gledhill was
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forced to defend against Clark’s action and, therefore, was adversely affected. Moreover, at the
very least, naming well-respected attorneys and their law firm in a lawsuit and alleging
wrongdoing adversely affects their reputation. As the only other parties to this suit, Clark’s
frivolous filings and arguments necessarily adversely affects Jones Gledhill by virtue of
requiring a response.
Despite having numerous opportunities to show why this lawsuit was not frivolous, or
explain how a modification, extension, or reversal of existing law makes it not frivolous, Clark
has failed to do so. Accordingly, Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover attorney fees under § 12123.
IV.

Jones Gledhill is Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees Under § 12-120(3).
The “transaction” at issue for purposes of determining the propriety of a fee award under

§ 12-120(3) is the settlement of the lawsuit underlying Clark’s alleged lien. (See, Defendants’
Memo. at p. 11 (Noting “transaction” is interpreted broadly).) The commercial nature of the
transaction stems not from the claims made in that lawsuit but from the purposes for which the
parties to this action – Clark and Jones Gledhill – partook in that underlying transaction. In that
regard, Clark does not dispute that he represented his former clients for a commercial purpose (to
earn a contingency fee), or that Jones Gledhill defended their client for a commercial purpose (to
earn an hourly rate). As a result, both Clark and Jones Gledhill were involved in that transaction
for a commercial purpose, and that transaction gave rise to the instant suit. (See Defendants’
Memo. at p. 11 (There need not be a contract between Clark and Jones Gledhill to find a
commercial transaction exists.).) Put another way, a commercial transaction is the gravamen of
this matter because for both Clark and Jones Gledhill their legal representation in the underlying
suit was for a commercial purpose and that transaction is integral to their involvement in this
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case. If Clark did not represent his former clients, he could not assert a lien on their recovery; if
Jones Gledhill had not defended its client, Clark would not be attempting to recover against
Jones Gledhill as his former opposing counsel.
In opposition, Clark argues that because Forbush v. Sagecrest was a negligence action, it
was not a commercial transaction. (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 2.) This is a red herring in that it
serves to rebut only Clark’s errant interpretation of Jones Gledhill’s argument; Jones Gledhill is
not relying on the claims made between the parties in that lawsuit but is instead relying on the
commercial nature of Clark and Jones Gledhill’s involvement therein. Additionally, Clark
argues that “the gravamen of this case as pled is negligence for disregarding an attorney lien.”
(Id.) Clark’s argument is misplaced. The fact that a commercial transaction gives rise to a
negligence action does not remove it from the realm of a commercial transaction, and attorney
fees are still properly awardable:
It is true that the commercial transaction ground in I.C. § 12–120(3) neither
prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct,
nor does it require that there be a contract. Thus, as long as a commercial
transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party may be entitled to
attorney fees for claims that are fundamentally related to the commercial
transaction yet sound in tort.
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 755–56, 274 P.3d 1256, 1270–71 (2012) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, because a commercial transaction is integral to Clark collecting his alleged
attorney’s lien, a commercial transaction is the gravamen of this suit, and the prevailing party –
Jones Gledhill – is entitled to recover its attorney fees.
V.
Rule 54 of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Provides That Jones Gledhill Should
Recover All of Its Costs and Fees.
Clark concedes that Jones Gledhill is entitled to recover its matter-of-right costs. In
arguing against an award of discretionary fees Clark argues only that Jones Gledhill has
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established no basis for them. As outlined above, this case is exceptional (and, thus, warrants an
award of discretionary costs) precisely because it is frivolous, and Jones Gledhill is entitled to
recover its discretionary costs as a result.
Clark does not take issue with the rates charged by counsel for Jones Gledhill. Instead,
Clark ignores many of the factors appropriately considered in awarding fees here, focusing only
on 1) the time and labor expended and 2) the novelty and difficulty of the issues in the case.
Consequently, Clark argues that the amount of time spent defeating his lawsuit was excessive.
Yet, he offers few examples to demonstrate that this case “reeks” of “padding.” (Plaintiffs’
Memo., at pp. 7-8.) First he claims that double billing for the same work occurred on March 14,
15, 22, and 23, 2016. (Id., at p. 7.) On March 14, there was—at most—a .3 hour overlap
between any work performed by counsel for Jones Gledhill. (See August 2, 2016 Affidavit of
Amanda Brailsford, Ex. C at p. 1.) On March 15, two attorneys attended what is clearly the
initial client meeting for one hour each, for a total of two hours billed. (Id.) On March 22, two
attorneys spent .5 hours reviewing Clark’s amended complaint, for a total of 1 hour. (Id.) On
March 23, only one attorney billed any time. (Id.) Further, to the extent Clark complains about
hours spent researching and drafting Jones Gledhill’s motion to dismiss, he does so without any
particularity whatsoever, effectively preventing Jones Gledhill or this Court from specifically
rebutting his vague assertions. Nonetheless, drafting a successful motion to dismiss a $500,000
claim, on multiple legal theories, in roughly 30 hours is reasonable. Presumably, these are the
best examples Clark could identify of “attorneys drastically increas[ing] their hours well above
what they actually billed just because their party won.” (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 7.) Neither the
above-noted billing entries nor any others support Clark’s assertion.
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Additionally, Clark argues that the number of hours spent on this case, in general, were
excessive. Clark, however, sought $500,000 in damages and to recover his own attorney fees.
Disposing of Clark’s purportedly $500,000 lawsuit for approximately $35,000 is reasonable and
presents a very effective return on investment for time spent by Jones Gledhill’s counsel.
Indeed, if counsel for Jones Gledhill charged Clark’s hourly rate, fees would exceed $35,000.
Further, to the extent Clark claims this lawsuit consisted solely of a Rule 12(b) motion he is
mistaken, as he fails to mention that by virtue of his filings additional briefing relating to a
motion to strike and opposing his motion for judicial notice were required.
Finally, Clark complains (once again, in only general terms) that the hours spent on
briefing for Jones Gledhill’s fees and costs is unreasonable. (Plaintiffs’ Memo., at p. 8.) As the
Court is aware, the instant motion and its supporting memorandum required an assessment of all
positions taken by Clark in this action—a sizeable and difficult effort in its own right in light of
Clark’s briefing—as well as research into prevailing party status under Idaho law, and significant
research of three separate, complicated statutory bases for fee awards with many caveats and
exceptions. Moreover, although there is a straightforward argument for demonstrating the
frivolity of Clark’s arguments, special care in protecting Jones Gledhill’s interests was required
given Clark’s propensity for appealing decisions (as he has done here), which necessitated an
especially thorough approach and explanation of the various bases entitling Jones Gledhill to its
fees and costs.
Accordingly, Clark has failed to show that amounts billed by counsel for Jones Gledhill
are unreasonable. Instead, counsel for Jones Gledhill successfully defeated Clark’s claim for
over a half a million dollars and had his complaint dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the
amount of fees incurred are reasonable and should be awarded to Jones Gledhill.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Jones Gledhill’s instant motion should be granted for fees and
costs incurred in defending this lawsuit in the total amount of $35,987.59.

DATED this 7th day of September 2016.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC

By /s/ Amanda K. Brailsford
Amanda K. Brailsford
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of September 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
~ Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com

/s/ Amanda K. Brailsford
Amanda K. Brailsford
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Elyshia Holmes, Deputy Clerk

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,

Case No. CV OC–1604633
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION
TO DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

Judge Hoagland

Defendants.

COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby file their Reply Memorandum in support of their
Objection to Defendants’ Motion For Fees and Costs.
REPLY ARGUMENT
1. Perfected Lien? Jones Gledhill claims Clark’s claim was frivolous and without
foundation as he never obtained a perfected lien. However, Jones Gledhill ignored the
undisputed facts that Jones Gledhill knew in September 2015 that Clark was asserting a valid
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS’
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attorney lien based on his involvement in the Forbush v. Sagecrest Case as plaintiffs’ counsel for
nearly three years. Accordingly, Jones Gledhill knew Clark had a lien pursuant to statute on the
proceeds of the Forbush settlement with Anfinson Plumbing, Jones Gledhill’s client, as of
September 2015, which created Clark’s security interest in the proceeds.
Clark sent a letter to Jones Gledhill in September 2015 and requested that Jones Gledhill
place Clark’s name on the settlement check.1 Jones Gledhill never responded, never denied
Clark’s lien, and never denied Clark’s request to place his name on the settlement check.
Moreover, notwithstanding the notice of Clark’s lien, the facts establish that Jones Gledhill
concealed the settlement and amount from Clark which prevented Clark from proceeding to
judicially prefect his lien.
Based on the clear wording of I.C. § 3-205, an attorney lien, perfected or not, creates a
security interest in the proceeds of the lawsuit. While the Court ruled that one must obtain a
“perfected” lien to enforce the security interest, Clark’s interest nonetheless attached, pending
judicial resolution. If the security interest attached, but Clark had not yet perfected his lien, then
the proper course in this litigation was to dismiss without prejudice.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that an attorney’s lien is “equitable in nature.”
Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463, 466, 660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983). Accordingly, as the facts
indicate Jones Gledhill concealed the settlement and amount from Clark, despite knowledge of
his lien, equity would intervene to prevent Jones Gledhill from avoiding liability when it
interfered with Clark’s ability to perfect his lien. Accordingly, based on the facts presented, the
lack of a perfected lien should not have resulted in dismissal of this case.
1. There is no basis for attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-121. Clark cited to the
“abiding belief” standard as a basis for his objection to costs under I.C. § 12-121, which Jones
Gledhill ignores in its response brief. There is nothing in this record that should leave this Court
with an “abiding belief” Clark brought this case frivolously and without foundation. Clark raised
“fairly debatable” issues as to the liability of opposing counsel, which is also a “novel” legal
question. Clark also argued in good faith that it is inequitable to allow someone to avoid liability
under Idaho’s lien statute when they had knowledge of the lien, concealed facts, and thereby
1

See Exhibit 4 attached to the Declaration of Eric R. Clark filed in Opposition to Defendants Motion to
Dismiss.
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interfered with the attorney’s ability to perfect his lien. Once again Clark refers the Court to the
decisions in Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259, P.3d 608, 614 (2011), and Campbell v.
Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 652, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005) and requests the Court apply the
standards stated in those cases to deny the Defendants’ request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12121.
2. Consideration of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-123 is not properly before
the Court. I.C. § 12-123 requires a court to set an evidentiary hearing before considering
whether to impose sanctions. I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(i). Here Jones Gledhill filed its motion, but
never requested the Court set such a hearing. Clark filed his Objection to the Motion for Costs
and Attorney fees and has requested a hearing on his Objection. Currently, no evidentiary
hearing is set for the Court to consider this claim. Accordingly, as no proper hearing has been
set as required by I.C. § 12-123(2)(b)(i), this issue should not be considered as part of Clark’s
hearing on his Objection to attorney fees.
Additionally, as Clark argued previously, there is no factual basis on which to find the
type of conduct addressed in I.C. § 12-123 and the motion should be summarily denied on that
basis alone.
3. I.C. § 12-120(3) does not apply; JG’s “commercial transaction” analysis is
baseless. The language of I.C. § 12-120(3) does not address relationships that are so tangential
as to be meaningless. Here, Clark sued on a negligence claim based on Jones Gledhill’s conduct
related to Clark’s attorney lien. Jones Gledhill seems to argue that the Court must consider the
tangential relationships between Jones Gledhill and its clients and Clark and his former clients
each as “commercial transactions” and therefore those relationship are material here. However,
while citing to Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256, (2012), Jones Gledhill
ignores the scope of that ruling. The Supreme Court, discussing the breadth of I.C. § 12-120(3),
specified that the commercial transaction upon which a party seeks attorney fees must be “at the
center of the lawsuit,” not peripheral and involving persons or entities not parties to that suit.
“Thus, as long as a commercial transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party
may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are fundamentally related to the commercial
transaction yet sound in tort.” Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256,
1271 (2012). Here, the “commercial transactions” that Jones Gledhill cites are certainly not at
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the center of the lawsuit, and therefore are not relevant to any I.C. § 12-120(3) “commercial
transaction” analysis. As there is no applicable “transaction” where Clark and Jones Gledhill are
parties at the “center of the lawsuit,” then Jones Gledhill is not entitled to attorney fees according
to I.C. § 12-120(3).
Carrillo also provides an additional basis to deny attorney fees, even if any tangential
relationships are relevant. Carrillo involved personal injury claims arising from work that Boise
Tire had performed on the Carrillo’s vehicle. Although Boise Tire was negligent, Carrillo sought
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) and alleged when the Carrillo’s contracted for the work on
their vehicle that act and subsequent relationship constituted a “commercial transaction.” The
Carrillo Court rejected such an argument because the Carrillo’s had not entered into the contract
for any commercial purpose. “We today make clear that, in order for a transaction to be
commercial, each party to the transaction must enter the transaction for a commercial
purpose.” Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256, 1272 (2012).
(Emphasis added). Carrillo required the Court’s analysis must focus on the respective parties’
intent for the transaction.
For the transaction to satisfy the definition of a “commercial transaction,” each party to
the transaction must enter the transaction for a “commercial” purpose. Jones Gledhill ignores
this requirement in its briefs. Accordingly, for the Clark-Former Client “transaction” to be
“commercial” for purposes of I.C. § 120(3), both Clark and his former clients had to enter into
that transaction for a “commercial purpose.”
The reality, if the former clients actually pursued damages for wrongful death and
personal injuries for a commercial purpose, thereby creating a “commercial transaction,” which
Jones Gledhill’s Counsel2 now argues, then the damages former clients recovered are fully
taxable. Considering the $1,000,000.00 settlement figure and a deduction for attorney fees paid,
former client’s tax liability would be in the neighborhood of $240,000.00, if former clients want
to contend their recovery was based on a commercial transaction as it appears to be Counsel’s
argument.

2

Andersen Brailsford is also counsel for former clients and accordingly statements made by Counsel will be
construed as judicial admissions of the former clients.
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CONCLUSION
Once again, Clark respectfully requests the Court deny the Defendants’ Motion for Costs
and Attorney Fees. Clark did not act frivolously and without foundation or in any manner
warranting an award of attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-121 or for I.C. § 12-123 sanctions.
Moreover, I.C. § 12-120 does not apply by any tortured analysis of the facts. Finally, Jones
Gledhill exorbitant claim for over $35,000.00 in attorney fees, belies its argument that attorney
lien law in Idaho is settled and straightforward as is any resulting liability pursuant to I.C. § 3205. Accordingly, the Court must deny the entire request for attorney fees as unreasonable.
Jones Gledhill is entailed to costs limited to its filing fee, and that is all.
DATED this 12th day of August, 2016.

~ :. : /\ -U -L
___________________________________
Eric R. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, via I-Court
transmission and addressed as follows:
Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
Rachel A. Murphy (ISB No. 9349)
ram@ aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

___________________________________
Eric R. Clark
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D ~ H E R D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE HARDY
OEPUTV

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERIC R. CLARK, and CLARK &
ASSOCIATES, PPLC,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. CV-OC-2016-04633
vs.

JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Associate, William
Fuhrman, individually, and as an agent of
Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.; and
Christopher Graham, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS
AND ATTORNEY FEES

Defendants.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs, filed
through counsel on August 2, 2016.

On August 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to

Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs. A hearing was held on September 14, 2016, and the
Court took the matter under advisement. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion
for Fees and Costs is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The pertinent facts in this case were recited in the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Motion to Strike, Motion to Seal, and Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion for Judicial Notice,
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filed June 28, 2016. The Order, in part, addressed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all claims
against the Defendants in this case. The Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, because
Plaintiffs did not have a valid or enforceable attorney's lien applicable to the Defendants because
Plaintiff had not taken any affirmative adjudicatory action to perfect the lien. A final Judgment
was entered on July 20, 2016, dismissing with prejudice all of Plaintiffs' claims against
Defendants.

On August 2, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion for Fees and Costs, along with an Affidavit of
Amanda K. Brailsford and Memorandum in Support. On August 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an
Objection to Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs, along with a Declaration of Eric R. Clark
and Memorandum in Support (filed August 18, 2016). Defendants filed a Reply in Support of
Motion for Fees and Costs on September 7, 2016. A hearing was held on September 14, 2016.

ANALYSIS

Defendants seek $13 6 in costs as a matter of right, and $4 3 5. 09 in discretionary costs,1 together
with $35,416.50 in attorney fees, under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3), 12-121, and 12-123.
Defendants claimed a total of $35,987.59.

1) Costs

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(A) provides that '"costs are allowed as a matter of right to

1

Defendants claim $499.95 in costs in their Memorandum brief; however, the Affidavit asserts costs totaling
$571.09.
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the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." It is within the trial
court's discretion to determine which party to the action is the prevailing party. See I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(B); Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010). In
making the determination, the Court considers, "(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple
claims or issues between the parties; and (c) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on
each of the issues or claims." Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct.
App. 1983). Further, "the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall
view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Credit Suisse AG v. Teufel Nursery, Inc., 156 Idaho 189,
203,321 P.3d 739, 753 (2014) (citation omitted).

Defendants are the prevailing parties in this case, which is undisputed by the Plaintiffs. 2
Defendants are therefore entitled to costs as a matter of right under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(l)(C). 3 Defendants claim $136.00 in filing fees as costs as a matter of right.
Accordingly, the Court awards Defendants $136.00 in costs as a matter of right.

Defendants also claim discretionary costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l )(D). The
Court has discretion to add items of cost, or increase the amount of the costs allowed, "on a
showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in
the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).

2
3

Pis.' Mem. in Supp. of Objection to Defs.' Mot. for Fees and Costs, p. 8 (filed Aug. 18, 2016).
Plaintiffs do no dispute that Defendants are entitled to costs as a matter of right. See id.
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Defendants seek $93 .20 in print and copy expenses, $148. 75 for a copy of the transcript of the
June 3, 2016 hearing regarding the Motion to Dismiss, and $193.14 in Westlaw expenses.
Plaintiffs object to these discretionary costs, because they have "not established any basis" for
these costs. 4

Defendants claim the transcript was necessary and reasonable because Plaintiffs represented, in
their Motion to Reconsider, that Defendants' counsel stated something she did not in fact state in
the previous hearing:
During oral argument at the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss hearing, counsel for
the Defendants argued that others had handled the settlement funds and therefore
the pleadings were deficient because these other parties were not named. Clark
has added these parties in the second amended complaint. 5
But Defendants' counsel did not make that argument, and in fact, stated the opposite:
I hope the Court understands and I think it does that my argument is not that
Anfinson Plumbing and the insurance company should be added to this case.
They had no notice of the lien and my argument was the ridiculousness of the
interpretation of the statute such that [']in whosoever's hand the proceeds may
come['] can suddenly be a defendant[.]6
The Court can always listen to the audio record of a hearing (without charge), and a CD can be
obtained by counsel for just a few dollars.

The Court finds that Defendants' claimed discretionary costs were neither necessary nor
exceptional, particularly the transcript costs. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' claimed
discretionary costs.

4

Id.
Pis.' Mem. filed in Supp. Of Mot. For Reconsideration and Mot. To Amend Compl. P. 6 (filed June 13, 2016).
6
June 3, 2016 Hearing, Tr. p. 30, L. 20-25, p. 31, L. I.

5
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2) Attorney Fees

"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Defendants request attorney fees under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3),
12-121, and 12-123. Each statute will be addressed in turn.

a. Fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120{3)

Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides a basis for an award of attorney fees as follows:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.

The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
When this Section applies, an award of attorney fees is mandatory. Action Collection Servs.,
Inc., v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286,290, 192 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Ct. App. 2008). In order to determine

whether Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies to a given case, "[t]he critical test is whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must
be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover."
Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993). In Great Plains
Equipment, the Supreme Court stated there are
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[T]wo stages of analysis to determine whether a prevailing party could avail itself
of LC. § 12-120(3): (1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to
the claim; and (2) the commercial transaction must be the basis upon which
recovery is sought. It has long been held that the critical test is whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial
transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party
is attempting to recover. The commercial transaction must be an actual basis of
the complaint, that is, the lawsuit and the causes of action must be based on a
commercial transaction, not simply a situation that can be characterized as a
commercial transaction. To hold otherwise would be to convert the award of
attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to
a matter of right in virtually every lawsuit filled.
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). This language was echoed De Groot v. Standley
Trenching, Inc., which states:
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in
a civil action to recover on "any commercial transaction." Commercial
transactions are all transactions except for personal or household purposes.
Whether there is a commercial transaction is a question of law over which this
Court exercises free review. Where a party alleges the existence of a contractual
relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the
application of [LC. § 12-120(3) ] and a prevailing party may recover fees even
though no liability under a contract was established. This same principle applies
where the action is one to recover in a commercial transaction, regardless of the
proof that the commercial transaction alleged did, in fact, occur. Idaho courts will
consider whether the parties alleged the application of LC. § 12-120.
De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 157 Idaho 557, 338 P.3d 536, 546 (2014) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs initiated this action to recover on an alleged attorney's lien in a personal injury case.
Plaintiffs' alleged that Defendants (who were the opposing counsel in the underlying case)
negligently failed to protect Plaintiffs' lien. First, Plaintiffs had no valid lien. Second, this was
no commercial transaction. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) requires a commercial transaction as the
gravamen of the case. Plaintiffs and Defendants were opposing counsel in the underlying case.
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There was no commercial transaction between them. Neither did the underlying case involve a
commercial transaction.

It was a personal injury case.

Accordingly, the Court finds that

Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).

b. Fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 123

Attorney fees may only be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121 when the Court "finds that the
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation[.]"
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2).

Under Idaho Code§ 12-123, attorney fees, as sanctions for frivolous conduct in a civil case, may
only be awarded after giving notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether
particular conduct was frivolous. The Court then must determine "if the conduct was frivolous,
whether any party was adversely affected by the conduct if it is found to be frivolous, and ...
determine if an award is to be made, the amount of that award." LC.§ 12-123(2)(b)(iii).

Defendants cite Idaho Military Historical Society Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d 1072
(2014), in support of their assertion that this case was frivolous and attorney fees are appropriate
under Idaho Code § 12-121. In that case, an owner of an airplane sued a company that was
storing the airplane after the storage company refused to release possession of it. Id. at 626, 329
P.3d at 1074. The storage company "filed a claim of lien with the FAA seeking compensation
for claimed storage and maintenance expenses they incurred on the airplane." Id. The storage
company filed a counterclaim based on the lien it had filed. Id. The District Court found that the
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lien "failed to satisfy the requirements of statute." Id. at 631, 329 P.3d at 1079. The storage
company's claim to an interest in the plane was frivolous, because there was no evidence that it
was entitled to compensation. Id.

In this case, the Court determined Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief as a matter of law, because
the alleged attorney lien had not been perfected. Plaintiffs argued, under Idaho Code § 3-205,
that the suit was proper against these Defendants, because the settlement check went through
their hands.

But Plaintiffs disregarded established case law finding that the failure to take

affirmative adjudicative steps to perfect an attorney's lien renders the claimed lien
unenforceable. Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463,466,660 P.2d 928, 931 (1983) ("The equitable
source of the claimed charging lien necessitates that an attorney take affirmative steps in an
adjudicative process to perfect and reduce his lien to a judgment or order of the court."). If
Plaintiff had perfected the lien through an affirmative adjudicatory process in the underlying
action, then Defendants would have had to protect Plaintiffs' interest, as required by Idaho Code
§ 3-205. Plaintiffs did not argue a new or novel interpretation of Idaho Code§ 3-205, nor argue

that the law should be extended or modified.

Plaintiffs "novel legal question" merely argued

that the Court should ignore established precedent, which it has declined to do.

Moreover, in correspondence before this suit was filed, Plaintiffs were specifically warned by
Defendants that the claim failed based on Idaho case law. 7

Furthermore, Plaintiffs' took action that increased the cost of litigation by filing documents that
were under seal in another case but were not sealed in this case. Defendants responded by filing
1

See Brailsford Aff. Ex. A (filed Aug. 2, 2016).
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a Motion to Seal in this case, which the Court granted. And ultimately, the documents did not
add anything to the Plaintiffs' case anyhow.

The Court does not find that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith or with malicious intent in pursuing this
case. However, there was no legal basis for Plaintiffs' claim, of which Plaintiffs' were fully
aware before filing suit, and then Plaintiffs also unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation.

Therefore, the Court finds and concludes that Plaintiffs brought and pursued this case
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation and Defendants are entitled to an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. The Court further finds that Defendants Motion for
attorney fees Idaho Code§ 12-123, is moot in light of the finding above.

"The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court." Bott v.
Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 128 Idaho 580, 592, 917 P.2d 737, 749 (1996). "When awarding

attorney's fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)
and may consider any other factor that the court deems appropriate." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145
Idaho 746, 749-50, 185 P.3d 258, 261--62 (2008) (citation omitted). "Rule 54(e)(3) does not
require the district court to make specific findings in the record, only to consider the stated
factors in determining the amount of the fees. When considering the factors, courts need not
demonstrate how they employed any of those factors in reaching an award amount." Smith v.
Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 902, 104 P.3d 367,376 (2004).
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Exhibit C to the Brailsford Affidavit contains the detailed accounting of time and services
provided. Defendants claim a total of about 152 attorney hours at rates from $205 to $250, for a
total claim of $35,416.50 in attorney fees. Defendants claim about 77 hours on the Motion to
Dismiss. Defendants claim about 54 hours on the Motion for Fees and Costs. The issues in each
of these motions were not particularly novel or difficult. The amount of time and labor claimed
seems unreasonable and excessive for these issues. Exhibit C contains numerous large blocks of
time with little explanation of what actual work was done in those large spans of time. Many of
the descriptions are duplicative and indistinct. As such, Defendants have not provided sufficient
information to find that all of the time claimed was reasonable. See Sun Valley Potato Growers,
Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 86 P.3d 475 (2004) (award of attorney fees vacated

where prevailing party did not provide the trial court with sufficient information from which to
determine the reasonableness of the amount claimed).

In summary, the court finds that the information provided is insufficient to show that all the
amounts claimed are reasonable, and indeed the amount claimed appears excessive and
unreasonable considering the lack of novelty or difficulty of the issues and what would normally
be a reasonable amount of time and labor required on the issues presented.

Therefore, when considering all the factors outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3),
including, but not necessarily limited to the matters identified above, the Court concludes that the
amount claimed was reasonable for at least $26,250.00 of attorney work performed on the case,
and that the Defendants are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees of $26,250.00 under
Idaho Code § 12-121.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the above and foregoing, Defendants are awarded $136.00 in costs as a matter of
right, no discretionary costs, and $26,250.00 in attorney fees, for a total of $26,386.00.

Defendants will submit an Amended Judgment consistent with the above for the Court's
signature.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 1J1h day of October, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
th

I hereby certify that on this 17 day of October, 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy
of the within instrument to:

Mr. Eric Clark, Esq.
Clark & Associates, PLLC
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com
Ms. Amanda Brailsford, Esq.
Andersen Schwartzman Woodard Brailsford, PLLC
101 South Capital Blvd. Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
akb@aswblaw.com
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Signed: 10/21/2016 11:06 AM

FILED By: --=-=i:..------ff---- Deputy C erk
Fourth Judicial Dist rict, A.da County

CHRISTOPH ER D. RICH, Cle rk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV-OC-2016-04633

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,

AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.
2. Defendants are awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $136.00, and
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $26,250.00.

DATED this

day of

Signed: 10/20/2016 08:49 AM

2016.

SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND
District Judge
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CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 10/21/2016 11:07 AM

I hereby certify that on this

day of

2016, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES,
ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D
X
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com

Amanda Brailsford
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendants

D
D
D
D
X
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 342-4455
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
Email: akb@aswblaw.com

Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

By
Deputy Court Clerk
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CERTFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of October 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
cg] Email via iCourt:
eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com

/s/ Amanda K. Brailsford
Amanda K. Brailsford
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Electronically Filed
11/7/2016 10:44:30 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

ERIC R. CLARK, Esq.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616
(208) 830-8084
Fax: (208) 939-7136
Idaho State Bar No. 4697
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark & Associates,
PLLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. CV OC–1604633
PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED NOTICE OF
APPEAL

JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants-Respondents.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., AN IDAHO PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION; WILLIAM FUHRMAN,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A.; AND CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN AGENT OF JONES
GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY, P.A., AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. In addition to the prior Notice of Appeal designating the Judgment entered July 20,
2016, the Plaintiffs also appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Amended Judgment entered
October 20, 2016, a copy of which is attached.
2. Appellants hereby appeal as a matter of right to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
above-referenced Judgments according to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1).
3. ISSUES ON APPEAL: In addition to the issues the Appellants identified previously,
the Appellants also raise the following issues:
(i)

Whether the District Court erred when it awarded attorney fees below according

to I.C. § 12-121, notwithstanding the claim involved fairly debatable issues regarding the
interpretation of Idaho’s Attorney Lien Statute, and the case presented novel legal issues that
have never factually been addressed by any appellate court in Idaho?
(ii)

Whether the Appellants are entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal?

4. The Appellants have a right to appeal since the Judgment described in paragraph 1
above is an appealable order or judgment as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1).
5. Appellants do not request the preparation of any transcript.
6. In addition to the documents previously requested, the Appellants request a scanned
copy of the clerk's record to include the following documents in addition to those automatically
included under Idaho Appellate Rule 28:
08/02/2016

Defendants’ Motion For Costs and Attorney Fees

08/02/2016

Affidavit

08/02/2016

Memorandum of Costs

08/15/2016

Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendants’ Motion For Fees And Costs

08/15/2016

Plaintiffs’ Declaration in opposition to Motion for Costs and Attorney
Fees

08/18/2016

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in opposition to Motion for Costs and Attorney
Fees

09/07/2016

Defendants’ Reply Memorandum

09/12/2016

Reply Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs’ Objection To Defendants’
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10/18/2016

Motion For Fees And Costs
Memorandum Decision

10/21/2016

Amended Judgment

7. No Exhibits are requested.
8. I hereby certify that:
(a) a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court Reporters if
required,
(b) the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript of the hearings noted
above has been paid;
(c) the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid;
(d) the appellate filing has been paid; and
(e) service of this notice has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 or 20.1.
DATED this 7th day of November, 2016.

~ :. : ~ U .. L
___________________________________
Eric R. Clark
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of November, 2016, I filed the foregoing
document electronically through the Idaho iCourt e-filing system which caused the following
parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected on the Notice of
Electronic filing:
Steven B. Andersen
Amanda K. Brailsford
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702

___________________________________
Eric R. Clark
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Signed: 10/21/2016 11:06 AM

FILED By: --=-=i:..------ff---- Deputy C erk
Fourth Judicial Dist rict, A.da County

CHRISTOPH ER D. RICH, Cle rk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV-OC-2016-04633

Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,

AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.
2. Defendants are awarded costs as a matter of right in the amount of $136.00, and
reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $26,250.00.

DATED this

day of

Signed: 10/20/2016 08:49 AM

2016.

SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND
District Judge
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CLERK’S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 10/21/2016 11:07 AM

I hereby certify that on this

day of

2016, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES,
ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D
X
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
Email: eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com

Amanda Brailsford
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Defendants

D
D
D
D
X
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 342-4455
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
Email: akb@aswblaw.com

Christopher Rich
Clerk of the District Court

By
Deputy Court Clerk
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CERTFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of October 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
cg] Email via iCourt:
eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com

/s/ Amanda K. Brailsford
Amanda K. Brailsford
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Electronically Filed
11/17/2016 3:51 :31 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Katie Holden, Deputy Clerk

Steven B. Andersen (ISB No. 2618)
sba@aswblaw.com
Amanda K. Brailsford (ISB No. 4819)
akb@aswblaw.com
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: 208.342.4411
Facsimile: 208.342.4455

Attorneys for Defendants Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.,
William Fuhrman, and Christopher Graham
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Eric R. CLARK, and Clark &
Associates, PLLC,

Case No. CV-OC-1604633
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A., an Idaho Professional Association;
William Fuhrman, individually, and as an
agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and Christopher Graham, individually,
and as an agent of Jones Gledhilll Fuhrman
Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
COURT

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 1
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled
proceeding hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in
the reporter's transcript or the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the
I.A.R. and the Plaintiffs' November 7, 2016 Amended Notice of Appeal.
1.

Clerk's Record:
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to Strike Clark's Declaration and Recitation of
Facts, filed May 6, 2016.

2.

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the district court and

upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, including Appellants.

DATED this 17th day of November 2016.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD BRAILSFORD, PLLC

By

Isl Amanda K. Brailsford
Amanda K. Brailsford
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 17th day of November 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Eric R. Clark
CLARK & AS SOCIATES, ATTORNEYS
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, Idaho 83816
Attorney for Plaintiffs

D
D
D
D

U.S.Mail
Facsimile (208) 939-7136
Hand Delivery
FedEx Overnight Delivery
[8J Email via iCourt:
eclark@ericrclarkattorney.com

Isl Amanda K. Brailsford
Amanda K. Brailsford
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERIC R. CLARK, and CLARK &
ASSOCIATES, PLLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 44477
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P .A, an Idaho Professional Association;
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM,
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants-Respondents.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record:
1. Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed
May 4, 2016.
2. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Filed in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed
May 4, 2016.
3. Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice and
Opposition to Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss to Strike Clark's Declaration and
Recitation of Facts;" and "Former Client's Motion to Seal Documents Containing
Information Protected by Attorney-Client Privileged or Work Product Doctrine, filed
May 9, 2016.
4. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint, filed June 13, 2016.
5. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Amend
Complaint, filed June 13, 2016.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

000230

6. Declaration of Eric R. Clark Filed in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and
Motion to Amend Complaint, filed June 13, 2016.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 18th day of November, 2016.

'. ',

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERIC R. CLARK, and CLARK &
ASSOCIATES, PLLC,

Supreme Court Case No. 44477
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A, an Idaho Professional Association;
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM,
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
ERIC R. CLARK

AMANDA K. BRAILSFORD

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

EAGLE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

NOV 1 S 2016

Date of Service: - - - - - - - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERIC R. CLARK, and CLARK &
ASSOCIATES, PLLC,

Supreme Court Case No. 44477
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN GOURLEY,
P.A, an Idaho Professional Association;
WILLIAM FUHRMAN, individually, and as
an agent of Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,
P.A.; and CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM,
individually, and as an agent of Jones Gledhill
Fuhrman and Gourley, P.A.,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
31st day of August, 2016; and the Amended Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
7th day of November, 2016.
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